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Abstract
Two teams in a large American software company were designed to interact in an in-
teresting way: the rst team (called Application) wrote the code that customers used; the
second team (called Platform) wrote the code that the Application team used. Application
depended on Platform in order to complete their tasks on a daily basis, but Platform did not
depend on Application. A case study of the two teams revealed evidence of a power imbal-
ance and intergroup con ict. e data indicated that the dependent (Application) perceived
this intergroup con ict, while Platform did not; that Platform failed to prioritize Applica-
tion’s requested work; and that Application expected Platform to ”do things” for them, while
Platform expected Application to ”refrain from doing things” to them. It was argued that
the differences found in perception, prioritization, and expectation where, in part, the result
of the asymmetric dependence itself.
e case study was used to generate questions about the effects of task-dependence on
interpersonal work relationships. e management, social psychology, and behavioural eco-
nomics literature was unclear and contradictory about how task-dependence would affect
helping behaviour. Situational affordances and Heider’s balance theory were used to explain
how task-dependence and expectations impel helping behaviour between coworkers. e
approach recognizes that there are individual dispositional and motivational explanations
for helpful behaviour, but these explanations can be improved with a situational perspective
which accounts for the force of social expectations.
e theoretical model was tested using an experimental card-game. e card-game was
designed so that the task would remain the same while three factors of task-dependence were
manipulated: level of dependence (low vs. high), mutuality of dependence (asymmetric vs.
symmetric), and reward interdependence (individual vs. group). e goal was to isolate these
aspects of task-dependence and measure their effect on helpful behaviours and intragroup
con ict. e results indicated that as the level (the amount) of dependence increases, the
amount of intragroup con ict increases, but so does the number of helpful behaviours. As
the mutuality of dependence changes from asymmetric to symmetric, the number of helpful
behaviours increases, but the intragroup con ict decreases.
e experiment deepens the ndings of the case study: asymmetric dependence is asso-
ciated with intragroup con ict and it presents a situation where the more powerful of the
two is less inclined to give help to their dependent. Unexpectedly, however, if the level of
the dependence increases, the more powerful of the two will offer more help. ese nd-
ings contradict the predictions of social exchange theory, interdependence theory, and the
power and in uence approaches. Balance theory offers an explanation: a request for help
coming from a co-worker in great need creates an imbalanced cognitive situation, one with
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more tension than the situation created when a request comes from someone less depen-
dent. One way the help-giver can relieve their cognitive tension is to offer help; helping a
co-worker satis es the co-worker’s expectations, thereby balancing the help-giver’s cognitive
situation. e experiment also demonstrated that a high level of task-dependence is necessary
for helpful behaviours to increase; without the ability and opportunity to help afforded by
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A large software company recently split one of its product teams in two. e team had grown
from 25 people to 300 in two and half years, and in order to manage the growing complex-
ity they were separated, moved into different buildings, and placed under different general
managers. e two teams were then considered separate entities, with different reporting,
measurement and reward structures. e restructuring may have solved the immediate man-
agement issues, but there was one problem: the two teams still worked intimately on a single
product.
e general managers tried to split the teams intelligently. Upper management in this
company are seasoned software developers and company veterans, and they split the teams
based on accepted software engineering principles (Parnas 1972). One team was responsible
for the customer-facing code (the “Application”), and the other team was responsible for the
invisible server-side code (the “Platform”). Application depended on Platform for their code
to work on a daily basis, yet Platform did not depend on Application for their day-to-day
work. e teams were designed to be asymmetrically dependent in order to minimize the
impact of changes, which is known as modularization, information hiding, or a separation
of concerns. In short, if something on the Application changed, the Platform group didn’t
need to know about it. is enabled the two groups to work as independently as possible,
which allowed them to develop the product concurrently with a minimum number of critical
dependencies.
A proper separation of concerns is considered to be the foundation of good software
engineering practice (Larman 2002). But is it good social engineering practice? Asymmetric
relationships are rife with problems, including con ict, anxiety, threats, coercion, insecurity,
and mistrust (Kelley et al. 2003, p. 257). e Application team reported some of these
problems. ey noted that Platform had the ability and power to determine whether or
not Application features were developed on time and under budget. One Application team
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member highlighted the imbalance, “I feel like they lose sight of the fact on how much they
affect us. So I think that it’s quite clear that we’re dependent on what they’re building, but I
think they forget that we’re as dependent on it as we are.” Another member also noticed the
asymmetry, “We’re consuming their stuff, we’re not really giving them anything. So there’s
nothing that they really need from us or want from us. We want stuff from them and we
expect stuff from them.”
Overall, Application viewed their relationship with Platform negatively, reporting a high
number of unhelpful behaviours from Platform. Platform on the other hand perceived their
relationship to be more balanced, reporting a relatively even number of helpful and unhelpful
behaviours. Underlying their interactions was an inter-group con ict, pernicious in its effect
and a deep concern for the company’s management. An Application team member described
the con ict: “Honestly, it’s been a real struggle working the Platform team, that’s been one
of the biggest problems we have.” Another noted, “So, I think that everyone is aware that
there is a lot of tension between our two teams. At least I de nitely see it on the Application
side.”
Can these problems be attributed entirely to the individuals and the idiosyncracies of
a high-tech company’s intense development schedule? Or can some of the problems be a
consequence of the way that the teams were designed to interact? To what extent can the
behaviours and con ict be caused by the structure of the task-relationship itself? In other
words, if a company designs teams to be asymmetrically dependent, should they be surprised
if they nd con ict, regardless of the individuals involved?
Asymmetric dependence has been found to result in a number of negative consequences
in the context of interpersonal relationships, but there is a lack of understanding of how
asymmetry effects work teams in organizations. is dissertation attempts to create a mul-
tidisciplinary understanding of how asymmetric dependence could in uence helpful be-
haviours and con ict between task-related individuals. Organizational approaches, such as
those found in organizational citizenship behaviour, role theory, social norms, and social ex-
change theory, are compared with social psychological approaches, such a interdependence
theory and work on power and in uence. I also discuss recent research in behavioural eco-
nomics, which helps deepen our understanding of the organizational and social psycholog-
ical ndings. I found that the results from empirical research and the hypotheses derived
from theoretical work offer contradictory explanations for how task-dependence in uences
behaviour.
In an effort to clarify and explain these apparent contradictions, a new approach is pre-
sented combining situational affordances (Gibson 1977; Reis 2008) and balance theory (Hei-
der 1946, 1958). e approach proposes that task-dependence is a situation that affords
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more helping behaviour, and it is a situation that causes the help-receiver to increase their
expectations for help. ose expectations create tension within the help-giver and give rise to
forces acting on the help-giver to behave accordingly. ose forces, and the conditions under
which they act to produce helping behaviour, are explained by Heider’s balance theory. An
experiment is developed to test the theory and resolve the current inconsistent hypotheses
and ndings in the literature. e experiment combines aspects from social psychological ex-
periments with those of behavioural economics experiments. e results are encouraging and
help explain and deepen the ndings from the case study. e theory and results also help
explain recent ndings in behavioural economics which have demonstrated that expectations
alone are enough to encourage prosocial behaviour.
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Chapter 2
Case Study: Some effects of asymmetric
interdependence between software teams
e case study presented in this chapter served as the inspiration and motivation for the
theory and experiment portions of this dissertation. e dissertation’s topic, the effects of
interdependence on behaviour, was only realized during the analysis stage of a previous study.
at previous study investigated the coordination mechanisms used between two software
development groups. e current case study, on the other hand, was focused on the inter-
personal relationships between those two groups. is chapter provides a background on the
circumstances of the rst study and presents the results of the current study.
Two groups from a large software company were interviewed over a three month period in
the summer of 2007. Like most software teams, the two groups had problems coordinating
their work. But the data indicated that at least some of these problems may have been due
to how the software teams had been arranged in the organization. e rst team had been
designed to depend on the second team, and the second had been designed to not depend on
the rst. e organization had set up a one-way dependency, also known as an asymmetric
interdependency.
In the case study that follows, I have presented evidence that it was this asymmetric in-
terdependency that in uenced the way the two teams interacted. I have argued that the
asymmetry partially in uenced the teams to perceive their interaction very differently, to
prioritize their work differently, and to expect different types of behaviour from the other
team. In order to understand why and how the organization placed the teams in an asym-
metric interdependence, the rst section provides a short background on how software teams
manage their dependencies.
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2.1 Dependencies in software development
Software engineers build systems larger than a single person can handle alone, but to do
so they need to somehow split the system into smaller parts. Once they’ve split the system
into parts, they need to coordinate the actions of those parts (system-level) and the actions
of the people who are building those parts (social-level). In software engineering, system-
level interactions are referred to as dependencies, so- called because the functioning of one
component depends on the functioning of another.
Understanding the dependencies between components in a project is important, because
when a component is changed, often those components that depend on it must also be
changed. In extreme cases changes in one component often will break the components that
depend on it. is matrix of dependencies is not unlike that which exists in mechanical sys-
tems, where components that physically interface must be coordinated during design to t
properly (Sosa et al. 2004). Indeed some software engineering experts have argued that soft-
ware systems are the most complicated and interconnected systems ever built by man, partly
because software has fewer physical constraints which allows more complicated dependency
networks (Brooks 1995).
e software engineering community has traditionally viewed dependencies between
components as the most pernicious problem of software engineering. Even introductory
software engineering textbooks focus on methods to cleanly encapsulate functionality (mod-
ularization), often using an object metaphor (see for example, Larman 2002; Martin 2003).
Writers outside of the software eld have also recognized that the same principles are at work
in wider organizational design; Baldwin and Clark (2000) argue from the strategic manage-
ment perspective that modularization encapsulates complexity and hides design decisions
behind standardized interfaces.
e emergence of formal “design patterns” was an attempt to codify and communicate
software design knowledge, and these focused almost exclusively on ways to cleanly separate
and isolate components (Gamma et al. 1995). At their core, design patterns are well-known
ways to maximize “separation of concerns,” so that a change in one component has minimal
impact on those that depend upon it (Parnas 1972). e most difficult of all dependencies
are cyclical, where a section of component A depends on a section of component B which
depends on a different section of component A. ese are known as cyclical dependencies,
and many design patterns are devoted to breaking them (for example, see the Dependency
Inversion Principle Martin 2003, pp. 127-135).
It is understood in the software industry that however well one might initially design a
system, the initial decomposition is difficult, and even the best designers cannot anticipate
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all of lines of interaction that may be required in the future. e result is informal and unan-
ticipated interaction between groups which were not speci cally designed to interact (Olson
and Teasley 1996; Grinter et al. 1999). And although they may have not been designed to
interact, researchers have found that teams tend to be organized along the lines of the compo-
nents that they build, either intentionally or unintentionally (Conway 1968; Herbsleb and
Grinter 1999a,b; Cataldo et al. 2008). For example, Team A takes responsibility for compo-
nent A, and Team B takes responsible for component B. erefore if component A depends
on component B for its functionality, Team A’s work depends on Team B’s work.
Since much of software design is devoted to reducing the impact of dependencies, and
designers try to avoid cyclical dependencies like buried mines, it is common to organize teams
so that Team A’s work is sent to Team B. Ideally, Team B does not send its work output back
to Team A. If the designers have done their job correctly, changes are propagated from A to B,
but not from B to A. In this situation, B depends on A for aspects of their functionality, but A
does not depend on B for any of theirs. is is referred to as an asymmetric interdependency,
or a one-way dependency, and it is ideal from a software engineering point of view.
e case study reported in this chapter describes a real world software project, within
which two teams were designed to be asymmetrically interdependent. Using qualitative in-
terview data, I present evidence that the asymmetry may have caused a difference in how the
two teams perceived their interactions, how they prioritized each other’s requests for help,
and a difference in what they expected of the other group. is hypothesis-generating study
was exploratory in nature and stimulated by unexpected ndings, and as such the data can-
not support any de nitive conclusions (Gersick 1988). Rather, the case study presents the
empirical impetus for the theory development in Chapter 4 and the experiment study in
Chapter 5.
2.2 Background of the Study
e case study presented in this chapter grew out of a qualitative study conducted over a
summer internship at a large software company in the United States. e “Company” is one
of the world’s largest software developers with expertise and top products in almost every
major software market. I was hired as a summer intern at the Company’s research and devel-
opment division. e research group I was hired into had a unique goal among the dozens of
other groups in the R&D division. e group was trying to understand how programmers
worked together to develop large software systems, a eld which is now known as the “human
aspects of software development.” With a deeper understanding of these human aspects the
group would develop new software tools to help programmers work more effectively, and
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ultimately those tools would reach the commercial marketplace.
With this study the group wanted to understand how a software team following the
Agile software development methodology would coordinate their work with a team following
a more traditional waterfall methodology. However the group could not nd any teams
who were both following a strict form of Agile software development and who were open to
participating in a research study.
e group eventually did nd a team that was willing to participate in the study. eir de-
velopment methodology was a hybrid of agile and waterfall: they worked on plan-development-
test cycles of 6 to 8 weeks, but they did so within the larger constraint of a plan-development-
test cycle of one year for their overall project.1 is team was the “Application” side of a
large internet product which provided web services for small businesses. e product offered
a light and easy to use alternative to large enterprize resource management (ERP) systems,
combined with services found in turnkey web ecommerce systems. e service provided cen-
tralized and web-accessible versions of an enterprize mail server, a document management
and sharing system, an online store, order processing system, easy to use online advertising,
and so forth. e Application team was responsible for all the customer-facing code; if the
customer could read it, click on it, or use it, the Application team was the one responsible
for how it looked and the functions it performed.
In order for the Application team’s program to function they needed a set of back-end
software, which included databases, networking code, and all of the customized software
that allowed documents and mail to be shared, orders to be processed, and advertising to be
tracked. e “Platform” team provided this functionality.
e two main groups have been labeled Application and Platform, labels which confer
a dependent-dependee relationship on the groups. An application depends on its platform
for implementation; the platform has very little dependency on its application, other than
a very high-level group goal of “success,” which is far removed from having an impact on
day-to-day interactions. e groups were labeled this way not to bias the discussion of their
relationship, but rather as descriptive of their interactions. eir actual group names give no
hint to their dependent relationship. In their working relationship, however, the two groups
are highly asymmetric. e Application group consumes the entire output of the Platform
group, and the Platform group consumes no output of the Application group. At the time
of the study another group had recently started to develop a second application on top of
1e differences between “waterfall” and “Agile” software development methodologies are contentious and
often super cial; most differences are due to how long an iteration lasts. An iteration is de ned a closed loop
of planning the functionality, development that functionality, and testing that functionality—hence the term
“plan-development-test cycle.” Teams labeled waterfall have iterations that last from six months to multiple
years. Teams labeled Agile try to keep iterations between two weeks to two months. See Martin (2003),
Boehm and Turner (2004), and Larman (2005) for comprehensive overviews on the Agile vs. waterfall debate.
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the platform, which further increased the asymmetry; Application was then not even the sole
consumer of Platform’s services.
After meeting the Application team, the research group shifted its focus from Agile soft-
ware development to coordination. e group was interested in nding out how these two
teams kept each other up to date on the progress of their software, the changes that oc-
curred, their future plans, and all the minutiae which allowed the two team’s software to
work together—this is what is meant by the term “coordination” in software development.
e study’s focus shifted to understanding which physical and software artifacts they used to
maintain awareness of what other the other team and team members were doing. e study
was to determine the mechanisms that the teams used to coordinate their work, and then
build new or improved versions of those mechanisms. e research group decided that the
best way to investigate this problem was through qualitative interviews.
e interviews were coded and a number of different categories were identi ed that repre-
sented helpful behaviours and unhelpful behaviours related to coordination. ese categories
were used as the basis for a survey sent to a random sample of 2500 technical employees of
the Company, from which 775 responses were gathered.
e detailed results of the analysis and survey related to coordination mechanisms is not
presented here, as coordination mechanisms are not the focus of this dissertation. However,
as an example, we found that developers used a bug tracking system “ProjectStudio” to send
notes and reminders to each other. A developer would le a “bug” against another developer
that said, “remember that I need feature A’s interface speci cation by Friday.” is bug would
appear on the target developer’s computer acting as a reminder of something they needed to
do. From a software engineering standpoint, and particularly a tool-building standpoint, this
was interesting because the software developers were using a coding tool (the bug tracker) for
communication. at type of communication “should” have happened through email, a
public wiki, a public whiteboard, or some other communication tool.
During the end of the interview analysis I noted an unexpected problem between the
teams. It was clear that the two teams had problems communicating with each other and
deciding on how to t their two halves of the software project together. is was not a
new nding, as it has been long known that inter-team coordination is a difficult aspect of
large-scale software development (Weinberg 1971; Curtis et al. 1988; Brooks 1995; Kraut
and Streeter 1995). As mentioned before, it is considered good software engineering prac-
tice to modularize and separate concerns, such that components are not placed in circular
dependencies. Good software engineering practice would expect Application to depend on
Platform’s output, and Platform to be relatively independent of Application. It was unex-
pected, however, that this asymmetric interdependence would have a social cost attached to
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it, a cost that that would affect the team’s ability to work together.
e following questions inspired a reanalysis of the interview data: Does the asymmetric
interdependence between teams affect their ability to get their work done? In what way? e
following analysis attempted answer these questions.
2.3 e Company’s Organization
e simpli ed organizational chart for the Internet Product Group (IPG) is given in Fig-
ure 2.1.2 At the time of the study, the product team was 3 years old and had grown to
300 employees from its initial 25. Product groups in the Company are overseen by Corpo-
rate Vice Presidents (CVP) but are lead on a daily basis by General Managers (GM). GMs
oversee the work of their three Group Leads. A Group Lead acts as a Lead and oversees the
work of the other Leads within their role. Technical employees at the Company fall into
three distinct roles: Developers (Devs), Developers in Test (Tests), and Program Managers
(PMs). A Dev Lead, Test Lead or PM Lead manages other members of the same role. Until
this point the product groups are arranged as a functional organization. Individual product
features are handled through a matrix-style system. Features are owned and developed by
cross-functional teams called Feature Crews, consisting of a PM, Dev and Test, who act as
peers. A PM prioritizes the features that will go into the software, and writes the high-level
feature speci cation that Devs and Tests will use for their work. A Dev is responsible for
software design, writing new features and xing bugs. Tests translate feature speci cations
into test cases and test the software. e Company typically promotes technical people to
management roles, so that most CVPs, GMs, and group leads are former Devs, Tests, and
PMs.
e right side of the organization chart diagrams the portion of the Company’s India
development office that was allocated to IPG’s product. Having a small portion of the IPG
product developed overseas caused a tremendous amount of coordination difficulty. But
the interview data gathered from these offices were not used because their team was not
involved in the main Application-Platform interaction. Likewise, there was a section of the
Application group located in Boston, but data from those interviews was not used. It was
found in the interviews that the Boston group’s location was a dominant feature of their
interactions with the rest of the IPG group, and issues of location overshadowed those positive
or negative effects that may have been attributable to the asymmetric interaction with the
Platform group.













































Figure 2.1: Official organization chart (simpli ed)
2.3.1 e task-related social network
At the start of the previous year’s iteration, the IPG GMs decided on a list of features to imple-
ment. e features were assigned to the group responsible for them (Application or Platform)
and work began. Once a particular feature had been sufficiently speci ed and prioritized it
was assigned to a feature crew. e feature crew (a PM, Dev, and Test) worked on the piece
of functionality together. Asked to draw a graph of their interactions, PMs, Devs and Tests
would invariably list the members of their feature crew rst. e second most frequent inter-
actions were with members of other feature crews in their respective group (e.g., Application
PMs, Devs and Tests would interact with other Application PMs, Devs and Tests, and Plat-
form PMs, Devs and Tests would interact with other Platform PMs, Devs and Tests). eir
third most common interactions were with members of the opposite group (e.g., Applica-
tion PMs, Devs and Tests would interact with Platform PMs, Devs, and Tests). e forth
most common interactions were with outside stakeholders, such as subsidiary companies or
partners that were providing a service or consuming one of the IPG’s services.
e Company organized its product group members as a functional organization, but
in practice the IPG group followed a matrix organization. Adding to the complication, the
IPG was split into Application and Platform groups, placed under different GMs, and the
Platform group was moved to a neighbouring building (due to a lack of office space). e
separation was more than physical; the Platform group was now in charge of all the software
components that the Application needed for their code to work. e interview data illustrates
the difficulty that the two teams encountered after the split.
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2.4 Method and Participants
is study was conducted during three months, June through August 2007, and consisted
of 31 one-hour interviews with 26 members of the IPG. e interviews followed a formal
semi-structured “Echo Method” designed by Bavelas (1942). e method has recently been
used in studies of organizations to examine task interactions in new product development
(Duimering et al. 2006; Safayeni et al. 2008), task structures of engineers (Safayeni et al.
1992), and manufacturing exibility (Scala et al. 2006). e method elicits the subject’s
social network of task-based interactions, where the subject is the middle “node” and nodes on
the outside represent the individuals, groups or technologies with whom the subject interacts
while doing his or her job. Echo questions are then used to examine interactions between the
subject and each of the identi ed nodes. e subject is asked to provide concrete examples
of behaviours performed by other nodes that are helpful from the subject’s point of view, and
examples of behaviours that are not helpful. e exact format of the question was, “When
you interact with this person/group/technology, can you give examples of things they do that
help you complete your job? How does this impact your job?” To elicit unhelpful behaviours
the question was rephrased as, “When you interact with this person/group/technology, can
you give examples of things they do that do not help you complete your job? How does this
impact your job?”
By asking for speci c examples of positive and negative behaviours, subjects are encour-
aged to provide descriptive information about concrete events experienced on the job, rather
than ungrounded opinions or stereotypes about others. e questions are speci cally de-
signed to limit subjective biases. An additional bene t of this method is that past behaviours
are remembered in the context of the subject’s task. is adds ecological validity to the be-
haviours, because they are recalled due to the signi cant task-related impact the behaviour
had on the subject’s work (Freeman et al. 1987).
In total, 26 subjects were interviewed: 13 from the Application group (6 PMs, 5 Devs,
2 Tests), 7 from the Platform group (5 PMs, 2 Devs), 3 from Boston (2 PMs, 1 Dev), and
3 from India (2 PMs, 1 Dev). Interviews were face-to-face, with the exception of Boston
and India, which were done over the phone. Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed
verbatim, for a total of 460 pages of single-spaced text. e transcripts were used as the basis
for this analysis.
Transcripts were coded in a four-pass process. e unit of analysis was a helpful or un-
helpful behaviour that had actually occurred and affected the subject’s task from their point
of view. e coding categories emerged during the coding process in a manner similar to
that described by Strauss and Corbin (Strauss and Corbin 1998). at is, previous similar
codes were revisited and revised in the light of recent codes, and speci c behaviours were
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grouped under broader categories of behaviours which emerged from the data. e rst two
passes coded and revised the codes for behaviours relating to coordination (the focus of the
original study). e third pass recoded the data with respect to the focus of the current study,
the differences in perceptions, prioritization, and expectations between the Application and
Platform group. A forth pass re ned these codes in light of the codes from the third pass.
e results of the interviews are best understood as a social network of role interactions
(Safayeni et al. 2008). I will present the data from two of the role interactions, the Application
PM (AppPM) — Platform PM (PlatPM) interaction, and the Application Dev (AppDev) —
Platform PM (PlatPM) interaction. I chose to focus the analysis on these interactions because
they represented the main Application — Platform interaction, and because interviews were
conducted with both roles involved in the interaction.
2.4.1 Limitations of a case study
ere are signi cant limitations to performing a selected sampling of interactions in a single
product group in a single company. is is a small sample and not intended to be gen-
eralizable to interactions in other software projects, even within the Company. ese are
behaviours that happened in this organization, this group, and in this speci c context . e
data is intended to provide evidence that such interactions have occurred in this situation,
and through this data one can generate hypotheses for future investigation (Gersick 1988;
Charmaz 2006).
In particular, however, this case study suffers from two more practical limitations: the
original study was not focused on asymmetry in interdependence, and the samples were
unbalanced. First, the original interviews were targeted to elicit data about inter-team co-
ordination, coordination mechanisms, and ways in which software teams might be better
able to coordinate through the use of new software tools or physical reorganization. As such,
the issue of asymmetric interdependencies was never explicitly asked of the participants; the
data used in the current case study was gathered from example behaviours relating to the rst
study’s topic. e consequence of this limitation is the low number of behaviours reported
in some interactions (for example, see Table 2.2). Two, it was difficult to get a symmetri-
cal sampling of participants from the Application and Platform groups. ere was a hard
time limit for the original study and we ran into difficulty scheduling interviews with pro-
grammers (these interviews took place near the end of a product cycle, “crunch time”). As
a result, much of the interview time was spent on non echo questions related speci cally to
coordination mechanisms, there are more Application members interviewed than Platform,
and overall fewer interviews than would be ideal.
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2.4.2 Point of view and aggregating behaviour
e interview data contains behaviours which were reported by a particular subject. at
subject is reporting a behaviour from their Point of View (POV). From their POV they are
reporting a “Sender” role’s behaviour (so called because the behaviours were “sent” to the
subject in the past). By gathering POV data from multiple people in the same role with
respect to another role, the data becomes richer and more reliable. e behaviours can then
be aggregated based on the POV role. For example, if there were three Application PMs
interviewed, and they identi ed Platform PM as a signi cant interaction and gave example
behaviours performed by the Platform PMs, summing those behaviours would give an overall
view of the Application PM — Platform PM “link” from the POV of the Application PM
role. e term “link” is used to describe an interaction between two roles.
An overall measure of the effectiveness of an interaction can be computed by taking the
behaviours reported by subjects from a particular role, and summing the number of helpful
behaviours and dividing by the number of unhelpful behaviours from a particular Sender role.
is is referred to as the link’s Interaction Effectiveness (IE) from that POV role (Safayeni
et al. 2008). It is then possible to compare the differences in one group’s perceptions of the
other by comparing the IE ratios. For example, with a link between A and B, A—B: from
A’s POV the IE is 1.5, and from B’s POV the IE is 0.7. In this case the evidence indicates
that A perceives B to be more helpful, and B perceives A to be less helpful.
A bene t of this measure is that it is a ratio, so that if there are ve subjects from role A,
but three from role B, the IE’s are still comparable as a measure of the role’s perception of
the other role. A limitation of unbalanced samples is that, as usual, reliability increases as the
number of the subjects in a POV increase.
In order to give a transparent view of the interview data, behaviours are aggregated by
category and by number of helpful versus unhelpful. For each behaviour category cited I will
give the percentage of subjects in that role who mentioned the behaviour (N=x%), and the
number of times a unique behaviour was coded into that category (freq=y). Also for trans-
parency, when possible the subject’s own words are used to describe the behaviour category.
e subject responsible for the quote is identi ed in brackets after the quote. For the most




Overall, I found the interaction between Application and Platform to be difficult and lled
with tension. In Application’s own words:
Honestly, it’s been a real struggle working the Platform team, that’s been one of
the biggest problems we have. [AppPM6]
[e issue] was de nitely escalated and I think that there is de nitely some ten-
sion at the higher levels as well. So, I think that everyone is aware that there
is a lot of tension between our two teams. At least I de nitely see it on the
Application side. [AppPM2]
Two subjects mentioned asymmetry in their interview. One Platform PM noted that
some of the bad interactions may be because his group is a platform, and one Application
PM explicitly mentioned that the dependent-dependee relationship may be an underlying
cause:
We’re consuming their stuff, we’re not really giving them anything. So there’s
nothing that they really need from us or want from us. We want stuff from them
and we expect stuff from them. [AppPM3]
2.5.1 Analysis of AppPM—PlatPM link
POV Role N Sum
AppPM Helpful Behaviors 4 4
Unhelpful Behaviors 6 31
Interaction Effectiveness 0.13
PlatPM Helpful Behaviors 3 9
Unhelpful Behaviors 2 8
Interaction Effectiveness 1.13
Table 2.1: Number of helpful and unhelpful behaviours from the other role, from each role’s point of view
(POV) (“N” is number of unique interview subjects, “sum” is number of unique behaviours within each cate-
gory)
e overall summary in Table 2.1 shows that the interaction is perceived to be worse
by AppPM: AppPM perceives an IE of 0.13, and PlatPM perceives an IE of 1.13. e
following sections describe the behaviours reported from each point of view, both helpful
and unhelpful.
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AppPM’s POV: PlatPM Unhelpful Behaviors
Behavior: Our critical dependency was not seen as a priority by them [PlatPM] (N = 100%, freq =
10).
Example comments:
I feel like they lose sight of the fact on how much they affect us. So I think that
it’s quite clear that we’re dependent on what they’re building, but I think they
forget that we’re as dependent on it as we are. . .ey think it’s no big deal on
our side, when in fact is is a big deal, from a resource and timing perspective.
[AppPM6]
Maybe they just don’t think it’s important. But they do a very, very poor job
of communicating what the problem is or where I fall in their prioritization.
[AppPM3]
It’s hard for me to understand how they prioritize things. I know I’ve talked
this over with [my manager], and he de nitely doesn’t think that they prioritize
things very well, and I de nitely would have to agree. ey seem to waste a lot
of time, and I don’t—it’s hard for me to put myself in their shoes because I don’t
understand why they’re doing it. I just don’t know. [AppPM2]
is behaviour affects AppPM’s ability to complete their tasks, meet crucial deadlines,
and plan their schedules. For example, because the Platform group didn’t perceive Applica-
tion’s tasks as priorities, they didn’t “consume” their code rst to test if it did what it was
supposed to do. As a result:
It didn’t have any functionality and it didn’t have the ability to easily add that
functionality. So, we basically ended up creating a very large work item for them
at the very end of our development cycle, and all of our developers were stalled
waiting for them, and it was a huge problem. [AppPM2]
is behaviour so affects AppPMs that they start to perceive other behaviours in terms of
how it affects their priorities, even when such behaviours may have been the result of other
factors:
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e person in charge of specifying the feature, he was a contractor who has left
for six months. So, it seems like if I was going to develop a feature that a bunch
of other people would rely on — or if I was a manager and I was looking at all
the people to assign to a feature, I would de nitely not assign the feature that
everyone relied on to the person who was going to leave.
But I think even if he stayed, he still speci ed the feature badly. I mean, you
look at this feature and every PM expected it to have the same functionality. It
had no functionality. [AppPM2]
From AppPM2’s point of view, the feature did not receive the consideration and work it
deserved, and this AppPM perceives the cause to be a lack priority on the part of PlatPM.
is perception caused another AppPM to decide that a contract was needed between the
two groups:
So maybe spelling it out a little bit more, almost like a customer service contract
between the [Platform] and [Application] PMs would be a more explicit way of
making sure everybody’s on the same page, and it might have made a couple of
my interactions a little bit better. [AppPM3]
e data indicates that the AppPMs feel powerless, they are unable to control or affect
how their work gets prioritized by the Platform group. e AppPM’s perception is changed
by their extreme dependence on Platform group, to the point where mistakes are seen as
just another symptom of, “It’s a lack of prioritization, a lack of thinking that it’s important.”
[AppPM6]
is behaviour is so prevalent in this role (N=100%) and across roles (see Section 2.5.2)
that it is described as a central characteristic of the asymmetric interdependence (differences
in priorities, Section 2.6.2). Also observed in this behaviour is the characteristic of differences
in perception (Section 2.6.1). is behaviour overlaps with most of the unhelpful behaviours
from the AppPM’s point of view, to the extent that the other behaviours could be understood
as symptoms of the underlying cause of lack of prioritization.
Behavior: It is difficult to get PlatPM to do what we need them to do (N = 100%, freq = 8).
Example Comments:
You have to present a very strong case and it’s always difficult when you say,
‘Hey, you guys should do this. It would make our job a lot easier.’ It’s just—it’s
a difficult ask unless you can say, ‘Well, this is how it bene ts you.’ [AppPM4]
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We basically said, ‘is is what we need, wouldn’t it be great if someone like you
developed it and made it extensible so other features could use it?’ . . . It’s just
they de nitely didn’t see it as a high priority, and it’s de nitely not on their list
of features that they want to get out the door. [AppPM2]
is behaviour directly affects the AppPM’s ability to complete their tasks and plan their
product features. Many of Application’s plans are contingent on functionality provided by
Platform. us, if any of the current functionality gets bumped, delayed, or cut, it directly
affects AppPM’s current work. Similarly, if any planned Platform features are changed, it
affects AppPM’s plans, schedules, and the commitments they’ve made to other groups, such
as marketing.
A consequence of this behaviour is that the Application group is forced to take on work
that, from a architecture design point of view, should be part of Platform’s responsibility. For
example:
I feel like in general Application has to work around Platform. Like they just
won’t do something for us, and we’ll say, “Fine,” and we’ll do it on our own, and
share it amongst our little feature group. [AppPM2]
ey thought that building [the feature] database would be a low more work and
they only wanted to build a [more simple] database that got them to complete
their task circles or priorities. ey didn’t want to do stuff to help us make it a
better [feature] is kind of what it comes down to. [AppPM3]
Platform is responsible for components that Application relies on complete their tasks.
e data suggests that a consequence of this division of responsibilities is that Application
often requires Platform to make changes and add functionality that Platform does not per-
ceive as important. In this case, Platform has its own goals and responsibilities that are met
regardless of whether or not Application gets its request ful lled. Platform is content with a
component that does x, while Application needs a component that does x + y. As a conse-
quence, AppPMs nd it difficult to get their features included into Platform’s plans, which
affects their ability to deliver their part of the product on time, under budget, and with the
desired features.
is behaviour is closely related to the problem of priorities; if the Platform group highly
prioritized Application’s work items, they likely wouldn’t have as much trouble getting Plat-
form to do as they needed. It is a highly signi cant behaviour, and a central characteristic
17
of the asymmetric interdependence, included as part of the differences in priorities (Sec-
tion 2.6.2).
Also closely related, and a possible consequence of this behaviour, is the Hot Potato
behaviour.
Behaviour: Hot Potato features (N = 50%, freq = 7).
Example Comments:
But all the bugs were coming over to us and it’s been a little bit back and forth,
and then they decided they didn’t want to do anything in [the last version], so
[the feature] came back to us, but now it’s going back to the Platform team.
It’s just one of these hot potatoes that nobody wants to deal with. But it really,
logically belongs under their charter. [AppPM3]
Ultimately it wasn’t prioritized as a feature in [next version]. So they budgeted
zero for improvements in [next version] even though they owned [the feature’s]
UI and [the feature’s] database. . .Management said ‘[Platform] can’t do this,
they’re not staffed to deal with this at all. Give it back to [Application] because
they know more about it, presumably, because they owned it in [last version].
And then we’ll move it back to [Platform] [next version].
So that’s kind of why it’s gone back and forth so many times, and I’m cynical
enough at this point to believe that post [next version] they won’t own it. at
they will not take the responsibility to own it. [AppPM3]
e result of features being bounced around is con ict between the teams and confusion.
Con ict emerged in this situation in part due to the problem of feature ownership. A PM
reported:
And the [Platform] PM came in and being the strong PM that he is, he started
tracking it for both their team and then also my part, so that sort of in the end
made me feel like my work was cheapened a little bit. . . I didn’t know how much
I should do, so because of that, it led to ambiguity. It led to a few delays and it
didn’t turn out as well as I wanted it to and it’s because of this ownership thing.
[AppPM4]
is situation resulted in confusion and difficulty for Application. An AppPM reported
situations in which they didn’t know who owned what, or didn’t understand how the own-
ership was determined:
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It’s hard to, one, delineate where the ownership line lies, and, two, it’s redundant
to have two people on two separate teams own the same thing, so when that’s the
case then one owner needs to be decided, and how that’s done is very arbitrary.
[AppPM4]
is confusion led to time wasted while nding and negotiating responsibilities. [AppPM2]
A Hot Potato refers to situations in which Platform should logically own a feature, to
keep with the architectural design of the product and how the groups have been split. How-
ever, Platform doesn’t need it, use it, want it, or build it in a way that is useful for Applica-
tion. When Platform stops work on a feature, Application is forced to take ownership, even
though it is Platform that logically should own and drive it. is overlaps with the priorities
behaviour mentioned above.
In essence, because Application is so critically dependent on Platform, Platform makes
decisions that affect Application. Application is left without recourse. Taking ownership
of the feature in dispute xes the problem. Other possible options are a customer service
agreement [AppPM3], or escalation up the management chain to solve disputes [AppPM2]
(see Section 2.5.1 for AppPM’s point of view on escalation).
Behavior: ey don’t communicate well with us about our dependencies (N = 33%, freq =
5).
Typically what happens is the Platform team, because they own all these features
they don’t communicate them well enough to us, if they’re making a change to
how provisioning works, or how the content systems work, they don’t do a good
job of communicating that to us [AppPM6].
is behaviour is similar to the previous Hot Potato behaviour; both involve the depen-
dent (Application) not receiving the level of care and helpful behaviour they expect from the
team that they depend upon (Platform). e same solutions apply to both the Hot Potato
and lack of communication behaviours.
AppPM’s POV: PlatPM Helpful Behaviors
Behaviours: Responsive to my emails about my dependencies (N = 33%, freq = 2). It’s
easier to get what we need from Platform compared to external teams (N = 16%, freq = 1).
Status meetings are helpful, but I only go when I need something (N = 16%, freq = 1).
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e data indicates that with respect to its dependencies, the AppPMs perceive far more
unhelpful than helpful behaviours, indicating a very poor relationship from their point of
view. Two PMs reported that of the PlatPMs they interact with, only two are helpful over
email. e two PlatPMs respond quickly and put the AppPM in touch with their depen-
dency. An AppPM notes that even though the relationship is difficult with PlatPM, it is still
“easier to get what we need from Platform compared to external teams” [AppPM3].
e comment that “status meetings are helpful, but I only go when I need something”
[AppPM4] is echoed by an PlatPM as an unhelpful behaviour (see Section 2.5.1).
PlatPM’s POV: AppPM Unhelpful Behaviors
Behaviors: Sometimes they don’t show up to status meetings, so we can’t help them out (N =
25%, freq = 1). ey changed their requirements (N = 25%, freq = 1). Maintaining com-
munication is difficult (N = 25%, freq = 3). ey have trouble conforming to my scenarios
(N = 25%, freq = 2). Sometimes they don’t show up to status meetings, so we can’t help them
out (N = 25%, freq = 1). It’s tough to balance my needs with theirs (N − 25%, freq = 1).
Example Comment:
ere’s a little bit of tension in my thinking of two things—I’d like to interact
more with them so that I know the direction they are taking so that we can build
the right things on the platform. On the other side, is that the best value for me
or should I just focus on the platform and the interaction we are having is good
enough? So I don’t know the answer to that. [PlatPM1]
e example quote indicates that the PlatPM is being pulled between their own group’s
goals and tasks and Application’s tasks. PlatPM1 recognizes that Application is indeed wholly
dependent on Platform, and that this recognition affects how the PM tries to balance his work
load.
Platform PMs mentioned that there are so many AppPMs depending on them that they
lose track of who they need to speak with:
ere were some follow-ups, but it wasn’t as tight as I hoped it would have
been. . . I wish that there was more pulling of information from their side instead
of me pushing information and status updates to them. . .e one thing, and it’s
the nature of the platform–partner interaction, I wish that they would do more
of the tracking on the status rather than I going to them. I wish that there was
more pulling of information from their side instead of me pushing information
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and status updates to them. But then again I guess that’s just the nature of the
platform. [PlatPM2]
e Platform PM described situations in the past that illustrate the effects of an asym-
metric interdependence; Application is wholly dependent of Platform, and when Platform
changes, so does Application:
We need to make changes on the platform and we need the apps they’ve already
coded to be updated to act accordingly to the new feature of the platform. is
requires a lot more interaction because at that point it’s me setting those scenarios
and asking them to conform to it. [PlatPM2]
e Platform PM realizes that they are the ones controlling the situation, so much so that
two of their unhelpful behaviours are: 1) maintaining communication is difficult because
there are too many people depending on them to keep track of, and 2) AppPMs don’t follow
my scenarios close enough.
Platform PM’s expectations about their role and the appropriate behaviour for Applica-
tion PMs is one of the main sources of con ict between the two teams and a central charac-
teristic of their asymmetric interdependence (differences in expectations, Section 2.6.3).
PlatPM’s POV: AppPM Helpful Behaviors
Behaviour: Everything is ne with their group (N = 25%, freq = 1). eir requirements
are clear and formal (N = 50%, freq = 4). ey follow up to remind me of their dependency
(N = 50%, freq = 2). ey accommodate our needs by cutting their functionality (N =
25%, freq = 1). ey don’t escalate unnecessarily (N = 25%, freq = 1).
e data indicates that from the Platform PM’s point of view the relationship is not
as bad as the interviews with the AppPMs indicated. For example, PlatPM4 perceives the
relationship to be ne:
We have our status meeting where we sync up [with AppPMs] . . .ey’re good
about asking questions in email. ey [his subordinate PlatPMs and the AppPMs]
are comfortable with each other [PlatPM4].
From the PlatPM’s point of view, all AppPM behaviours considered helpful relate to
being good dependents. at is, clear and formal requirements allow PlatPMs to keep the
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relationship regulated, formal and tracked: “e characteristic of good requests from Ap-
plication is that it’s more formal and there is a contract” [PlatPM1]. It is helpful when the
dependent reminds them of their dependency because, “sometimes you’re so busy with mul-
tiple things, it helps if they ping you” [PlatPM1]. It is helpful when a dependent, “tries to
understand what our constraints are and not escalate unnecessarily” [PlatPM2].
e data indicates that the Platform PMs view the relationship to be one where it is
helpful when the dependent makes the compromises, and accommodates the PlatPM’s pre-
ferred method of work. e differences in how the two sides view the interaction and expect
the other to act is a main characteristic of their asymmetric interdependence (differences in
expectations, see Section 2.6.3).
2.5.2 AppDev—PlatPM link
POV Role N Sum
AppDev Helpful Behaviors 1 4
Unhelpful Behaviors 2 7
Interaction Effectiveness 0.57
PlatPM Helpful Behaviors 1 1
Unhelpful Behaviors 1 1
Interaction Effectiveness 1.00
Table 2.2: Number of helpful and unhelpful behaviours from the other role, from each role’s point of view
(POV) (“N” is number of unique interview subjects, “sum” is number of unique behaviours within each cate-
gory)
e summary of the AppDev — PlatPM link in Table 2.2 shows that the interaction is
worse from the point of view of the AppDevs: AppDevs perceive an IE of 0.57, and PlatPMs
perceive an IE of 1. e following sections describe the behaviours reported from each point
of view, both helpful and unhelpful.
AppDev’s POV: PlatPM Unhelpful Behaviors
Behavior: Hot potato features/negotiating responsibility (N = 33%, freq = 4).
Example:
Application and Platform were originally one team. . .ere are some features
that land in the middle . . . one or the other teams should take responsibility
fully and take over. [AppDev1]
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Behavior: Our critical dependency was not seen as a priority (N = 33%, freq = 1). Can’t
get good communication from them regarding my dependency (N = 66%, freq = 2). Difficult
to sync up our requirements with their plans (N = 33%, freq = 1).
e behaviours reported by AppDevs are extremely similar to those reported by AppPMs.
e impact is similar as well; Platform behaviours cause signi cant changes to Application’s
task situation. For example:
So, we’re totally broken because the old thing doesn’t work anymore and the
new thing isn’t done yet. [AppDev1]
If your deadline is at the end of this week, and then there’s suddenly a change
where you need to add 3 days of extra work. ere is no room to move that
deadline, because there are cascading affects downwards. We can’t afford to
postpone the deadline. It will extremely impact work-life balance. [AppDev2]
e rst three behaviours are the same as reported by PMs. With Developers, the be-
haviour is slightly more speci c to code dependencies, but the impact and meaning of the
behaviours remain the same. As with AppPM, AppDevs perceive it to be very difficult to get
their requests handled by Platform PMs. One of the choices to handle this dependency is to
take over the code, but, “we can’t really do anything with it, because it’s in their code base or
it is half in their code base and half in ours.” [AppDev1] e behaviours in this interaction
indicate that in splitting up the two groups, the organization has placed many constraints on
the ability of Application to control the code that they depend upon.
AppDev’s POV: PlatPM Helpful Behaviors
Behaviors: ey let let us know the status of our dependencies (N = 33%, freq = 1). We
can provide feedback on what they’re going to do (N = 33%, freq = 2).
Example:
One thing I think they’re doing a good job of is that they publish the important
design documents to us as well. We get a chance to provide feedback or at least
get a heads up on what they’re going to do . . .ey also communicated how
things are going to be carried out in the schedule. [AppDev1]
Two relevant ndings from this interaction are the relative lack of helpful interactions
compared to unhelpful from AppDev’s point of view, and the language that AppDev uses to
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describe helpful behaviours from PlatPM. e data indicates that the AppDevs are completely
dependent upon the Platform team, to the extent that they nd it helpful that the Platform
team “at least” gives them a heads up on what they are “going to do” [my emphasis]. is
gives further indication that in this product group the Application team depends heavily on
the Platform team, which results in behaviours characteristic of asymmetric interdependence
(differences in expectations, Section 2.6.3).
PlatPM’s POV: AppDev Unhelpful Behaviors
Behaviors: Difficult to manage so many dependencies (N = 25%, freq = 1).
e interaction there is a little harder because it’s not a one-to-one basis . . .When
I have to do this it’s usually from me to a bunch of Application PMs, and Devs.
at one is really hard, I don’t know how to make it easier yet, because there
isn’t a single person to follow up with.
is behaviour is similar to the unhelpful behaviour “Maintaining communication is
difficult” mentioned by Platform PMs in Section 2.5.1. Similarly here, the issue is that
there are too many people depending on PlatPM, and PlatPM has trouble keeping everyone
updated.
PlatPM’s POV: AppDev Helpful Behaviors
Behaviors: eir communication is formal (N=100%, freq=1).
Bugs are really helpful, because they’re in the database . . . you have that bug on
your plate and there’s a lot of governance around bugs in [the Company] in
general. So that’s a good thing if it’s a bug [PlatPM1].
is behaviour is the similar to the helpful behaviour “eir requirements are clear and
formal” reported by Platform PM (Section 2.5.1). PlatPM considers it helpful when AppDev
is a good dependent. e data indicates that the Platform PMs view the relationship to be
one where it is helpful when the dependent makes the compromises and accommodates their
preferred method of work. Contrasted with the behaviours that AppPM and AppDev nd
Helpful, the behaviour is an example of an underlying characteristic of asymmetric interde-
pendence (differences in expectations, Section 2.6.3).
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2.6 Analysis: Characteristics of Asymmetric Interdependence
e previous data was presented as evidence to argue that there was a signi cant and task-
related asymmetric interdependence between the Application and Platform groups. e data
indicates that the manner in which the two teams were split introduced a heavy dependence
between the two teams; Application was designed to depend on the Platform team’s work, and
the Platform team was designed to be independent from the Application team. e results
of the qualitative analysis will be drawn on to present three arguments: 1) the Application
and Platform groups perceive their interaction differently; 2) the Application and Platform
groups have different priorities and prioritize requests from the other group differently; and
3) the Application and Platform group have different expectations as to what constitutes
helpful or proper behaviour from the other group. e data will be used to argue that these
differences are due, at least in part, to the asymmetric interdependence that was set up by
the Company, in order to conform to standard and accepted software engineering practices.
Setting the two groups into a situation in which one is dependent on the other, yet the other
is not dependent in any task-related way on the rst, creates an asymmetry which may cause
a difference in perceptions, priorities and expectations. e following three sections will
present the argument and the evidence drawn from the analysis in Section 2.5.
2.6.1 Perceptions are different
A group’s perceptions refers to the overall number of helpful and unhelpful behaviours be-
haviours reported by all individuals in that group. e total helpful and unhelpful behaviours
give a clear and simple high-level summary of how each group perceives the other. Informa-
tion is unavoidably lost when summing helpful and unhelpful behaviours, however a group’s
perceptions are an overall indication of how well the relationship is working from their point
of view. Differences would indicate a lopsided experience of the interaction.
When behaviours are summed a clear picture of the difference in perceptions between
the groups emerges. Figure 2.2 displays the percentage breakdown of helpful and unhelpful
behaviours as reported by each group. e Application group perceives far more unhelpful
behaviours (83%) than helpful behaviours (17%), compared to the Platform group which
perceives a more balanced number of unhelpful (47%) and helpful (53%) behaviours.
A link-by-link breakdown of the overall differences in perceptions provides a more de-
tailed view of how the groups perceive each other (Figure 2.3). e AppPM’s perception
of the AppPM–PlatPM link is particularly negative with only 11% helpful behaviours and
89% unhelpful. e AppDev’s perception of the AppDev–PlatPM link is slightly more bal-



















Figure 2.2: Percent of behaviours reported to be helpful vs. unhelpful by group
perceptions of the exact same interaction: PlatPM’s perceive their interaction with AppPM
to be relatively balanced with 53% helpful beahviours and 47% unhelpful, and view their
interaction with AppDev’s as balanced with 50% helpful and 50% behaviours. Although
it should be noted that the sample size for the PlatPM’s perceptions is smaller than the
AppPM’s (3 PlatPM’s interviewed vs. 6 AppPM’s), and almost insigni cantly small for the
AppDev–AppPM interaction (1 PlatPM interviews vs. 2 AppDev’s). is was an unavoid-
able consequence of this study being a reanalysis of data collected for an previous unrelated
study (see Section 2.4.1).
e overall difference in perception help to quantify the qualitative ndings presented in
the results section above. Application PMs and Devs reported that Platform PMs and Devs
don’t realize that what they do has such a great effect. To be clear, Application does affect
Platform’s higher level outcomes; if an Application feature crew is late on a feature it would
affect the entire product group’s ability to complete their product in time. Such a feedback
would occur at the end of the product development timeline, which lasts one year. ere are
many ways in which the delay from an Application feature can be absorbed before it leads
to a delay in the entire project, and thus impact Platform. A Platform feature crew, on the
other hand, need only be late one day before it impacts an Application team. Such a delay
directly affects an Application team because they depend on Platform’s output directly. An
AppPM summarizes the the problem:
I feel like they lose sight of the fact on how much they affect us. So I think that
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Figure 2.3: Percent of behaviours reported to be helpful vs. unhelpful by link
forget that we’re as dependent on it as we are. . .ey think it’s no big deal on
our side, when in fact is is a big deal, from a resource and timing perspective.
[AppPM6]
Previous research on the effects of asymmetry on trust have proposed that as dependence
increases, so does power. de Jong et al. (2007) cite Rusbult and Van Lange (2003): “the
concepts of dependence and power are inextricably related, in that to the extent that one
person (A) is relatively more dependent, the other (B) is relatively more powerful” (p. 355).
de Jong et al. (2007) use work from psychology on power and attention to argue that “power
disadvantages tend to focus the attention of the less powerful individual on the behavior of
the more powerful individual” (p. 1627). In contrast, “people in power . . . do not need to
pay attention, . . . and they may not be personally motivated to pay attention” (Fiske 1993,
p. 621). ere is no explanation given for the difference in attention.
Whether or not it is true that Platform has power over Application, Application appears to
be more closely attuned to the behaviours of Platform. is may simply be because Platform’s
behaviour has such an impact on Application’s ability to complete their task. It also appears
from the data that Application perceives far more negative behaviours than positive from
Platform. e nding may be an artifact of recall, that behaviours that constrain a task
are easier to pinpoint and remember, and behaviours that lift constraints or allow a task to
continue are assumed to be part of the ways things should be. It could also be an example
of a broader “theme” of asymmetric interdependencies which Agar (1980) found in a study
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of interpersonal relationships: informants in a subordinate position expressed more negative
affect toward the dominant member (p. 40). I believe the rst is more plausible in the work
situation studied.
In summary, it appears that the Application group perceives their relationship to be far
more unhelpful than the Platform group. is perception is at least partly due to the way
in which the two groups have been designed to work together: Platform was designed to
be the foundation on which Application builds its products. According to proper software
engineering guidelines, and accepted rules of design, Platform’s code affected Application,
but Application’s code did not affect Platform. An asymmetric interdependence was set up
which caused Application to perceive the behaviours of Platform differently; Application
PMs and Devs focused their attention on unhelpful things that Platform had done to them
in the past.
2.6.2 Priorities are different
Software engineers in the Application group believed that the amount of work an employee
could complete was a nite resource. In order to get someone to do what you wanted them
to do, you needed to move that work item higher on their priority list. If an Application PM
was able to move a work item higher on a Platform PM or Dev’s list, they had done their
job well. If an AppPM could not move an item higher on the list, they tended to attribute
the problem to a difference in priorities. An Application Program Manager explains the
importance:
It’s a question of priorities. It always comes down to priorities. You can move
the earth if you prioritize it high enough, that’s why in WWII they made the
atom bomb in two years. e single most important thing that I do is prioritize
— I help my team, my partners, etc. [AppPM3]
e data suggests that the Application group attributed a number of behaviours directly
to a difference in priorities, whereas the Platform group mentioned behaviours that only tan-
gentially related to priorities. e most substantial unhelpful behaviour reported by AppPM
was, “Our critical dependency was not seen as a priority by them,” reported 10 times by ve
different AppPMs. An AppPM explained one particular instance:
e person in charge of specifying the feature, he was a contractor who has left
for six months. So, it seems like if I was going to develop a feature that a bunch
of other people would rely on — or if I was a manager and I was looking at all
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the people to assign to a feature, I would de nitely not assign the feature that
everyone relied on to the person who was going to leave. [AppPM2]
e second most important unhelpful behaviour reported by AppPMs was, “It is difficult
to get PlatPM to do what we need them to do,” which was reported eight times by all six
AppPMs. An AppPM explains a speci c difficulty:
You have to present a very strong case and it’s always difficult when you say,
‘Hey, you guys should do this. It would make our job a lot easier.’ It’s just—it’s
a difficult ask unless you can say, ‘Well, this is how it bene ts you.’ [AppPM4]
e unhelpful behaviours, “Hot Potato features,” and “ey don’t communicate well with
us about our dependencies,” were the third and forth most important unhelpful behaviours re-
ported by AppPMs (reported seven times by three AppPMs, and six times by two AppPMs,
respectively). ese behaviours also relate to priorities from the AppPM’s point of view:
“hot potato features” are a failure of the Platform group to assign a high priority to features
that the Application group value, and a failure to “communicate well about our dependen-
cies” indicates that the Platform group does not think these dependencies are as vital as the
Application group thinks they are.
From the Platform group’s point of view, one unhelpful behaviour was related to priori-
ties, “It’s tough to balance my needs with theirs,” which was reported once by one PlatPM. is
PM realized that the Application group’s needs were con icting with their needs, and they
had to nd a place on their priority list that would balance the two.
e data indicates that the Application group focuses heavily on Application priorities
while the Platform group does not. is is understandable, in that the Platform group is
concerned with their own work rst. But wouldn’t the Platform group be concerned with
Application group’s priorities, given that the Application group was building the end product,
the part of the Internet Product Group’s (IPG) system that the customer interacted with? To
understand the dynamic we need to examine how the two groups viewed each other and each
other’s place within the IPG.
Application viewed themselves as the end result of the entire Internet Product Group. It
was the Application’s work that determined the look of the Internet Product, the product’s
feel, and the product’s functions. Platform was viewed as the underlying tools that Applica-
tion was employing to provide the service to the customers.
Platform viewed themselves as the foundation for the Application’s product. ey also
viewed themselves as creating a robust, scalable, and extensible foundation that other teams
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would soon be using to build products upon. At the end of the study I was able to interview
one member of a new group that had recently begun to use Platform’s code. Platform had
started to interact with two application groups, further solidifying their view that they were
the foundation which other groups used to build upon.
From a naive point of view, it would seem that Platform should depend on Application.
After all, it is Application’s product that would ultimately make or break the Internet Prod-
uct Group; Platform was only the foundation upon which IPG’s customer-facing product
was built. From a software engineering point of view, the relationship that emerged was in-
evitable. While Platform does depend on Application’s success in an overall sense, in their
day to day task-related interactions Application depends on Platform. It was the principles of
software engineering that placed Application as the dependent of Platform, so that Platform
could isolate themselves from changes from the Application group. is relationship was
ideal from a software engineering point of view but it may have helped create the the situa-
tion highlighted by the difference in priorities: Platform did not view Application’s priorities
as their own priorities, and as a result Application found it difficult to get their day-by-day
tasks completed.
2.6.3 Expectations are different
Perhaps the most telling result of the asymmetry between Application and Platform is the
difference in what they expect the other to do. Many of the helpful or unhelpful behaviours
reported by the interview subjects can be interpreted as a request for the other group to do
or to not do something. e following sections will examine those behaviours from each
group’s POV.
AppPM’s expectations of PlatPM
All seven behaviour categories reported by AppPM, both helpful and unhelpful, could be
classi ed as a request or desire for PlatPMs to “do something.” e helpful behaviours are
straightforward: “Responsive to my emails about my dependencies,” “It’s easier to get what we
need from Platform compared to external teams,” and “Status meetings are helpful, but I only go
when I need something,” are all examples of situations in which the AppPM needed something
from the AppPM (email updates, agreements on work to be completed, agreements on work
during face-to-face status meetings).
e unhelpful behaviours are similarly straightforward: “Our critical dependency was not
seen as a priority by them,” “It is difficult to get PlatPM to do what we need them to do,” “Hot
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Potato features,” and “ey don’t communicate well with us about our dependencies,” are ex-
amples where AppPM needed something done but it wasn’t (an issue regarding a critical
dependency wasn’t handled quickly enough, a request for work was ignored, features we
needed them to complete were bounced around because they didn’t care about them, and
they didn’t give us timely communication).
ese helpful and unhelpful behaviours from the AppPM’s point of view relate to ways
in which the Platform group did or did not do something for them. Every example the
Application interviewees gave was related to an action that the Platform group either did or
did not do.
PlatPM’s expectations of AppPM
From the Platform PM’s point of view, two helpful behaviours and two unhelpful AppPM
behaviours could be classi ed as a request to “do something.” e two helpful behaviours,
“ey follow up to remindme of their dependency,” and “eir requirements are clear and formal,”
are self-explanatory examples of when the AppPM did something helpful for the PlatPM.
e unhelpful behaviours, “ey have trouble conforming to my scenarios,” and “Sometimes
they don’t show up to status meetings, so we can’t help them out,” are examples of things that
the AppPM did or didn’t do (AppPM didn’t do what our formal “scenarios” speci ed, and
AppPM didn’t show up to our meetings).
In contrast, there are ve helpful and unhelpful AppPM behaviours that could be classi-
ed as requests to “refrain from doing something.” e helpful behaviours, “ey accommo-
date our needs by cutting their functionality,” and “ey don’t escalate unnecessarily,” are exam-
ples where PlatPM wanted AppPM to stop or refrain from doing something (they stopped
asking for more functionality, they refrained from turning to upper management to solve
intergroup problems). e unhelpful behaviours, “Maintaining communication is difficult (I
have too many dependencies),” “ey changed their requirements,” and “It’s tough to balance my
needs with theirs,” are examples where PlatPMs wished that AppPM would stop doing what
they nd unhelpful (stop so many dependents communicating so frequently, stop changing
your requirements, stop making so many requests which cause me to balance my workload).
From this relatively small sample of the interactions it appears that the Application group
is in a position where they want (or even need) Platform to do things for them. Seven out of
seven of the behaviour categories reported by the AppPMs can be classi ed as “do something”
or “they did not do something” for their group. In comparison, the Platform group is in a
position where they both want Application to do things for them as well as refrain from doing
things. Four out of ten categories reported by the PlatPMs can be classi ed as “do something,”
while ve out of ten categories can be classi ed as “refrain from doing something.”
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Asking a group to refrain from a particular behaviour illustrates the asymmetry between
the groups. at every one of Application’s behaviours were related to Platform doing some-
thing for them highlights the extent to which they depended on Platform’s behaviours to get
their work done. at Platform needed Application to stop doing things, such as stop asking
for features, and stop communicating, demonstrates the position of control that Platform
had. Platform needed very little from the Application group. Some of the communications
that came from Application took on a sense of annoyance and distraction. In summary, the
asymmetry between the groups may have contributed to a difference in how each expected
the other to behave. Application was the dependent, as required by the software engineering
principles that guided the separation and interaction of the group’s work. Platform desired
Application to act accordingly.
2.7 Implications
is study used interview data to argue that two teams, arranged in an asymmetric inter-
dependency, developed different perceptions of their interactions, different priorities, and
different expectations for the behaviour of the other group. In a case study it is impossible
to prove a direct causal link between the one-way dependency and the behaviours reported
by the interviewees. But I would argue, based on the evidence presented, that the structure
of the interdependency at least in uenced their behaviour, perceptions and expectations.
Qualitative case studies often leave the researcher with more questions than answers, and
this is no exception. Does a one-way dependency in uence the behaviours of the two groups
involved? Does the one who is depended upon “hold all the cards” in their interaction? Can
they dictate terms and act as if they are in control? Does the dependent understand this
interaction and act differently towards the other? Does asymmetric dependence in a task-
related relationship produce the same dynamic as a power imbalance does in an interpersonal
social relationship (Rusbult and Van Lange 2003)?
One-way asymmetric interdependencies are better understood in the social psychological
literature on interpersonal relationships than in the management literature. To what extent
do the theories of that area transfer to situations in which the people and groups are task-
related? e difference may be signi cant, because in a task-related interaction there are
many constraints that act on workers that are not present in interpersonal relationships (such
as performance measurements, group and sub group goals, the task goals themselves that
de ne a work relationship, and so forth).
As a result of this case some basic questions emerge. While many other questions may
be inspired by the case study, the following three questions are particularly interesting be-
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cause together they investigate a very simple issue that has not been adequately addressed in
the literature: the in uence of a work team’s structure on the helping behaviour within that
work team. First, does level of dependence effect the number of helpful behaviours between
coworkers? Does current literature predict greater or fewer helpful behaviours in situations of
high dependence versus situations of low dependence? Secondly, does the structure of depen-
dence affect the number of helpful behaviours between coworkers? Does current literature
predict greater or fewer helpful behaviours in situations of asymmetric (one-way) dependence
versus situations of symmetric (two-way) dependence? And nally, although the case study
did not indicate that performance rewards affected behaviour in a signi cant way, the litera-
ture has consistently investigated performance rewards in concert with interdependence. is
in uenced the third question: does group versus individual performance rewards in uence
the number of helpful behaviours between coworkers? And if so, can performance rewards
be used to soften any negative effects of the physical structure of the coworker’s dependence?
e remainder of the dissertation will discuss and investigate these questions.
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Chapter 3
e effect of interdependence on behaviour
e case study in Chapter 2 described a situation in which a software group named Appli-
cation was heavily dependent on a group named Platform. e data indicated that Appli-
cation perceived Platform to be very unhelpful, yet Platform perceived their relationship to
be balanced. Due to the nature of case study data there could be many reasons for the un-
helpfulness and con ict perceived by Application. Were Platform’s unhelpful behaviours a
result of personal dispositions, attitudes, or idiosyncratic interpersonal issues? Or were these
difference due to the task-relationship Application and Platform were placed in? Application
was designed to be asymmetrically dependent on Platform. To what extent did this structural
dependence cause the behaviours and perceptions recorded in the case study?
is chapter investigates the effect that interdependence has on behaviour. If it is true that
asymmetric dependence is one of the causes for the differences in helping behaviours observed
in the case study, then how do researchers understand the effects of asymmetric dependence?
Has interdependence itself been found to affect the extent of helping behaviour? Perhaps
most importantly, why and under what conditions would someone help another if they were
not likewise dependent on that person?
3.1 Understanding interdependence
How one worker’s job affects another’s is fundamental to the study of organizations. It is the
question of how one worker’s task impacts another’s task, and how one worker’s action and
non-action affects another’s ability to complete their work. It is an issue that is at the heart
of how work is designed, but it has been often neglected by work design theories (Grant and
Parker 2009, p. 323). Only recently have scholars argued for a refocused effort on studying
how work relationships themselves affect work outcomes (Morgeson and Humphrey 2006).
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is has been called the relational perspective of job design (Grant 2007). First I will brie y
discuss the genesis of scholarly interest in the social and task interconnectedness of work.
3.1.1 Interdependence as the foundation of organization theory
One of the original discoveries linking task-related relationships to productivity came from a
pin factory. In 1776, Adam Smith discovered that 10 workers could produce no more than
200 pins a day if each worked on their own set of pins (Smith 1966). He found that manufac-
turing a pin could be divided into separate tasks such as straightening, cutting, sharpening,
grinding, and painting. If each worker specialized in a task, the group of 10 could produce
as many as 48,000 pins per day. is discovery, referred to as the division of labour, was
and is the cornerstone of theories of work. Years later, Frederick Taylor developed Scienti c
Management, a rigourous application of division of labour. Rigourous to such an extent that
the workers themselves were argued to be physically and mentally predisposed to a narrowly
de ned job (Taylor 1911). Even the human relations movement, which was sparked by
the Hawthorne Studies (Mayo 1933), and explicitly challenged the Scienti c Management
orthodoxy, found that the division of labour affected power, social in uence, and worker
behaviour. e Relay Assembly Test Room demonstrated that a person (in this case a re-
searcher), who was placed originally as an observer, took on the role of a supervisor, and
through their interactions helped increase the room’s productivity by 30 percent. e Bank
Wiring Observation Room studies demonstrated that the task relationships between the front
and back groups may have contributed to a difference in power, and may have helped create
social pressures on workers to conform to group norms (Rollinson 2005, pp. 11-12). ese
early insights highlighted the in uence that the division of labour had over the productivity
and social behaviour of workers. It was only later that scholars tried to better describe and
understand how workers affected each others’ tasks.
Simon (1957) recognized that interdependencies arose when one worker’s ability to com-
plete their task depended on another worker’s behaviour. In order for two interdependent
workers to successfully complete their tasks they needed to coordinate their actions. Coordi-
nation, then, is informing each participant as to the planned behaviour of the others (Simon
1957, p. 72). Coordination results when the behaviour of the individual is guided by his ex-
pectations of the behaviour of the other members of the group (p. 124). Above and beyond
ensuring that the behaviour of others is predictable and in the right direction, Simon argued
that coordination ensures that members of the group have the same goal (p. 139). Simon
argued that coordination could occur through two main mechanisms. First, self coordination,
whereby an individual coordinates their actions with the activities of others through simple
observation of what they are doing. Self coordination does not need explicit communica-
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tion, it can operate with observation and self-adjustment. More effective self coordination
requires others to communicate their intentions. Second, more complicated forms of coordi-
nation, which require at least three steps: 1) the development of a plan of behaviour for all
the members of the group; 2) the communication of the relevant portions of this plan to
each member; and 3) a willingness on the part of the individual members to permit their
behaviour to be guided by the plan (pp. 103-108).
Later, March and Simon (1958) de ned interdependence as a “felt need for joint decision-
making,” (pp. 121-123). Joint decision-making could be accomplished using mechanisms
designed to handle different levels of routine. Highly routine situations could be handled
through decisions made ahead of time, called Simple Programming, which are rules gov-
erning organizational action given certain conditions. Less routine through Coordination
by Plan, which are preestablished schedules of behaviour. Non-routine situations could be
handled through Coordination by Feedback, which is transmission of new information to
handle contingencies not anticipated in the schedule (p. 162). e focus again was on the
coordination mechanisms through which the interdependencies could be handled.
It was not until ompson (1967) that interdependence was considered by itself as a
determining factor in organizational structure. Interdependence was de ned as, “e extent
to which a task requires organizational units to engage in work ow exchanges of products,
information, and/or resources and where actions in one unit affect the actions and work
outcomes in another unit” (p. 54).
ompson developed what he called a “Guttman-type scale” (p. 55) of interdependence,
where each incrementally more complex form of interdependence contains all less complex
forms. e simplest form of interdependence is pooled, where one unit1 depends on another
unit not in any direct way, but they depend on each other through the higher level unit to
which they both belong, in the sense that if one unit fails it jeopardizes the higher level unit.
ompson describes this situation as one in which “each part renders a discrete contribution
to the whole and each is supported by the whole” (p. 54). Pooled interdependence has also
been used by later writers to describe the interdependence between units who depend on a
common resource2, although this is not precisely what ompson meant by the term. e
second most complex form of interdependence is sequential, in which a rst and second unit
can be identi ed to make contributions to and depend upon the higher level organization, so
that there is a pooled interdependence between them. But also a direct interdependence can
be identi ed between them, such that the rst unit needs to act properly before the second
can act, and unless the rst acts the second cannot solve its output problem (p. 54). e
third and most complex interdependence is reciprocal, in which two units both support and
1In ompson’s terms, unit is used to refer to an individual, group, department, or even company.
2Malone and Crowston (1994) used the term “shared resources” (p. 91).
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are supported by the larger organization (pooled), and the second unit depends directly on
the proper actions of the rst in order to solve its output problem (sequential), but where
the rst unit then depends further on the successful actions of the second unit. e outputs
of each become the inputs of the other, such as in an airline which contains both operations
and maintenance units (p. 55).
Each increased level of interdependence requires a increased level of complex coordi-
nation, which correspond closely to those suggested by March and Simon (1958). Under
some conditions, pooled interdependence can be coordinated through standardization (sim-
ple programming), sequential interdependence through coordination by plan, and reciprocal
through mutual adjustment. Each level of complexity places an increasingly heavy burden on
communication and decision, with standardization requiring the fewest decisions and least
frequent communications, and mutual adjustment requiring the most decision and com-
munication activity. “ere are very real costs involved in coordination” (ompson 1967,
p. 56). ompson further proposed that organization design decisions result from trying to
minimize coordination costs. Organizational structure such as departmentalization (p. 57)
and hierarchy (p. 59) are consequences of such decisions. us, ompson showed that
having a clear understanding of interdependence is an important aspect of studying how
organizational structure evolves and changes.
Perhaps Mintzberg summarized it best when he said, “e two fundamental and opposing
requirements of organized human activity are the division of labor into various tasks to be
performed and the coordination of these tasks to accomplish the activity” (Mintzberg 1979,
pg. 2).
3.1.2 e in uence of sociotechnical systems research
Sociotechnical systems theory, upon which job design theory was built, was very much aware
of the in uence of interdependence on work outcomes. Kiggundu (1981) summarized the
extent to which interdependence was found to affect a workers’ ability to complete their tasks:
ese studies followed the introduction of the mechanized longwall method
of coal getting and examined its effects on the organization of work and the
responses of various groups of employees. ey found that the three shifts mak-
ing up the 24-hour operations were highly interdependent. For example, the
work performance of the rst shift (cutting) signi cantly affected the nature
and success of the second shift (ripping), which in turn affected that of the third
shift ( lling). ey also found that the various occupational tasks making up
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each shift were also interdependent. For example, the rst shift, which pre-
pared coalfaces for ring shots, was responsible for three tasks: boring holes for
the short- rer, driving the coal-cutter, and ring the shots. ese tasks, done
strictly in this sequence, were highly interdependent. If holes were not bored
through to the full depth of the undercut, the shots red would be less effective.
Cutters producing uneven cuts would create reduced work heights and affect the
productivity of the llers. Likewise, poor workmanship by the gummers would
make the work of the rer less effective. Other functions of the production
process were also highly interdependent. ese ndings led Trist and Bamforth
to remark that “so close is the task interdependence that the system becomes
vulnerable from its needs for one hundred percent performance at each step”
(1951, p. 18) (p. 500).
Kiggundu (1981) built on the ndings of sociotechnical theorists by proposing that in-
terdependence could be differentiated into initiated task interdependence and received task
interdependence, and that each has a different effect on an worker’s felt responsibility for
their own task and for their dependent’s tasks. Initiated task interdependence occurs when
work ows from the initiator to one or more receivers, such that the successful performance
of the receiver’s job depends on the initiator’s. Received task interdependence occurs when
a person’s performance of their job depends on the work ow from one or more other jobs.
Kiggundu (1981) proposed that each form of interdependence has three elements: scope,
which is “the breadth of interconnectedness of a a particular job with other jobs” (p. 501);
resources, which is “the degree to which the interdependence between two or more jobs in-
volves receiving or giving resources necessary to do the job” (p. 501); and criticality, which is
“the extent to which the interdependence between the focal job and one or more other jobs
is crucial for the performance of the focal job” (pp. 501-502).
e proposed effect of initiated task interdependence is supported by omas (1957) and
Horsfall and Arensberg (1966) who found that when workers facilitate the work of others,
they experience a sense of responsibility, possibly because they realize that others depend on
them in order to complete their task and to receive performance-related rewards. Kiggundu
(1981) proposed that initiated task interdependence would be positively related to experi-
enced responsibility for their dependent’s work. e effect of received task interdependence is
supported by sociotechnical systems theorists. Trist and Bamforth (1951) found that miners
occupying roles high in received task interdependence 1) refused to accept responsibility for
production, 2) developed norms of low productivity, 3) did not utilize their full potential,
and 4) engaged in “self-compensatory” absenteeism and turnover more than others. Fur-
ther, roles high in received task interdependence spent more time in nonproductive activities
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(Kiggundu 1983, p. 150). Kiggundu proposed that received task interdependence would be
negatively related to employee’s valued personal and work outcomes: work motivation, work
satisfaction, growth satisfaction and performance.
e ndings were partially supportive of Kiggundu’s model. Initiated task interdepen-
dence was positively related to the employee’s felt responsibility for their dependent’s out-
comes, as well as for the employee’s valued personal and work outcomes. On the other hand,
the expected negative relationship between received interdependence and valued outcomes
was not found; the correlations were practically zero. Possible explanations included a rela-
tively high correlation between initiated and received task interdependence (.50) which indi-
cated a lack of discrimination between the two scales. e results of the scale subdimensions
for each form of interdependence (scope, resources, and criticality) were inconclusive.
3.1.3 De ning interdependence
Asking a scholar to de ne interdependence would serve as an excellent Rorschach test—there
are almost as many de nitions for the concept as there are papers written about it. I will argue
that most de nitions differ only in the language used.
Staudenmayer (1997) states that there is a “confusing multitude of conceptualizations and
operationalizations” leading to a “high degree of ambiguity and confounding with respect to
the concept of interdependency,” which re ects “fundamentally different assumptions about
the nature of technology, organizations, and people” (pp. 2-3). While the number of different
de nitions are as great as the number of papers dealing with interdependency, the situation
is not as bad as it seems. Certainly differences exist in the wording used, for example, “the
degree to which an individual’s task performance depends upon the efforts or skills of others”
(Wageman and Baker 1997, p. 141), compared to “the extent to which an individual team
member needs information, materials, and support from other team members to be able
to carry out his or her job” (Van der Vegt et al. 2003, p. 717). But most de nitions are a
rewording for only minimal bene t over ompson’s original: “e extent to which a task
requires organizational units to engage in work ow exchanges of products, information,
and/or resources and where actions in one unit affect the actions and work outcomes in
another unit” ompson (1967, p.54).
ere is a small amount of controversy over what ompson meant with his view of inter-
dependence. Some authors content that his interdependence only referred to organizational
units, from work teams and higher, to the level of physically separate offices and departments
(Wageman 2001, p. 199). ompson’s interdependencies are argued to be pre-identi able,
stable, clearly visible, and a simple result of the technology used in the task (Staudenmayer
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1997, p. 6, 13), and are “not a structural feature that can be manipulated” (Stewart and
Barrick (2000, p. 138), referring to Van de Ven and Ferry (1980)). However, ompson
did not mention these caveats. ere is nothing inherent in the concept that would prevent
ompson’s interdependence to refer to intra-group processes, or to interdependencies that
occur and disappear spontaneously and unpredictably (e.g., Saavedra et al. 1993, pp. 62–63).
Staudenmayer (1997) proposes that the terminological confusion stems from a disagree-
ment about the underlying, and implicit, theoretical perspective employed by each writer.
She argues that there are three competing theoretical perspectives: information processing
theories, resource-based theories, and sense-making theories.
Sense-making theories suggest that interdependencies between workers are so complex,
seemingly random and unpredictable, that those workers have only a limited ability to un-
derstand and reason about the structure of their work (Weick 1990; Staudenmayer 1997,
p. 29). Sense-making theorists argue that an organization’s interdependencies and coordi-
nation cannot be planned with conscious re ection of its members and managers, but are
instead unconsciously arrived at through adaptation to local task demands (Hutchins 1991),
or subtly in uenced through changes in the physical arrangement of tools and work stations
(Hutchins 1990). Other theorists argue that interdependencies, complex and ill-understood,
are best coordinated through “heed,” de ned as “a disposition to act with attentiveness, alert-
ness, and care” (Weick and Roberts 1993). Although intriguing and intuitively appealing
(interdependencies are often difficult to pinpoint and analyze) the sense-making perspective
will not be incorporated into this dissertation. e theories are not designed to increase un-
derstanding of a speci c instance of interdependence between two units, or offer analytic
solutions to predict the impact that this interdependence would have on the behaviour of
the units involved.
Staudenmayer’s remaining two competing theoretical perspectives, information process-
ing theories and resource-based theories, are practically the same approach. e information
processing perspective is exempli ed by ompson (1967) and Galbraith (1977), while Mal-
one and Crowston (1994) and Salancik and Pfeffer (1974). Earlier I noted that Malone and
Crowston (1994) built on ompson’s categorization of interdependencies, and there is lit-
tle difference in their conceptualization of interdependency. Indeed, Malone and Crowston
take ompson’s coordination mechanisms and extend them, adding a number of re ne-
ments and terminology from engineering and computing systems. Similarly, it is difficult to
see how interdependence as discussed by Salancik and Pfeffer (1974) differs from omp-
son’s original concepts of interdependence, except that the authors are speaking of resources
instead of information. Indeed, ompson (1967) argued that resources are one of the three
things for which units would depend upon each other (the other two being products and in-
formation). ough the recognition that interdependence is inextricably tied to power was
40
a substantial contribution, which is addressed in Section 3.3.7.
Staudenmayer (1997) argued that the terminological confusion surrounding the de -
nition of interdependence stemmed from a disagreement about the underlying theoretical
perspective taken by the researchers. I have argued that the perspectives are not substantially
different in the case of information theory and resource-based perspectives. In the case of
sense-making theories, the perspective is not useful for the present topic. In other words, I
believe the de nitions of interdependence are different in terms of wording, not in substance.
When needed, I will adopt the ompson (1967) de nition of interdependence.
3.1.4 Task interdependence vs. reward interdependence
e distinction between task and reward interdependence is more important than the dis-
agreements between de nitions of task interdependence. Task and reward interdependence
are forms of interdependence, both of which can be distinguished in eld studies and experi-
ments, and have been shown to in uence behaviour in different ways (Johnson and Johnson
1989; Saavedra et al. 1993).
Reward interdependence is the extent to which the rewards one individual receives are
linked to the task performance of others. Practically speaking, reward interdependence de-
pends on the performance measurement used, which typically varies on one dimension be-
tween individual and group. If reward interdependence is high, one person’s rewards depend
on the task performance of others, and this is usually created with a group performance mea-
surement. For example, a person works at a call centre with 40 other people and their reward
is based on how many calls the entire group processed. If reward interdependence is low,
one person’s rewards do not depend on the task performance of others, and this is usually
created with a purely individual performance measurement. For example, a person works as
a member of a product marketing team and their reward is based only on how many pages
they individually contributed to the nal report. In practice, performance measurements
are often a combination of individual and group reward, and a very high-level concept of
group may be used, such as an organization in the case of employee stock reward plans. e
rules for which combination leads to which level of reward interdependence have not been
formalized, although the term “hybrid” has been used to describe a middle level of reward
interdependence (Wageman 1995, 2001).
ere are, of course, practical issues that muddy the clean separation between individ-
ual and group performance measurement. e examples given above hint at the issues. It is
usually possible to have a group performance measurement regardless the type of interdepen-
dence. In the call centre example, even though the person does not require any information,
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resources, or products from the other call centre employees, and even though the actions of
the call centre employees (within reason) do not affect their ability to complete their task, the
person is still rewarded based on the entire group’s performance. is is plausible and not
difficult to put in place, although fairness is another matter. e marketing team example
is a little more implausible. For a situation where a team is working together on a common
project, with resources, information, and the products of action being passed among each
other in frequent and ad hoc reciprocal interdependencies, is it even possible for an evaluator
to determine any one individual’s contribution to the nal product? If it is possible, would
it be fair to the others who were equally important but did work that did not appear as part
of the nished products materials (e.g., a researcher)? However, while the different forms of
performance measurement may be impractical, they are still conceptually distinct and useful
for describing the interdependence between workers.
A second issue is the separation between task interdependence and reward interdepen-
dence; they are not mutually exclusive concepts. e amount of task interdependence may
affect the amount of reward interdependence, but not vise versa. As task interdependence
increases, the ability to complete one’s task increasingly depends on the ability of others to
complete their tasks. Even if a purely individual performance measurement were practically
possible, the other’s task performance will affect one’s own task performance, which will af-
fect one’s own performance measurement and reward. erefore, as task interdependence
increases, so would reward interdependence. e degree to which reward interdependence
increases would depend upon the extent to which the other were able to affect one’s ability
to receive one’s reward. e opposite is not the case, however. As reward interdependence
varies in either direction, the amount of task interdependence would remain the same. is
is because rewards do not directly affect the interdependency required by the task. In the
call centre example, moving from an individual to group performance measurement would
certainly affect one’s ability to receive rewards, but it would not affect the task of answering
calls. Nor would changing from an individual to a group performance measurement affect
the marketing team member’s task of research, writing, or deciding. is is not to say that
reward interdependence would not affect behaviour, which it has been shown to do quite re-
liably by changing the situation to cooperative or competitive (Deutsch 1949; Johnson and
Johnson 1989; Stanne et al. 1999).
At this point a clari cation is needed between reward, outcome, and goal interdepen-
dence. Reward interdependence is frequently confused with something different: outcome
interdependence (which is sometimes also called goal interdependence). Outcome or goal in-
terdependence refers to the extent to which an individual’s ability to reach their goal depends
on the ability of others to reach their goal. Confusingly, goal interdependence is very similar
to task interdependence, if it is assumed that in order to reach their goal, an individual would
42
need to complete their task. On the other hand, if their goal is rewards, then wouldn’t goal
interdependence be the same as reward interdependence? So is goal interdependence task in-
terdependence, or is it reward interdependence? at, of course, would depend on what the
individual’s goal is. To increase the confusion, goal interdependence could equate to reward
interdependence through a type of “evaluation interdependence;” where since the goal of the
employee is to complete their task successfully, and they are being evaluated based on their
ability to complete their task, goal interdependence could imply evaluation (and therefore
reward) interdependence. In order to remove this confusion, the term task interdependence
will be used instead of outcome or goal interdependence, which has caused problems in the
past (e.g., Wageman 2001, p. 201). Only the term “reward interdependence” will be used
to refer to rewards; the terms “goal” and “outcome interdependence” will be avoided.
3.1.5 Level of dependence vs. mutuality of dependence
With three exceptions, when writers speak of extent of interdependence, or amount of in-
terdependence they are speaking of situations in which person A and person B are mutually
dependent upon one another. “e studies that have been carried out have all examined the
relationship between symmetrical task dependence and the extent to which team members
help each other (e.g., Anderson and Williams 1996)” (de Jong et al. 2007, p. 1626). When
researchers measure low and high interdependence in the eld (e.g., Pearce and Gregersen
1991), or when they manipulate amount of interdependence in an experiment (e.g., Wage-
man 1995; Allen et al. 2003), they are varying the extent to which team members depend
on one another. But studies have demonstrated that dependence can be asymmetric; group
members can receive work from another member and never be in the position to give work
back (Trist and Bamforth 1951; Saavedra et al. 1993), and an individual A can identify a
coworker B who they depend heavily upon, but understand that B does not likewise de-
pend on them (de Jong et al. 2007). e case study in Chapter 2 illustrated such a situation
between software teams. In order to better understand interdependence it is useful to separate
the concept into two components: level and mutuality.
Level of dependence refers to the extent to which one person depends on another to
complete their task. is can vary in degree and in eld studies is typically represented on a
scale from none to very high (e.g., Van der Vegt and Jannsen 2003, p. 736). e concepts
of scope, resources and criticality Kiggundu (1981, pp. 501–502) collectively refer to level
of dependence. But perhaps criticality is closest to what is meant by level of dependence.
Level involves a notion of timing and correctness; if an action is late it may delay those who
are depending on it, the severity of the delay is the level of dependence. Or if an action is
incorrect it may force rework or compensatory work, the extent of that extra work is the
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level of dependence. Level of dependence captures what was found in the case study and the
sociotechnical studies (Trist and Bamforth 1951, p. 18).
Mutuality of dependence refers to the pattern of dependence between coworkers. is
can also vary on a continuum from complete asymmetry where B depends on A but A does
not depend on B at all, to complete symmetry, where both A and B depend equally on each
other’s actions. In ompsonian (1967) terms, asymmetric would correspond to sequential
interdependence, and symmetric would correspond to reciprocal. Symmetric also covers the
concept of team interdependence (Van de Ven et al. 1976; Saavedra et al. 1993).
Researchers in social psychology have recognized that there is a distinction between level
of dependence and mutuality of dependence (Rusbult and Van Lange 2003, p. 355). In-
deed,“many extant theories of power ultimately miss the mark, in that they fail to distinguish
between level of power and mutuality of power” (Kelley et al. 2003, p. 250). Survey measures
have typically not been able to capture a change in mutuality. e most prominent scale,
initiated and received task interdependence Kiggundu (1981, 1983) is capable of capturing
asymmetric interdependence, but only if both measures are taken with respect to a single
other, and analyzed at the dyadic level, which was the approach taken by Bowler and Brass
(2006) and de Jong et al. (2007).
For simplicity and clarity this dissertation will consider two levels of level and mutuality:
low vs. high, and asymmetric vs. symmetric. Level and mutuality can vary independently
as illustrated in Table 3.1. In an asymmetric relationship, A’s actions could only minimally
affect B’s ability to complete their task; if A completed their work poorly, B would still be
able to complete their own task, or would only spend a small amount of time on corrections,
illustrated as cell (A). Or, A’s actions could heavily impact B’s ability to complete their task;
if A completes their task poorly, B would be unable to complete their task, or B would
be forced to spend a great deal of time understanding and/or xing A’s portion before they
could complete their own task, illustrated as cell (C). In a symmetric task-relationship, with
low dependence, A and B both experience a minimal effect from the other’s actions, cell (B).




Level of Low (A) (B)
Dependence High (C) (D)
Table 3.1: Possible combinations of level and mutuality of dependence
For example, in the case study, Application and Platform would rest in cell (C). Appli-
44
cation depended very heavily on Platform’s work and actions (such as prioritization), but
Platform had only a minimal dependence on Application’s work and actions. Application
was forced to redo work, re-prioritize features, take over “hot-potato” features, and otherwise
put in extra work due to Platform’s actions. If the situation were more symmetric, Plat-
form would experience a similar amount of effect from Application’s actions. If there were
a lower level of dependence, Application would be able to shrug off Platform’s behaviour,
work around their unhelpfulness, and would otherwise not feel their impact. e ndings
from the sociotechnical coal mining studies also describe situations of high dependence and
asymmetry (Trist and Bamforth 1951, p. 18).
3.2 Interdependence as an independent variable
Task interdependence has been studied as a component of job design which affects valued
work outcomes (e.g., Kiggundu 1981, 1983; Morgeson and Humphrey 2006) and as a task
characteristic that affects helping behaviours and performance (e.g., Saavedra et al. 1993;
Wageman and Baker 1997; Bachrach et al. 2006b). e following sections will review those
studies that have treated interdependence as an independent (causal) variable for various
outcomes of interest. e questions guiding this section are, does task interdependence by
itself affect outcome variables? e ways in which these studies have explained the effect of
interdependence is discussed in Section 3.3.
3.2.1 Effect on valued work outcomes
Morgeson and Humphrey (2006) proposed that social characteristics should be incorpo-
rated into the job design literature which had ignored them for too long. Now considered
part of the relational perspective of job design (Grant 2007; Grant and Parker 2009), task
interdependence is one of the core concepts for describing how workers are related to and
affect others, both within and outside their team. Building upon the work of Kiggundu
(1981, 1983), Morgeson and Humphrey (2006) incorporated initiated interdependence and
received interdependence subscales into the Work Design Questionnaire. e scale for ini-
tiated interdependence includes three questions: 1) e job requires me to accomplish my
job before others complete their job; 2) Other jobs depend directly on my job; and 3) Unless
my job gets done, other jobs cannot be completed. e scale for received interdependence
includes three questions: 1) e job activities are greatly affected by the work of other people;
2) e job depends on the work of many different people for its completion; and 3) My job
cannot be done unless others do their work (Morgeson and Humphrey 2006, p. 1338).
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e valued work outcomes of interest were work motivation, work satisfaction, growth
satisfaction and performance. Kiggundu (1983) found that initiated task interdependence
was positively related to the valued work outcomes as well as the employee’s felt responsibility
for their dependent’s outcomes. He found no signi cant relation between received interde-
pendence and any of the valued outcomes or felt responsibility. Slightly contrary to these
ndings, Wong and Campion (1991) found that as task interdependence increases, the job
motivation responds in a ∩-shaped manner. ey found that jobs with moderate amounts of
interdependence had high motivation, and those with low and high interdependence had low
motivation. To add further confusion, using a U.S. Department of Labour survey, Morgeson
and Humphrey (2006) found no signi cant correlation between initiated or received inter-
dependence and their outcomes of interest, which were information and communication
generalized work activities (although I cannot understand what they mean by these outcome
measures).
Incorporating interdependence into their work group characteristics measures, Campion
et al. (1993) developed a three item subscale for task interdependence: 1) I cannot accom-
plish my tasks without information or materials from other members of my team; 2) Other
members of my team depend on me for information or materials needed to perform their
tasks; and 3) Within my team, jobs performed by team members are related to one an-
other (pp. 848-849). ey were interested in how work group characteristics were related
to productivity, employee satisfaction, and manager’s ratings of employee effectiveness. e
authors found that interdependence was related only to productivity. In a replication and ex-
tension of their rst study, Campion et al. (1996) found a stronger correlation between task
interdependence and their outcomes. ey concluded that, “interdependence is again found
to be an important consideration in predicting the effectiveness of work teams” (p. 447).
In summary, the conclusions from the work design literature are contradictory. Some
studies report a monotonic positive relationship between interdependence and positive work
outcomes such as motivation, satisfaction, and performance. One study reported a non-
monotic ∩-shaped relationship, and others have found no relation between interdependence
and valued work outcomes.
3.2.2 Effect on performance
A number of survey and experimental studies have investigated the problem of “ t” between
a team’s type of interdependency either its reward or feedback interdependence. Early stud-
ies in goal setting found that adding group-level goals to already present individual goals
encouraged higher performance in groups (Matsui et al. 1987). Saavedra et al. (1993) in-
vestigated this question further by developing an experiment that paired pooled, sequential,
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reciprocal and team interdependencies with individual and group performance feedback.3
e authors found that reciprocally interdependent teams performed best when matched
with group feedback, and that pooled interdependent (essentially independent) teams per-
formed equivalently well when paired with individual feedback. Wageman (1995) found a
similar result from a eld experiment, but with respect to reward interdependence. Teams
working relatively independently performed best when paired with individual rewards, and
teams performing with a high level of interdependence performed best when paired with a
group rewards. Teams that had a mix (relatively independent workers with a group rewards,
highly interdependent teams with an individual rewards, or hybrid teams with elements of
low and high interdependence and individual and group rewards) did not perform as well.
e ndings from Saavedra et al. (1993) and Wageman (1995) indicate that there is a
∪-shaped relationship between interdependence and performance, when matched with the
appropriate performance feedback or rewards. Stewart and Barrick (2000) investigated this
issue further and found that there was indeed a curvilinear relationship between interde-
pendence and performance, but it changed its shape based on the type of task the group
performed instead of the type of reward or feedback. For complex conceptual tasks, low
interdependence and high interdependence correlated to high performance, while moder-
ate interdependence was correlated to poorer performance, a ∪-shaped relationship. On the
other hand, behavioural tasks exhibited a ∩-shaped relationship, with low interdependence
and high interdependence correlated with low performance, and moderate interdependence
correlated with high performance. e curvilinear nding for behavioural tasks was not
completely explained, but the result may have to do with the nature of the task and the coor-
dination it required. Teams that perform primarily behavioural tasks, that is tasks de ned by
“overt, physical behavior, with the execution of manual and psychomotor tasks” McGrath
(1984, p. 65), tend not to bene t from increases in team coordination or problem solving.
Teams with simple tasks similarly don’t require the communication afforded by high interde-
pendence (Gladstein 1984, p. 501), and their performance may even be hurt by the increased
coordination overhead (Grant and Parker 2009, p. 331). is is because the teams perform
tasks that are easily programmed, and information is centralized instead of distributed among
team members (Stewart and Barrick 2000, p. 137).
3Team interdependence turned out to be almost equivalent to reciprocal interdependence in the Saavedra
et al. (1993) experiment, although it has been argued that they are conceptually distinct (Van de Ven et al.
1976)
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3.2.3 Effect on helping behaviour
To what extent does interdependence affect the amount of helpful behaviours between team
members? In general, helping behaviours are a type of prosocial organizational behaviour
(Brief and Motowidlo 1986) which are affiliative and promotive, and are in-role or extra-role
(Van Dyne et al. 1995, p. 229). However, scholars have traditionally placed interpersonal
helping behaviour under the domain of organizational citizenship behaviour (OCB) as al-
truistic behaviour (Smith et al. 1983; Organ 1988). Later it was assumed to be an over-
all second-order construct called helping behaviour, which theoretically included altruism,
courtesy, peacekeeping, and cheerleading, because managers had difficulty distinguishing be-
tween the subdimensions (Podsakoff et al. 1997, 2009). Other scholars have distinguished
between OCBs directed towards and immediately bene tting individuals (OCBI) and OCBs
directed towards and bene tting the organization (OCBO) (Williams and Anderson 1991).
is has been recognized as a useful distinction because it clari es the receiver of the be-
haviour while removing the excess conceptual baggage of the words altruism and compliance
(Van Dyne et al. 1995, p. 239). Helping behaviour need not be altruistic, in the sense implied
by social psychology, that is, behaviour motivated to increase another person’s welfare, often
(but not always) self-sacri cing in the absence of obvious, external rewards (Batson 1998,
p. 282). e interpersonal helping behaviour, or OCBI category can pro tably include the
following constructs: Organ’s (1988) altruism, the Podsakoff et al. (2009) helping behaviour
construct, as well as “Graham’s (1989) interpersonal helping, Van Scotter and Motowidlo’s
(1996) interpersonal facilitation, Farh, Earley, and Lin’s (1997) helping coworkers and inter-
personal harmony constructs” (Podsakoff et al. 2009, p. 124), and Settoon and Mossholder’s
(2002) interpersonal citizenship behaviours (ICB).
Katz (1964) remarked that since organizations cannot predict and program for all possible
variability, organizational effectiveness and survival requires spontaneous human behaviour
both within and outside of role prescriptions (p. 132). Building off his work, a distinction
was made in the OCB literature between in-role (required by the job or role) and extra-role
(spontaneous behaviour going above and beyond the role requirements) behaviour. OCBs
were de ned as those behaviours which go above and beyond the call of duty: “individual
behaviour that is discretionary, not directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward
system, and that in aggregate promotes the effective functioning of the organization” (Organ
1988, p. 4). OCBs were likened to the grease in the gears of a smooth running organization
(Smith et al. 1983, p. 654). Scholars later found that it is extremely difficult to distinguish
between in-role and extra-role behaviour, particularly if the behaviour is rewarded or expected
in some way by the organization (Morrison 1994; McAllister et al. 2007), or if the employee
has personal or social motives for that behaviour (Van Dyne et al. 1995, p. 238). erefore
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I will discuss helping behaviour as a construct which may be labeled by others as PSOB,
OCB, OCBI, or ICB, while recognizing that helping behaviour may be considered extra-
role in some situations and in-role in others. I will modify the de nition used by Anderson
and Williams (1996, p. 282) to remove the implication of exchange, and emphasize that
helping behaviour not only relates to solving problems but also to furthering the completion
of work tasks. Helping behaviour is any action that directly helps/enables supervisors and
coworkers to resolve task-related problems or furthers the completion of their task.
Research in helping behaviour is often concerned with the antecedents and consequences
of prosocial behaviours (Smith et al. 1983; Organ et al. 2006). is leads many researchers
to search for the personal characteristics and the dispositional, attitudinal and behavioural
antecedents for helping behaviours (Van Dyne et al. 1995, p.236). For example, in their
comprehensive review and analysis, Podsakoff et al. (2000) identi ed 52 individual, task,
organizational and leadership characteristics and behaviours. Of those, only three were task
characteristics: task feedback, task routinization, and intrinsically satisfying task. Task and
situational factors such as interdependence were not prevalent enough in the literature to
be included in the meta-analysis. While employee and leader dispositions, attitudes, demo-
graphics, and behaviours have been studied well, I will not discuss these studies as it leads to
a vast and deep literature that is not concerned with the interdependence of the work task.
Yet, despite this focus on the personal (or perhaps because of it), the core OCB researchers
call for a deeper understanding of situational factors such as task interdependence (Podsakoff
et al. 2000, p. 531; Organ et al. 2006, p. 113).
e effect of interdependence on helping behaviour has been investigated using eld
surveys and experimental methods.
Survey studies
Smith et al. (1983) originally hypothesized that symmetric dependence would lead to an
increase in helpful behaviours. ey argued that interdependence would foster a collective
sense of social responsibility (Krebs 1970), and would tend to promote “higher levels of group
cohesion than other task environments” (Smith et al. 1983, p. 655). However, they did not
nd any evidence for this relationship. Pearce and Gregersen (1991) made a similar argu-
ment linking interdependence to helpful behaviours. Citing work design theory (Hackman
and Oldham 1976), they hypothesized that as interdependence increased so would helpful
behaviours between those coworkers. ey found support for their hypothesis, but only
through the mediation of felt responsibility (see Section 3.3.1). Reciprocal interdependence
correlated with felt responsibility (r = .34), and felt responsibility correlated with extra-role
behaviour (r = .23).
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Anderson and Williams (1996), in disagreement with Pearce and Gregersen (1991), pro-
posed that while symmetric dependence may increase felt responsibility, it would also affect
helping behaviour directly. ey argued that an increase in interdependence would also in-
crease the chance that the helper would realize that their coworker needs help, and then
offer it spontaneously. is hypothesis was not supported. Instead, they found that task
interdependence was indirectly related to helping behaviour through its large correlation to
help seeking behaviour (r = .39). e nding suggests that being in frequent task-related
contact with someone who can help will increase the chance that person will be asked for
help, but will not affect that person’s helping behaviour if not asked. Similarly, Settoon and
Mossholder (2002) hypothesized that an increase in initiated task interdependence (Kig-
gundu 1981, 1983) would increase the chance a helper would recognize that their help was
needed, and thus increase helping behaviours. eir hypothesis was not supported either;
initiated task interdependence did not relate at all to helping behaviour.
de Jong et al. (2007) were the rst to propose that asymmetric dependence would affect
helping behaviour between team members. First, they found that if members of a dyad (A
and B) were both highly dependent on each other, A’s perceived receipt of help from B
was highest. When members were both least dependent (still symmetrically interdependent,
but with a low amount of dependence), A’s perceived recept of help from B was lower,
but still relatively high. is indicated a positive relationship between level of symmetric
dependence and perceived helping behaviour. In a way this parallels the ndings of the
literature dealing with t (see Section 3.2.2), but instead of a positive relationship between
interdependence and performance there was a positive relationship between interdependence
and helping behaviour.
e results for the asymmetric situations are more complicated. de Jong et al. (2007)
found that when B depended on A, but A did not depend on B, A perceived low help from
B. e authors hypothesized that when B did not depend on A, but A depended on B, A
would perceive low help from B. In terms of power, when B was in power there would be a
low amount of help, perhaps because B would take advantage and not help A (there would
be no reason to). e authors did not nd support for this hypothesis. Instead, the amount
of help was the same in the absence of power and when B was in power. ey explained the
negative nding in three ways: one, perhaps the less powerful of the dyad cognitively justi ed
the lack of help from the person in power, and simply didn’t report it; two, the organization
studied had large rewards based on group performance and the more powerful of the dyad
took that into consideration and helped their coworker; and three, dyad members who had
experienced lack of help from their more powerful coworker had left those relationships and
formed other, more cooperative working relationships over time. e theoretical reasoning
behind these hypotheses and ndings are discussed in Section 3.3.7 on power below.
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e survey ndings on the effects of task interdependence are mixed. Some studies found
no direct correlation between interdependence and helping behaviour, others found a strong
positive correlation but only through mediating variables, and one study found evidence for
a direct positive correlation.
Experimental studies
e studies investigating “ t” between interdependence and reward interdependence (Sec-
tion 3.2.2) were concerned with its effect on performance. Wageman and Baker (1997) found
that the same pattern of results could be found when the dependent variable was helping be-
haviour. Providing the reward interdependence was appropriate (individual rewards matched
with low interdependence, and group rewards matched with high interdependence), as task
interdependence increased so did the amount of helpful behaviours between team members.
e authors then proved that it was the level of task interdependence that drove the helping
behaviour, not the reward interdependence (Wageman and Baker 1997, p. 152). Allen et al.
(2003) extended the Wageman and Baker (1997) method, and found that as task interde-
pendence increases, so too do helping behaviour, consistent with previous ndings. But they
also found that helping behaviour was highest when high task interdependence was coupled
with low reward interdependence, which is inconsistent with Wageman and Baker’s ndings.
e experimental procedures used by Wageman and Baker (1997) and Allen et al. (2003) are
discussed in detail in Section 5.1.1.
OCB scholars have long argued that helping behaviours should positively affect group
performance (Organ 1988), but empirical studies have found that in some situations OCBs
seem to reduce group-level performance (Podsakoff and Mackenzie 1994, p. 359). Podsakoff
et al. (2000) proposed that the disparate ndings could be a result of task interdependence;
groups with low interdependence do not need to help each other. Indeed, helping could dis-
tract employees from their own work and cost more than they bene t (Bergeron 2007; Wong
and Campion 1991, p. 834-835). Bachrach et al. (2006b) investigated this issue and found
that in high interdependence conditions, an increase in helping behaviour correlated with
an increase in performance. ey hypothesized that in a low interdependence condition, in-
creasing helping behaviour would correlate to a decrease in performance, but the evidence did
not support this. e negative result could be attributed to their experimental method (see
Section 5.1). Although not the focus of their study, they also found that as interdependence
increases, so did helping behaviour, which con rms the previous experimental ndings. e
authors noted, however, “the condition effect is not too surprising because the task struc-
ture in the high task interdependence condition afforded group members more opportunity
to help than in the low task interdependence condition” (Bachrach et al. 2006b, p. 1401).
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is was an astute observation and an often overlooked factor in the relationship between
interdependence and helpful behaviours (see Section 4.1).
In summary, experimental studies have found a consistent and strong connection between
task interdependence and helping behaviour. As their interdependence increases, so too does
helpful behaviour between team members.
3.2.4 Summary of the effect of interdependence
Scholars in the eld of job design have tried to understand how characteristics of the job af-
fect the worker’s behaviour, perception, and motivation. Empirical evidence has been mixed,
with some evidence that task interdependence enriches jobs by increasing motivation, felt
responsibility, and satisfaction. Others have not found evidence for this correlation. Other
scholars have eschewed the job design paradigm and focused on the antecedents and conse-
quences of organizational citizenship behaviours. Some of those have speci cally looked at
interdependence and its effect on helping behaviour between team members. ose using
eld survey methods have had trouble nding a direct link between interdependence and
helping behaviours, but have found evidence that points to its effect through the mediat-
ing variables of felt responsibility and help seeking. ose using experimental methods have
found a consistent and strong relationship between task interdependence and both group
performance and helping behaviour. Provided there is the appropriate reward interdepen-
dence, researchers have found that when interdependence increases, so too does performance,
and so too does helping behaviour between team members.
3.3 Explaining the effect of interdependence on helpful be-
haviour
Of those studies investigating the effect of interdependence on helpful behaviour, some sur-
vey studies and all experimental studies have found the following relationship: as interde-
pendence increases, helpful behaviours increase. With two exceptions (Bowler and Brass
2006; de Jong et al. 2007), these ndings refer to situations in which the interdependence
is symmetric (see Section 3.1.5 for the distinction between level and mutuality of interde-
pendence). In the studies discussed in Section 3.2, the term “low interdependence” referred
situations in cell (B) and “high interdependence” to situations in cell(D) in Table 3.2.
e empirical literature indicates that as level of dependence increases, so does the helping




Level of Low (A) ? (B) low helping beh.
Dependence High (C) ? (D) high helping beh.
Table 3.2: e effects of interdependence on helping behaviours, according to literature
an increase in helping behaviour solely because the level of dependence increases? is section
will attempt to answer that question. At least eight different explanations have been used to
account for the pattern.
3.3.1 Felt responsibility
e job design literature has had relatively little to say about how interdependencies affect
the outcomes that interest job design scholars (Kiggundu 1981, p. 499). Job design models
have typically been interested in how core job dimensions (skill variety, task identity, task
signi cance, individual autonomy, task feedback) in uenced a worker’s psychological states
(the meaningfulness of their work, their felt responsibility for work outcomes, their knowl-
edge of the actual results of work activities) and how these psychological states in uence the
worker’s personal and work outcomes (internal motivation, work performance, work satis-
faction, absenteeism and turnover) (Hackman and Oldham 1976, p. 256). e job design
literature has been criticized because it does not “adequately take into account the fact that
jobs exist as a network of interconnected positions” (Kiggundu 1983, p. 167), and until
recently the situation had not improved (Morgeson and Humphrey 2006). And although
Morgeson and Humphrey found no correlation between their interdependence measures and
their work outcomes, further work in relational job design has argued that a strong link is
indeed present.
Relational job design is a model which helps explain how jobs can be “structured to
cultivate prosocial motivation: to increase employees’ desires to protect and promote the well-
being of bene ciaries” (Grant and Parker 2009, p. 328). Bene ciaries are those that receive
the output of an employee’s work. For example, the person that a reman rescues, the shopper
that a cashier checks-out, or the students who use a classroom that a janitor cleaned the night
before. Grant unpacks and extends the concept of task-signi cance (Hackman and Oldham
1976) and argues that those jobs that impact their bene ciaries and provide contact with
those bene ciaries will increase an employee’s motivation to make a prosocical difference.
ose jobs that lack contact with their bene ciaries prevent employees from gaining a deep
understanding of how their work actions affect their bene ciaries.
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Grant (2007) argues that there are two necessary components for motivation towards
making a prosocial difference: perception of an impact, and affective commitment to ben-
e ciaries. First, employees that perceive an impact on bene ciaries recognize that their be-
haviour leads to outcomes. e behaviour-outcome contingency is essential to motivating
behaviour (Vroom 1964). But, according to expectancy theory, the outcome needs to have
a positive valence. Second, then, the employee needs to value the outcome. Valuing the
prosocial difference in a bene ciary’s life is increased for two reasons. One, Grant (2007)
cites benevolence, which is “the value of protecting and improving the welfare of other peo-
ple with whom one is in regular contact” (p. 403). Two, individuals spend more effort to
bene t those who are emotionally connected and important to them. Individuals see their
bene ciaries as having similar identities because of this connection, and acting to help these
bene ciaries is consistent with core personal values (Grant 2007, p. 404). erefore, affective
commitment to bene ciaries increases the outcome valence of the expectancy equation, and
perceiving that their behaviour impacts their bene ciaries increases the behaviour-outcome
component of the expectancy equation.
Although Grant (2007) is concerned with explaining why employees might help external
bene ciaries of their work (and how to increase that motivation), the motivation to make a
prosocial difference could also help explain some coworker-to-coworker helping behaviour.
As level of dependence increases, perception of impact may also increase. According to Grant
(2007) then, as level of dependence increases, so too might the motivation to make a proso-
cial difference. e explanation would be that the employee would perceive that they make
more of an impact on their dependent (bene ciary) and would be motivated to help more.
Crucially, this explanation rests on the assumption that an individual needs to like their
coworker in order to be motivated to help. e individual would need to translate an affec-
tive concern for their coworker into a positive valence towards the outcome of “helping my
coworker,” in the same way that an individual is said to do for an outside bene ciary (Grant
2007, p. 404). at is, the individual emotionally connects with the coworker, the coworker
is important to them, which leads to viewing the coworker as having a similar identity, and
in order to remain consistent with the their core values the individual is motivated to do
something prosocial for the coworker.
e motivation to make a prosocial difference is similar to one of the early attempts made
to explain helpful behaviour between coworkers. Hackman and Oldham (1976) originally
suggested that autonomy (freedom, independence, and discretion in one’s work process and
schedule) would lead to a feeling of felt responsibility for one’s work (p. 258). As discussed in
Section 3.1.2, Kiggundu (1981) built on their work and used ndings from eld studies of
task groups in laboratory settings (omas 1957) and eld settings (Horsfall and Arensberg
1966) to argue that workers who facilitated the work of others would experience a sense of
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responsibility for their dependent’s work. is felt responsibility could arise because the indi-
vidual realizes that their dependent’s ability to complete their task depends on the speed and
quality of the individual’s output. Further, the dependent’s ability to receive performance-
based rewards depends, in part, on the individual’s timely and correct output. Supporting
the felt responsibility perspective, Turner and Lawrence (1965) found a signi cant posi-
tive correlation (.53) between required interaction and the employee’s sense of responsibility
(Kiggundu 1981, p. 503).
Numerous studies have used Kiggundu’s felt responsibility to argue that interdependence
will lead to helpful behaviours. Pearce and Gregersen (1991) argued and demonstrated that
felt responsibility will motivate helpful behaviours even in the absence of any reciprocation
on the part of the dependent (see Section 3.3.5) (p. 839); Wong and Campion (1991) argued
that as task interdependence increases so will the intrinsic motivational value of the job, in
part because the worker will have an increased felt responsibility to work cooperatively with
their coworkers who depend on them (p. 826-827); Anderson and Williams (1996) argued
that the increased opportunity for interaction afforded by higher interdependence would
lead to a higher felt need for helping (p. 285); Settoon and Mossholder (2002) hypothesized
that an increase in initiated task interdependence would increase the chance a helper would
recognize that their help was needed, activating a social norm of responsibility (Berkowitz
1972), and thus increase helping behaviours in order to reduce chances for social censure
(Burke et al. 1976) (p. 259) ; Bachrach et al. (2006b) also used Kiggundu’s felt responsibility
argument and essentially con rmed the Pearce and Gregersen (1991) ndings using an ex-
perimental study; and de Jong et al. (2007) cited felt responsibility as the reason to assume
that increasing symmetric interdependence would increase helping behaviour (p. 1627). In
short, most studies arguing for a link between interdependence and helping behaviour do so
using felt responsibility.
3.3.2 Kahn’s role theory as the basis for felt responsibility
Felt responsibility, and the related motivation to make a prosocial difference, are theories of
motivation. Many of the papers cite Kiggundu (1981, 1983) as their foundation, but Kig-
gundu himself cited Kahn et al. (1964) as the motivational basis: “Kahn et al. (1964) argue
that interdependence creates some pressure that arouses in the focal person a psychological
force of some magnitude and direction” (p. 504).
e original theory linking role expectations to an individual’s behaviour (whether per-
formance in general or helping behaviours towards the role sender) is rooted in a power
relationship. e motivational basis that Kiggundu refers to above is part of the basic ques-
tions, “How do role pressures from others create psychological forces on the person? How
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do these forces combine with other forces to determine the person’s behavior?” (Kahn et al.
1964, p. 186). ese questions are part of the more general, “How do people in uence each
other’s behavior? What are the bases or preconditions for in uence? Under what conditions
will the in uence yield a result desired by the in uencer?” (p. 186).
Kahn et al. (1964) start with the question of how expectations lead to psychological
forces acting on the person. But then they shift the terminology to one of in uence. “Role
pressures are conceived as speci c attempts to in uence the behavior of a person in a given
position. Under most circumstances they generate a set of psychological forces on the person,
only some of which are in the direction intended by the in uencer” (p. 187). In uence is
seen to be primarily the result of power. “Role pressures are exerted through social in uence
processes and techniques which are based primarily in the formal role relations between the
sender and the focal person... power is highly concentrated in the hands of his direct su-
periors. Legitimate power, reward power, and coercive power are almost exclusively theirs”
(p. 205). In short, expectations result in psychological forces due to power. “If every effective
role sending involves some power implication, that is, some consequences of compliance of
noncompliance, what are the bases of that power? What in uence techniques are available
and under what conditions are they used” (p. 195)? And, “every attempt at in uence implies
consequences for compliance of noncompliance. In organizations these commonly take the
form of sanctions... e availability and visibility of such sanctions are important, whether
or not they are used or even threatened” (p. 16).
If Kiggundu (1981, 1983) used Kahn et al. (1964) as the theoretical justi cation that
felt responsibility would lead to psychological forces towards helping, there must be a power
component in the theory of felt responsibility. But such a component cannot be found in the
original formulation (Kiggundu 1981) or in any of its adopters. If felt responsibility does cre-
ate some force towards action on the part of the person who initiates the interdependence, it
must do so using some other mechanism. e only mechanism so far identi ed is expectancy
theory, as explained by Grant (2007): motivation towards helping behaviour requires a real-
ization that their helping behaviour leads to positive outcomes for their dependent coworker,
and that “helping my coworker” has a positive valence (see Section 3.3.1).
3.3.3 Perspective taking, empathy, altruism
e three closely related concepts of perspective taking, empathy, and altruism attempt to
explain why an individual would help their dependent. ey are overlapping concepts, and
they all may share some part of the underlying mechanism creating the forces produced by felt
responsibility. As such, and considering the vast literature behind each of the concepts, I will
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not attempt to delineate exactly where each begins and the other ends. Instead I will review
how management scholars have used the concepts as explanations for helping behaviour.
Perspective taking is the act of adopting another person’s viewpoint. It is argued that
perspective taking should increase empathy towards that person and their situation, and then
increase altruism (Batson et al. 1997). Studies have supported this argument. For example,
asking employees to take the perspective of their external supplier correlated with an increase
in helping behaviours towards those suppliers (Parker and Axtell 2001). It would not be
hard to imagine how perspective taking could also increase the empathetic concern towards
a coworker, prompting an increase in altruistic motivation and a corresponding increase in
helping behaviour.
Empathy, or empathetic concern, is “an emotional experience of compassion and feel-
ing for another in need and is directly associated with empathetic responding outcomes, like
ICB [interpersonal citizenship behaviours, i.e., helping behaviour]” (Settoon and Mossh-
older 2002, p. 258). Eisenberg and Miller (1987) review the social psychology literature on
empathy and found that there is typically a correlation between .10 and .31 between em-
pathic concern and prosocial behaviours (p. 113). Investigating if this general nding held
true for situations at work as well, McNeely and Meglino (1994) found a .18 correlation
between empathy and interpersonal prosocial behaviours. Settoon and Mossholder (2002)
had hypothesized that initiated task interdependence would directly correlate with helping
behaviour (citing felt responsibility) but failed to nd a signi cant correlation. But they did
nd a signi cant correlation from perspective taking to emphatic concern (r = .41) and
from emphatic concern to task-focused interpersonal citizenship behaviour (r = .31).
Altruism commonly refers to behaviour motivated to increase another person’s welfare,
which is often (but not always) self-sacri cing in the absence of obvious, external rewards
(Batson 1998, p. 282). ere is a great deal of social psychological research on altruism and
the situational factors which in uence altruistic behaviours (see Batson 1998, for a review).
Organizational scholars often cite Krebs (1970) when arguing that task interdependence in-
creases contact between coworkers which increases the chances of altruistic behaviours (e.g.,
Bachrach et al. 2006a, p. 194; Bachrach et al. 2006b, p. 1397; de Jong et al. 2007, p. 1627).
Although no current management theories incorporate altruism as the single explanation for
helping behaviours between coworkers, it is usually implied or referenced when it is hypoth-
esized that as interdependence increases so does helping behaviour.
Ultimately though empathy and altruism are labels for behaviour that appears to be al-
truistic or empathic. Labeling a behaviour as altruistic doesn’t explain it, and appealing to
altruism as the mechanism for helping behaviour verges towards tautology. Explanations in-
volving empathy and perspective typically end in a similar manner. Why did that employee
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help (act altruistic, display empathy to) their coworker? Because they were helpful (altru-
istic, empathic). Why didn’t they help (act altruistic, display empathy to) their coworker?
Because they were not helpful (not altruistic, not empathic). A more satisfactory explanatory
mechanism is needed.
3.3.4 Help seeking and norms
Although coworkers can help each other spontaneously, perhaps by recognizing that help is
needed and then offering it, past research has indicated that most help is given only after it
has been asked for. In a survey of 53 managers in a variety of work environments, Burke
et al. (1976) found that 92% of help was given after the helpee had requested it (p. 373). In
a replication, Kaplan and Cowen (1981) found that over 75% of the time help was given in
response to a direct request for help (p. 635). Perhaps then a direct answer to the question
of why would an individual help their dependent coworker would be, “because they asked
for help.” But this shifts our focus onto the request for help. e question then becomes,
how does the dependent’s request for help create a force towards helping behaviour in the
individual being asked? Flynn and Lake (2008) argue that the request for help creates a
situation in which refusal to help is a behaviour to avoid. In essence, Flynn and Lake argue
that instead of a force towards helping behaviour, as is proposed by the previous sections, a
request for help creates a force away from refusing to help.
Flynn and Lake (2008) are concerned with individuals who actively ask for help, their
perceptions of the chance that the responder will help, and whether or not the responder gives
help. In the Flynn and Lake (2008) experimental situations, the help seekers are strangers to
those who are asked. Although that is a different situation than one in which a dependent
coworker asks for help, the results may be enlightening. e author varies the directness
(whether the help was asked for explicitly, or implied; or whether the help was asked for
verbally, or through a hand-out sheet of paper), the experimental situations (hypothetical
situations vs. face to face situations), and the extent of help requested (short vs. long surveys).
One purpose is to show that when a help seeker takes the perspective of a help-giver, they
estimate more help will be offered. Crucial for our current topic, Flynn and Lake argue that
help seekers underestimate the amount of help they will receive, and this is because the help
seeker underestimates the negative effects of a help-giver refusing to give help. Help seekers
do not understand that “denying a request for help can be awkward and embarrassing because
it violates a social norm to assist those in need” (p. 141).
Flynn and Lake (2008) proposed that the force towards helping is a force away from re-
fusing to help. Refusing to help would “be violating an implicit norm of benevolence (Brown
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and Levinson 1987; Goffman 1971; Gouldner 1960)” (Flynn and Lake 2008, p. 128). Fur-
ther, “In many cases, people are motivated to comply with a request for help in order to avoid
the feelings of embarrassment that might be induced by noncompliance” (p. 129). And al-
though they didn’t investigate help seeking behaviour, Settoon and Mossholder (2002) ar-
gued that interdependence would increase the chance a helper would recognize that their
help was needed, activating a social norm of responsibility (Berkowitz 1972), and thus in-
crease helping behaviours in order to reduce chances for social censure (Burke et al. 1976;
Settoon and Mossholder 2002, p.259). us, helping behaviour is seen as the result of a
motivation away from embarrassment which could arise from violating an implicit norm of
benevolence, responsibility, or reciprocity.
is is an intriguing solution to the problem, and it could even be applied to the previous
sections. I contend that labeling behaviour altruism does not enhance our understanding of
why people are motivated to behave that way (e.g., they act altruistically because they are
altruistic). But perhaps the behaviour can be better explained as an attempt to avoid being
seen as non-altruistic, in situations that expect altruistic behaviour. e theory then becomes
more persuasive as we move from a dispositional explanation (a person acts altruistically be-
cause they are high in altruism) to a situational explanation (a person acts altruistically because
they were placed in a situation that expected them to act in an altruistic way). A move from
dispositional to situational explanations coincides with recent calls for a renewed situational
psychology, begun by Kurt Lewin (e.g., 1939; 1964) but often given little attention by social
psychologists (Reis 2008) (see Section 3.3.6) .
3.3.5 Social exchange theory
Bowler and Brass (2006) note that organizational citizenship behaviours are performed for
the organization as a whole, whereas interpersonal citizenship behaviours (ICB, or OCBI)
are performed for another person. OCB research has usually focused on job satisfaction and
other attitudinal variables that re ect an employer-employee interest, such as the organization-
to-employee, employee-to-organization, supervisor-to-subordinate, or subordinate-to-supervisor
relationship (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005, p. 878). For example, Shore et al. (2006) in-
vestigate how perceived organizational support (POS) affects an employee’s level of OCB,
their overall performance, absence, and tardiness. As a result, “most OCB researchers have
largely failed to address the possible exchange between employees... Research has largely
ignored the individual relationships between employees” (Bowler and Brass 2006, p. 71).
It is this interpersonal interaction that we are concerned about when we ask the question,
why and under what conditions would an individual help out their dependent? Social ex-
change theory addresses these questions directly by proposing that long-term interpersonal
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relationships both explain and predict the helping behaviour between coworkers.
Social exchange theory is not a theory, but a framework or set of concepts and principles
to apply to problems of interpersonal interaction (Emerson 1976, p. 336). As such, social
exchange is broad ranging, overlapping with and sometimes encompassing other explana-
tions for interpersonal behaviour, such as Interdependence eory (Section 3.3.6) and the
perspective taken by Behavioural Economics (Section 3.3.8). Each has it’s own unique ex-
planation for our behaviour of interest, but social exchange theory appears to be the most
inclusive.
Emerson (1976) described social exchange as “the economic analysis of noneconomic
social situations” (p. 336). Social exchange theory is an attempt to apply the concepts of
“reward, reinforcement, cost, value, utility, resource, comparison level, transaction, pro t,
outcome, etc” to interpersonal interactions (p. 347). An interaction is an exchange of re-
sources, with costs and bene ts to each party, resulting in mutual rewards. Rewards can vary
from monetary to the slightest signs of social acceptance, such as “eye contact with a smile,
which evokes valued approval” (p. 336). In general, social exchange theory is proposed to
be “a unitary framework for much of organizational behaviour” (Cropanzano and Mitchell
2005, p. 875).
Flynn (2005) discusses three types of social exchange: direct negotiated exchange, di-
rect reciprocal exchange, and generalized exchange. Direct negotiated exchanges are openly
negotiated with terms discussed and agreed to ahead of the exchange, and typically occur
between individuals unsure of their relationship (“I’ll cover your shift but only if you cover
mine next week”). Direct negotiated exchanges are also referred to as “economic exchanges”
(Shore et al. 2006, p. 839). In contrast, direct reciprocal exchanges are between individuals
in a stronger relationship. It is taboo to explicitly discuss terms; the exchange is implied
and expected sometime in the future (“Don’t worry about it, I’ll cover your shift”). Recip-
rocal exchanges depend on trust (Blau 1964), and involve “obligations, trust, interpersonal
attachment, or commitment to speci c exchange partners” (Emerson 1981, p. 35). Finally,
generalized exchanges occur between networks of people, sometimes but not necessarily be-
longing to the same organization. Person A helps out B, B helps out C, and sometime in
the future C helps out A. Peer reviews for journals, external examiners for PhD defences,
and other professional activities among professors are examples of generalized exchange.
In symmetric situations, the literature has used social exchange theory in a round-about
way to argue for a positive correlation between interdependence and helping behaviour. Set-
toon and Mossholder (2002) used social exchange theory (without directly naming it) to ar-
gue a direct link between interdependence and helping behaviour: “When interdependence
among coworkers is higher, expectations of exchange and reciprocity should be intensi ed”
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(p. 259). In fact, the rst paper on organizational citizenship behaviours implicitly used
social exchange theory to argue that increasing interdependence would increase helping be-
haviours. Smith et al. (1983) argued that interdependence would foster a collective sense
of social responsibility (Krebs 1970), and would tend to promote “higher levels of group
cohesion than other task environments” (p. 655). ey hypothesized that symmetric depen-
dence would in uence OCBs through the mediating mechanism of group cohesion and job
satisfaction (p. 656). A more general proposition, which was not directly tested, is that sym-
metry allows for the leader-member and member-member exchange of prosocial behaviour
(p. 655). An act of prosocial (helpful) behaviour then becomes subject to norms of reci-
procity (Gouldner 1960), and equity (Adams 1965), in that an individual may choose to
do acts of OCB in order to repay a previous kindness. Similarly, Anderson and Williams
(1996) used leader-member exchange to argue that helpful behaviours from a leader will be
reciprocated by helpful behaviours back to the supervisor from the employee (p. 283-284).
In asymmetric situations, the effect of social exchange is less clear. In general, social
exchange theory posits that when an individual decides whether or not to help a coworker,
the decision involves evaluating the extent that the coworker is known to, friends with, or has
helped the individual in the past (reciprocity). e theory would expect that a coworker who
is very well known, a close friend, and has helped the individual in the past will receive more
help than one who is not known and has not helped in the past. Bowler and Brass (2006)
used social exchange theory to argue that if an individual (Person A) is in an asymmetric
relationship with a dependent other (Person B), that is, A does not likewise depend on B, we
should expect that A will not feel that force towards helping behaviour. ere are two reasons
given for this lack of helping behaviour. One, citing impression management literature, they
argued that B (the dependent) would use helping behaviours as a form of ingratiation to
A, with the hopes of impressing them. “It is also unlikely, however, that the dependent
individual will receive ICB [helping behaviours] from the person who is the target of his or
her ICB because that person has no need to impress the dependent other” (Bowler and Brass
2006, p. 72) (emphasis mine). Two, citing relational in uence and power literature, they
argue that the power imbalance between A and B (B is dependent on A, therefore A has
the power) will affect the force that A feels towards helping behaviour. Speci cally:
Because social exchange relationships are based on equivalence between exchange
partners, an exchange relationship between the two employees of unequal in u-
ence is not likely. e higher in uence actor clearly has little to gain from pro-
viding services to the low-in uence individual (Bowler and Brass 2006, p. 73)
[emphasis mine].
Social exchange theory explains helping behaviour given to a dependent in terms of what
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the help giver needs, or what the help giver has to gain from giving help. If giving help
has no future value, or is not in repayment for a prior exchange, there would be no rational
reason the individual to give help. “is model assumes that people are motivated by self-
interest when they interact with others” (Tyler and Smith 1998, p. 612). It is, “the economic
analysis of noneconomic social situations” (Emerson 1976, p. 336). However, as there is no
official theory of social exchange theory, we cannot be sure if the hypotheses derived from
it by Bowler and Brass (2006) would be accepted by all social exchange theorists. Instead, a
more speci c and formalized approach, which many consider to be one of the foundations
of social exchange, is interdependence theory.
3.3.6 Interdependence theory
Describing the problems of the social psychology eld, Reis (2008) states:
On one hand, we trumpet the power of situations and contexts (a concept
that few outsiders would deny, at least in abstract terms). Indeed, our research
has provided impressive, even incontrovertible, evidence to support this asser-
tion. On the other hand, in the more than half-century since Gordon Allport,
Solomon Asch, Kurt Lewin, and others rst de ned the social in social psy-
chology in terms of situations, the eld has yet to develop a clear, consensual
de nition or taxonomy of what situations are, how they might be systematically
compared, and which ones are most in uential in what ways (p. 312).
In broad terms, interdependence theory (ibaut and Kelley 1965; Kelley and ibaut
1978; Kelley et al. 2003) is an attempt to create an objective description of the situation and
derive its affect on an individual’s behaviour. Situations are viewed as social affordances, as
opportunities for individuals to express motives, goals, values, and preferences. “A friend
in need is an occasion to assist, exploit, or ignore; a job that needs to be done is a chance
to divide labor, delegate, or do it oneself; and a romantic partner who prefers to vacation
somewhere different from one’s personal preference is an opportunity to be generous or pig-
headed” (Reis 2008, p. 316).
In speci c terms, interdependence theory describes a situation in terms of an outcome
matrix which describes the payoffs associated with each available choice. Using interde-
pendence theory, one derives an individual’s most probable action based on those payoffs.
Interdependence theory, similar to social exchange theory, explains an individual’s behaviour
in terms of what they receive from that behaviour. Underlying both theories is an assump-
tion that an individual prefers more payoff to less payoff, an assumption that the behavioural
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economists have dubbed “e Sel shness Axiom” (see Section 3.3.8). Although, it must be
noted that Kelley (1979) disagree with this interpretation. ey explicitly stated that “the
potentialities of outcome matrices have been underestimated and widely misunderstood,”
(p. 15) in reference to social psychologists who assumed that outcome matrices implied that
there was no room for prosocial motives “such as altruism, cooperation, and the desire for
justice” (p. 15). is issue will be taken up below in the discussion of given vs. effective
outcome matrices.
e term interdependence is used because usually the outcome of person A will depend
on the choice that B makes, and the outcome of B will depend on the choice that A makes.
e matrix may also describe a situation in which A makes a choice and their outcome is
the same regardless of B’s choice, and similarly B makes a choice and their outcome is the
same regardless of A’s choice; A and B are independent. On the other hand, if A’s outcome
cannot be affected by B’s choice, but B’s outcome is affected by A’s choice, it is said that A
is independent of B, and B is dependent on A; asymmetric dependence.
e outcome of A and B is represented by a number, which is a conceptual abstraction
representing gain, loss, happiness, sadness, money, information, or anything of value or of
interest to the person. Much like the numbers used in preference functions in economics
models, there is the assumption that the person will prefer a 5 over a 4, is ambivalent between
a 5 and a 5, and is ambivalent about a 0. And much like economic preference functions, the





run 5, 4 3, 5





run 5, 4 3,−3
bike 2,−4 3, 6
(b)
Figure 3.1: Alice and Bob’s interdependent situations
For example, Figure 3.1(a) shows an independent situation between Alice and Bob. e
left number in each of the cells is Alice’s outcome, the right number is Bob’s outcome. If Alice
chooses to run and Bob chooses to run, Alice will receive a 5 as her outcome, Bob will receive
a 4 as his outcome. If Alice chooses to run and Bob chooses to bike, Alice receives an outcome
of 3, and Bob an outcome of 5, and so on. e situation is considered interdependent because
given a choice by Alice to run, Bob can determine whether Alice receives an outcome of 5 or
an outcome of 3. Similarly, if Bob chooses to bike, Alice can determine whether Bob receives
an outcome of 5 or 6.
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e effects of interdependence can become very powerful, as can be seen when some
outcomes are negative. Consider Figure 3.1(b). Suppose Bob would rather bike than run,
but would dislike spending time away from Alice. If Bob decided to go for a bike Alice would
have a great amount of power over Bob’s outcome: if she chooses to bike, Bob’s outcome will
be 6; if she chooses to run, Bob’s outcome is −3.
e preceding example raises an important question: who chooses rst? Can the other
change their mind? Can the participants negotiate and decide on a choice together? Does
interdependence theory prescribe how two interdependent people arrive at their decision?
For game theoretic situations in behavioural economics, players choose independently
and simultaneously (see Section 3.3.8). Interdependence theory does not have this condition
or restriction. e matrix represents the outcomes after choices have been made, but it
makes no assumptions or prescriptions about how decision comes about. e participants
may be involved in a behavioural economic-type game with simultaneous decisions, or they
may be in a long standing relationship and are discussing which option they should both
take. Kelley (1979) give an example situation drawn from Tolstoy’s short novel “Family
Happiness”: “Suppose the two plans had been discussed. Sergey’s announcement that he
liked plan X would have brought Marya to instant accord. She would even have been happy
to agree on plan Y and so would Sergey, but neither would have espoused either plan if
the other had espoused a different plan” (p 11). Tolstoy’s situation is similar to the one
represented in Figure 3.1(b).
Kelley et al. (2003) use this game theoretic framework to derive 21 situations. Each
situation represents a different way in which two people can be interdependent. For example,
Chicken describes a situation where two people (usually males) drive their cars towards one
another at high speed (Kelley et al. 2003, p. 203). e one who veers rst is the coward (the
“chicken”), the one who doesn’t has more courage. If both veer it is embarrassing, but neither
can accuse the other of being more cowardly. If neither veers, they collide, and both “win.”
e situation is represented in Figure 3.2. e Kelley et al. (2003) situations frequently use
the same names that game theorists use. For example, battle of the sexes (p. 219), and the




veer −3,−3 −9, 3
stay 3,−9 −15,−15
Figure 3.2: Representation of classic game of “Chicken”
Where do the numbers in the outcome matrix come from? In most cases the numbers
are illustrative and meaningful only in a relative way. Adam is assumed to prefer 3 over −9,
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but it is not implied that Adam will receive $3 for winning the chicken game, or lose $15 for
crashing his car. e outcome matrices are used to illustrate and analyze a situation and the
forces acting on each participant, not represent a realistic outcome. However, real numbers
have been used. For example, 100 heterosexual pairs of UCLA undergraduates who had been
living with a partner for 3 or more months were asked to rate on a scale of −10 to 10 four
possible events: both clean the apartment, I clean the other doesn’t, the other cleans and I
don’t, and we both don’t clean. e results are presented in Figure 3.3. According to the data,
it would appear that males do not mind if their female partner cleans (as long as someone
cleans). Females on the other hand dislike it if only the male cleans, almost as much as they




clean +9, +7 0, +1
not −3,−1 −4,−3
Figure 3.3: Survey data for “Cleaning the apartment”
Asymmetric dependence
Asymmetric dependence refers to a situation where an individual has an individual (a partner,
a coworker, a friend, etc.) who depends on them, but they do not share that dependence.
I noted before that this situation has been left relatively unexamined by management lit-
erature (see Table 3.2). e situation is better understood in the context of interpersonal
relationships (Kelley et al. 2003, p. 249-267). In terms of interdependence theory, asym-
metric dependence can be represented as Figure 3.4. Bob depends on Alice, but Alice does
not depend on Bob. Alice can make choice a1 or a2 and receive the same outcome regardless
of Bob’s actions. In other words, Alice is independent of Bob. Bob’s outcome, on the other
hand, is completely controlled by Alice’s choice. It doesn’t matter whether Bob chooses b1 or
b2, if Alice choose a1 Bob will receive 5, if Alice chooses a2 Bob will receive 0. is situation
describes a completely asymmetric relationship where Bob has absolutely no control over his




a1 4, 5 4, 5
a2 7, 0 7, 0
Figure 3.4: “Asymmetric dependence:” Bob is dependent on Alice, Alice is not dependent on Bob
In the interpersonal relationships literature, asymmetric dependence is tied directly to
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power. “In situations involving asymmetric dependence, one person can in uence the well-
being of a second person, whereas the second person can exert little or no in uence over the
well-being of the rst. One person holds relatively greater power; the other is relatively more
dependent” (Kelley et al. 2003, p. 249). As such, the ways in which asymmetric dependence
explains helping behaviour will be discussed in Section 3.3.7.
Given vs. effective matrices
ere is a distinction made between the given matrix and what is referred to as the effective
matrix (Kelley 1979, p. 181). e given matrix is the external, objective set of payoffs. How-
ever, many individuals do not act according to their given matrix; they chose outcomes that
do not maximize their payoff, i.e., they act irrationally. Kelley (1979) note that “there is
much research evidence for its [the given matrix’s] invalidity... Raw matrix values are simply
not satisfactory predictors of behavior” (p. 15). is indicates that the matrix which is op-
erating at the time of choice is not the given matrix, but the effective matrix. e effective
matrix represents the outcomes that the individual perceives and acts upon at that moment.
e original ibaut and Kelley (1965) formulation of outcome matrices were criticized
for implicitly assuming that interpersonal behaviour was ultimately driven by “narrowly he-
donistic assumptions,” (Kelley 1979, p. 15) or what the behavioural economists would refer
to as e Sel shness Axiom. By introducing transformations, Kelley (1979) found a way to
take properties of the player (e.g., personal prosocial preferences for equality, cooperation,
or altruism), and properties of the situation (e.g., how much more or less their outcome will
be compared to their partner’s, that is, their relative outcome) and adjust the given matrix
in light of these individual differences. e adjustment is the transformation process which
results in the effective matrix.
Summary
Interdependence theory offers an elegant and powerful framework to describe almost every
type of interpersonal situation (Kelley et al. 2003). Each interpersonal situation can be de-
scribed objectively (with the given outcome matrix) and is transformed on an individual basis
according to that person’s values, dispositions, attitudes, needs, or beliefs about the future,
into a subjective situation (the effective matrix) (Kelley 1979, p. 16). e individual then
behaves rationally according to their effective matrix, and picks the action that will yield the
highest outcome. ey would be expected to make a choice resulting in a 5, over a choice
resulting in a 4. In other words, interdependence theory explains behaviour using the same
mechanism as social exchange and economic game theory.
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Given a situation where an individual is faced with helping a dependent, according to
interdependence theory why and under what conditions would they offer that help? e
individual would help their dependent because that action had the highest bene t. Helping
their dependent was a rational, bene t-maximizing choice at the time. eir cost bene t
equation takes into account their personal preferences for acting prosocially, being altruistic,
being a team player, and so forth, all of which combine to create the individual’s effective
matrix, or simply their subjective cost and bene ts. us, the conditions under which the
individual will help is answered by the individual’s effective matrix. However, in order to
develop a hypotheses about a particular situation, one would need to know the individual’s
preferences and all other personal factors that would alter the given matrix. Unfortunately
then, an observer would know an individual’s true effective matrix only after the choice had
been made. If the choice to help was made, then helping must have had more subjective
bene t than cost. If the choice to not help was made, then not helping must have had more
subjective bene t than cost.
3.3.7 Power and in uence
e possible explanations for an individual’s choice to help their dependent has been divided
into multiple perspectives above. It should be clear by now that this division is somewhat
arbitrary. Many of the previous approaches have had an underlying reference to power and
in uence. And although referencing a similar set of literature, the different perspectives
arrive at two contradictory explanations and hypotheses. ose that have appealed to a norm
explanation have argued that those in power will help their dependent. ose that have
appealed to the social exchange and power and in uence literature have argued that those in
power will not help their dependent.
Role theory (Kahn et al. 1964) explained that the force that a sender’s expectations exert
on a focal person is a result of the sender’s ability to in uence the focal person. In uence
is tied to power, which in organizations is exerted through rewards and sanctions resulting
from the focal person’s compliance or noncompliance. Role theory was used explicitly by
Kiggundu (1981, 1983), and implicitly by subsequent researchers (e.g., Pearce and Gregersen
1991), as the mechanism behind the force that Felt Responsibility exerted on an individual’s
behaviour toward their dependent. Although role theory was used as an explanation for the
force towards helping behaviour, the felt responsibility researchers were either not aware of the
power and in uence basis of Kahn et al. (1964), or they chose not to use power and in uence
as a component of their argument. In fact, the hypotheses derived from felt responsibility
are in con ict with those derived from power and in uence (see also Section 3.4).
Researchers in the help seeking literature have argued that seeking help is inextricably
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linked with power. To seek help is to acknowledge one’s dependence on another person, and
coupled with the admission of relative ignorance or incompetence, places the help seeker in
a less powerful position (Lee 1997, p. 339). Individuals are motivated to “maintain positive
public impressions and sel mages, and this usually entails being competent and independent,
in short, being powerful. Both of these motivations are threatened when one seeks help from
another.” (Lee 1997, p. 340). Lee (1997) found that when individuals were of unequal status,
less help was sought. e help giver’s motivations and the help given were not investigated.
Social exchange theory is implicitly concerned with power, in that it describes a person’s
actions with respect to the costs and bene ts they get out of an interaction. ose costs
and bene ts are related to the power imbalance in the relationship; an individual in power
can gain less bene t from a dependent. It was hypothesized that because there are minimal
bene ts to gain, a powerful individual is not motivated to help a less powerful dependent
(Bowler and Brass 2006, p. 73).
Finally, in interdependence theory, asymmetric dependence is treated as a pure problem
of power and in uence (Kelley et al. 2003, p. 249). Indeed, “the concepts of dependence
and power are inextricably related, in that to the extent that one person (A) is relatively
more dependent, the other (B) is relatively more powerful” (Rusbult and Van Lange 2003,
p. 355). e formalization of power as a function of dependence dates back to the 60’s when
Emerson (1962) recognized that “to say that ‘X has power’ is vacant, unless we specify ‘over
whom.’ In making these necessary quali cations we force ourselves to face up to the obvious:
power is a property of the social relation; it is not an attribute of the actor” (p. 32). Formally,
“Pab = Dba; the power of A over B is equal to, and based upon, the dependence of B upon
A.” Dab is A’s dependence on B, which is “(1) directly proportional to A’s motivational
investment in goals mediated by B, and (2) inversely proportional to the availability of those
goals to A outside of the A–B relation” (p. 32–33). A can reduce their dependence on B
by reducing their desire for that which B has control over, or by nding another source for
achieving their goal.
e dynamics of power are well studied in interpersonal relationships. For example,
a beautiful women may have more alternatives than her less attractive partner, giving the
woman power in the relationship; children learn that they lose power by depending on a
friend too much, and gain power when they take an “I don’t care what you do” attitude;
and a similar dynamic occurs in adult relationships where the partner who is relatively less
involved in the relationship “calls the shots,” as often does the partner who controls or brings
home more of the economic resources (Kelley et al. 2003, p. 253, 262). e pattern repeats
itself in employee-employer relationships as well, and has been termed “rational selective
exploitation.” Employees with attractive alternatives and mobility are more valuable and
command higher salaries compared to those who are tied down to a particular company or
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area because of job-speci c training, investments, or family commitments (Kelley et al. 2003,
p. 264).
e giving of help is complicated in interpersonal relationships. In some cases helping
behaviour from an individual in power may have unintended consequences. It is argued that
because of the prevalence of norms of reciprocity, help receivers are often placed in difficult
situations where they know that they will be unable to repay favours. Help receivers feel
resentful and hostile towards those offering help, welfare recipients experience a humiliating
loss of freedom and privacy, and siblings often feel embarrassed or resentful about seeking
help from one another (Kelley et al. 2003, p. 259). Depression-era behaviour and govern-
ment policies attempted to reduce these consequences; hobos attempted to retain some pride
by offering to do chores for food, and the government instituted make-work programs (Kelley
et al. 2003, p. 260).
According to the interpersonal power and in uence approach used in interdependence
theory, what would in uence a power holder to help their dependent? ere are two com-
peting forces identi ed. One, the power holder may be in uenced by social norms to help
their dependent: such as norms of fairness, norms of noblesse oblige, contributions-based
norms (resources should be allocated based on a concept of “deservingness”), or needs-based
norms (resources should be allocated based on each person’s needs, regardless of what they
have contributed in the past or what they may contribute in the future). It is apparent that
these norms are formulated more for interpersonal relationships (such as parent-child asym-
metry, or rich-poor asymmetry) than working relationships. Perhaps the norms identi ed
in Section 3.3.3 would be more appropriate. Regardless, this approach indicates that the
power holder would be in uenced by norms of benevolence (among others) to help their
dependent.
Two, the power holder may be in uenced by their own rational goal directed behaviour.
“It is easy to imagine that power holders typically will pursue their personal interests and
ignore others’ interests” (Kelley et al. 2003, p. 254). In experiments simulating the inter-
actions between a company with power (A) and a company without power (B), Tjosvold
(1981) found that when in a competitive situation (A and B’s goals were in con ict; if B
reached their goals it prevented A from reaching theirs) participants from A perceived that
they had little choice but to pursue self interest. While in a cooperative situation (A and B’s
goals were aligned such that if A reached their goals, B would as well, and vise versa) A felt
that helping B was worth the cost. e experiment was related back to following or violating
norms: “In the absence of powerful social norms or higher order goals favoring benevolence,
it is not surprising that power holders frequently behave in a self-oriented manner” (Kelley
et al. 2003, p. 255).
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de Jong et al. (2007) take the second approach and contend that the interpersonal power
and in uence literature supports the conclusion reached by the social exchange theorists—that
the power holder would gain little by helping their dependent, and therefore would not help.
ere are two explanations for this behaviour. First, asymmetry in power creates a situation
where the more powerful partner has more options and alternatives available to them (as
part of the de nition of dependence, Dab, above), and can withhold support and exit the
situation at a lower cost than their partner (Cook and Emerson 1978; Cook et al. 1983).
Asymmetry in relationships tend to generate negative effects, such as less voluntary help, an
agitated and negative emotional experience, increased use of threats and coercion, and in-
stability and incompatibility (Rusbult and Van Lange 2003). “In such a situation, the more
powerful team member may feel little need to invest in the relationship, which makes it less
likely that he or she will voluntarily help the less powerful person” (de Jong et al. 2007,
p. 1627).
Second, an experimental study found that the dependent in a relationship (B) was found
to “think hard” about the power holder’s (A’s) behaviour, in an effort to predict and control
that behaviour, while A had been found to spend less time and cognitive effort towards
observing and interpreting B’s behaviour (Depret and Fiske 1999, p. 465–466). is data
has been used to argue that power holders would have less need and less incentive to pay
attention to the actions and behaviours of their dependent (Fiske 1993, p. 621). erefore,
even if B helps A, or B tries to signal their trustworthiness or their intent to help, A will
simply not perceive B’s helpful behaviour (de Jong et al. 2007, p. 1627).
Both explanations were used to argue that as the asymmetry worsens (A’s relative power
increases), A would perceive less helpful behaviour from B, and as symmetry returns (A’s
relative power decreases), A would perceive more helpful behaviour (de Jong et al. 2007,
p. 1627). However the authors did not nd support for this hypothesis; individuals with
more power perceived about the same extent of help from their partner as those with less
power.
3.3.8 e behavioural economic perspective
One of the main goals of the behavioural economics research program is to understand and
explain how individuals make decisions. It is particularly relevant to this dissertation because
it provides the most scienti cally rigourous analysis of the assumptions and explanations that
underly social exchange theory and interdependence theory.
It has been noted above that the social exchange theory and interdependence theory ex-
plain human behaviour as a choice between alternatives. is choice occurs after available
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(subjective, perceived, etc.) costs and bene ts have been weighed. e choice is the logical,
rational one that maximizes the individual’s net bene t. is is the same model of choice
described by psychological decision theory, based on the rational actor model, which is con-
sidered to be “one of the great scienti c achievements of all time” (Gintis 2009, p. 245).
e rational actor model assumes that individuals seek to maximize their utility, where util-
ity is de ned in terms of individual bene t (e.g., money). is is known by some as the
self-interest assumption (Camerer 2003a, p. 48) or the sel shness axiom (Henrich et al. 2005,
p. 797). e sel shness axiom is the bedrock of microeconomics and Agency eory (Bot-
tom et al. 2006). However, it has been long known that “this model of decision making
was motivated as much by its analytic tractability and intuitive appeal as it was by empirical
facts” (Hagen and Hammerstein 2006, p. 340).
e rational actor model has been subject to a long and sustained critique (e.g., most
notably by the Tversky and Kahneman (1974) program of research). Loss aversion, base
rate fallacy, framing effects, conjunction fallacy, among many other fallacies and biases have
demonstrated that humans systematically diverge from the predictions made by the simple
rational actor model (Gintis 2009, pp. 21–29, 246). Henrich et al. (2005) state that the
sel shness axiom has been thoroughly challenged by empirical evidence:
Hundreds of experiments in dozens of countries, using a variety of game struc-
tures and experimental protocols, have suggested that in addition to their own
material payoffs, students care about fairness and reciprocity and will sacri ce
their own gains to change the distribution of material outcomes among oth-
ers, sometimes rewarding those who act prosocially and punishing those who
do not. Initial scepticism about such experimental evidence has waned as sub-
sequent studies involving high stakes and ample opportunity for learning have
repeatedly failed to modify these fundamental conclusions (p. 797)
Indeed, psychologists have stated that “game theoretic rationality in the service of per-
sonal pro t maximization is not an adequate model of human decision-making in social bar-
gaining situations. . .e idea that this simple game theoretical account is descriptive rather
than normative is surely dead in experimental economics and psychology” (Barclay and Daly
2003, p. 154). But, rather than disproving it, Gintis (2003, 2009) argues that the critiques
have been incorporated into the rational actor model, which is all the stronger for it:
ere is no alternative to the traditional decision-theoretic model on the hori-
zon, and there is not likely to be one, for one simple reason: the theory is mostly
correct, and where it fails, the principles accounting for failure are complemen-
tary to, rather destructive of, the standard theory (Gintis 2009, p. 246).
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ere is currently a great deal of debate over which form the revised standard theory
will take (see for e.g., Colman 2003; Henrich et al. 2005). It would take a great deal of
space and lead too far off track to review every alternative and their pros and cons, so the
focus will remain on trying to answer the question guiding this dissertation: why and under
what conditions would an individual help their dependent? Behavioural economics is con-
cerned with the exact same question when it asks, why and under what conditions would
an individual behave prosocially towards another? e experiments which are most useful
to answering these questions are the dictator game and the ultimatum game, both of which
will be described below. I will then discuss the leading behavioural economic explanation
for prosocial behaviour: other-regarding preferences.
e ultimatum game
ere are two players in the ultimatum game, a proposer and a responder. e experiment is
typically “one-shot” and anonymous, meaning that the participants (usually college students)
know that there is another person playing (not a computer) and that they will not nd out
who that person is, nor will they exchange roles or play that same person again. e proposer
is given a xed amount of money from the experimenter and told to divide it for themselves
(p) and for the responder (r). e responder is given a take-it-or-leave-it option to accept the
proposal, in which case they receive r and the proposer receives p, or reject the proposal, in
which case they both get nothing. After the responder makes their choice they receive their
proportion (if any) and the experiment ends. Typically the game is played with $10.
According to the rational actor model the responder should accept any positive r, because
they are a rational pro t-maximizing actor and something is better than nothing (Hagen and
Hammerstein 2006, p. 340). e proposer, knowing this, will offer the smallest positive r
and keep the largest possible p.
When actually played, “the self-regarding outcome is almost never attained or even ap-
proximated” (Gintis 2009, p. 57), which is “the kind of empirical nding that surprises only
economists” (Camerer 2003a, p. 43). In dozens of replications of this experiment, using a
range of xed amounts of money, but typically with western college students, proposers offer
an average of 40% (many offer half ) and responders reject small offers of around 20% around
half the time (Camerer 2003a, pp. 43, 50–55).
Many economists argue that the participants in dictator games would behave more like
rational agents (that is, according to the sel shness axiom) if the stakes were raised. Typically
these experiments use $10 as the pie to divide. As the stakes rise, studies have found no
statistical difference in rejection rates, and in one study with $400 stakes, rejection rates were
only slightly lower than typical (Camerer 2003a, p. 60).
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e frequency of rejections of large dollar amounts is striking. . . In List and
Cherry (2000) a quarter of the subjects who were offered $100 out of $400
rejected it. It is tempting to conclude that these subjects were “confused,” but
this explanation is acceptable only if confusion is measured independently of
whether a subject’s behaviour deviated from somebody’s pet theory (Camerer
2003a, p. 61).
is behaviour clearly violates the sel shness axiom. If players are not behaving according
to their self-regarding preferences, what is happening?
Behavioural economists argue that the ultimatum game is a precise way to measure “social
preferences” such as trust and fairness. ese concepts, usually amorphous and difficult to
quantify, can be precisely valued: a responder that rejects $2 out of a pie of $10 places a $2
value on how much they dislike being treated unfairly (Camerer 2003a, p. 44). is is called
“negative reciprocity,” and it is assumed that a responder rejects a positive offer when they feel
that the division is unfair. Rejection, then, is a way for the responder to punish the proposer.
Further, behavioural economists have found that social preferences are, in part, cultural. It
has been shown in an elaborate study involving 15 small-scale societies around the world,
that there is signi cant cross cultural variability in what is considered fair (Henrich et al.
2004, p. 19).
Considering that a proposer is giving money to a responder at a cost to themselves, giving
generous amounts to the responder is labeled altruism (West et al. 2007). However, given
that the responder can reject an offer as a way of punishing an unfair division, if a proposer
offers a generous r, are they doing so because they care about the welfare of the responder
at the expense of their own bene t, or are they trying to avoid a rejection? at is, to what
extent does the ultimatum game really indicate that the proposer is acting altruistically? e
dictator game was designed to answer this question.
e dictator game
e dictator game is the same as the ultimatum game, except that the responder cannot reject
the offer. By removing the option to reject, experimenters are able to remove fear of rejection
as an explanation for giving generously to the receiver. “If Proposers offer positive amounts
in a dictator game, they are not payoff maximizing, which suggests some of the generosity
in ultimatum games is altruistic rather than strategic” (Camerer 2003a, p. 56). Extensive
experimentation has found that the mean offer in dictator games is about 20%, compared
to the about 40% offered in ultimatum games. is indicates that there was some strategic
playing (avoiding rejection) in the ultimatum game, and some “pure altruism.”
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But does offering about 20% actually indicate altruism? Or could it be that the proposer
knows they are being watched, recorded, and perhaps judged by the experimenter? Under-
standing the long history of experimenter effects in social psychology research, Hoffman et al.
(1994) implemented an ingenious method of double-blind experimentation. e proposers
were given an envelope with 10 dollar bills and 10 blank slips (the same size as dollar bills)
and directed to a booth. e proposer was instructed to take any 10 bills or slips out of
the envelope, leaving 10 bills or slips inside. For example, if the proposer took 9 bills and 1
slip out, they were allocating $9 to themselves and leaving $1 for the receiver. is way the
experimenter could not tell how much money the proposer took from the envelope when
they carried it out of the booth and deposited it into a box. After all proposers had nished,
the experimenter opened the envelops and recorded the frequency of the allocations. e
receiver participants then drew random envelopes to receive their allocation.
More than half the proposers left nothing and the mean allocation was only 10%, which
was signi cantly less than the control conditions without double-blindness. Following this
line of research, other studies have attempted to increase “social distance” through other
mechanisms, but none had succeed in reducing the mean allocation over the standard dicta-
tor condition (Camerer 2003a, p. 62). In summary, Camerer (2003a) argues that anonymity
does not reduce all allocations in dictator games to levels predicted by the sel shness axiom,
and believes that these double-blind ndings indicate that there is some component of altru-
ism at work.
e double-blind experiments controlled for experimenter effects, but did they control
for the effects of other participants? Perhaps social forces are created by the other partici-
pants. e proposer knows that another human will receive their allocation, that this human
is a fellow student, and possibly even in the same class. Most importantly, the receiver will
know what the xed amount was and that the proposer divided it up in such a manner.
Understanding that there is a self-similar receiver and that they will know their choice, the
proposer may feel social forces towards being generous. Certainly such a situation and mo-
tivation is not unrealistic at all, but, crucially, this motivation is different than altruism. As
H.L. Menken said, “Conscience is the inner voice that warns us somebody may be looking.”
Dana et al. (2006) tested the effect of visibility by setting up a traditional $10 dictator
game. But, after the proposer had decided on the allocation, they were told that the receiver
at that point had no knowledge of the game being played. If they wanted, the proposer
could take $9 and walk away (an “exit option”), and the receiver would never be told what
had happened. Otherwise the experiment would continue as normal, the receiver would be
given their allocation and told the rules of the game and the original xed amount. According
to rational agent theory no player should chose the ($9, $0) exit option, as it is “dominated”
by the ($10, $0) and ($9, $1) options. e ndings showed that about one third of the
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participants chose to exit the game, taking $9 and giving the receiver nothing. A second
study tested to see if it was the receiver’s perceptions about the proposer that prompted the
proposer’s exit. A “private dictator game” was created, where the proposer was told that the
receiver will receive their allocation as part of the payment for an unrelated task. e receiver
would be ignorant of the proposer’s choice and the dictator situation. In the private dictator
game only one participant (out of 24) chose the exit option ($9, $0), indicating that it was
the receiver’s perception of the proposer that in uenced the exit behaviour in the rst study.
e authors concluded that:
In this way, invisibility affords more freedom to be unjust than does total power
and anonymity. e dictator game affords the dictator power and anonymity,
but not invisibility, since the receiver still knows that someone has money to
divide. Just knowing that one is the anonymous dictator that the receiver will
think badly of can be sufficient to compel giving (p. 201).
Dana et al. (2006) argue that generous gifts in the dictator game are due to the desire
not to violate the expectations of the receiver, rather than a pure altruistic concern for their
welfare (p. 193).
Explaining behaviour in economic games
How do economists explain the behaviour of participants in the ultimatum and dictator
games, and can this be used to understand helping behaviour in work situations? Game the-
orists predict participant’s behaviour in games using Rational Choice eory (RCT), which
has two components: 1) a preference function which has variables accounting for an indi-
vidual’s desires (goals, or utilities), which are unique to each individual and act to motivate
the individual’s behaviour; 2) rational calculation and evaluation of outcomes of possible be-
haviours, which lead to an individual choosing the behaviour that results in the maximum
utility given their preference function (Heintz 2005, p. 825). Although in early formula-
tions the rational calculation and evaluation component assumed complete information and
a high level of reasoning, current formulations do not. Participants make decisions subject
to information and material constraints. Even the sel shness axiom, the assumption that in-
dividuals seek to maximize only their own material gains and assume that other individuals
do the same, is no longer a core assumption of RCT (Henrich et al. 2005, p. 812).
e decades of behavioural economics work, of ultimatum, dictator, and other games,
have all demonstrated that individuals take the interest of others into account when they
make their proposals and allocations. But instead of disproving the RCT framework, these
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ndings have prompted an adjustment in the preference function equation. It is the self-
ishness axiom which is at fault (Camerer 2003b, p. 157). Instead of including only the
individual’s utilities, the functions now include other-regarding preferences. Other-regarding
preferences take many forms, such as inequality aversion (Camerer 2003a, p. 102), fairness
(Camerer 2003a, pp. 105, 107), and many other competing approaches (see Colman (2003),
Henrich et al. (2005) and their commentators for a wide range of alternatives).
Other-regarding preferences are now considered to be the best approach to dealing with
evidence that indicates that individuals do not obey the sel shness axiom. Other-regarding
preferences match how we see normal humans behave in real life; it is argued that because of
cultural norms (of reciprocity, altruism, benevolence, and so forth), only sociopaths would
consider complete sel shness at all times to be in their best interest (Gintis 2009, p. 52).
e evidence from economic games are used to argue that other-regarding preferences are
the explanation for why individuals do not behave according to the sel shness axiom, and
that because game theory has incorporated other-regarding preferences into the preference
equations it is now the strongest theory of human behaviour (Gintis 2009, p. 246). Indeed,
some argue that it is now only an empirical matter to determine the correct form for those
other-regarding preferences (Camerer 2003b, p. 157).
But these arguments largely sidestep the ndings from Hoffman et al. (1994) and Dana
et al. (2006), which show that anonymity reduces an individual’s other-regardingness to al-
most nothing. To reconcile, Dana et al. (2006) proposed that an individual’s utility function
should include: −α|µ − m|, where the parameter α is the proposer’s sensitivity to the re-
ceiver’s expectations, and |µ−m| is the absolute difference between the receiver’s expectations
(µ) and the amount the dictator gives (m). e model says that if the proposer is sensitive
enough, they will conform to the receiver’s expectations (Dana et al. 2006, p. 200). However,
rather than incorporate social expectations into game theory, an admission that would pro-
foundly disturb game theory’s commitment to methodological individualism (Colman 2003,
p. 150), Gintis (2009) argues that participants must have incorporated norms into their pref-
erence functions: “e most plausible interpretation of these results is that many subjects felt
obliged to behave according to certain norms when playing the Dictator Game, or violated
these norms in an uncomfortable way, and were willing to pay simply not to be in a situation
subject to these norms” (p. 76).
Perhaps Colman (2003) sums up the behavioural economic explanatory approach best:
We are so much attached to the notion of rationality that we are always ready
to repair it, but not to abandon it. e theory of rationality is, in fact, a for-
malization of a naive theory of human thinking. is naive theory makes it
possible to predict human behavior in most everyday situations in the same way
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as naive physics makes it possible to predict natural phenomena in everyday life.
However, no one takes naive physics so seriously as to claim that it provides “the
explanation” of the world. Moreover, even re ned and formalized versions of
this naive theory, like Newtonian mechanics, are shown not to be valid; and
more complicated and counterintuitive theories at the microlevel, like quantum
mechanics, have been invented. On the contrary, rationality theory is taken se-
riously, especially in economics, as an explanation of human behavior (p. 167).
However, one should be careful not to place too much explanatory validity on other-
regarding preference functions. It is often forgotten that “the important uses of game theory
are prescriptive (e.g., giving people good advice) and descriptive (predicting what is likely to
happen), because good advice (and good design of institutions) requires a good model of how
people are likely to play” (Camerer 2003b, p. 157). Although it is implied by some (notably
Gintis (2003, 2009)), game theory is not designed to the realistic model and explanation of
what actually happens inside an individual’s head. Individuals do not calculate and evaluate
preference functions to maximize their utility, even if that utility includes other-regarding
preferences. What is needed is a more phenomenologically valid approach that can explain
why an individual would help a dependent when they don’t have to (see Section 4.2 for one
possible approach).
Relating the dictator and ultimatum game to helping behaviour
It has been argued that helping behaviour between coworkers is often personally costly to
the help giver, at the time that the help is given, because it prevents them from completing
their own work (Bergeron 2007). If time and effort is considered a limited resource, it would
not be too great a stretch to see how helping a coworker could be considered costly to the
giver, but provide an immediate bene t to the receiver. Help-giving could be considered
similar to giving money to the receiver. In this case dollars represent time and effort which is
a scarce resource and valuable to both workers. is analogy between help-giving and money
exchange simpli es many complexities relating to perceptions of help versus perceptions of
money, motivations related to work compared to money, and so forth. But it is essentially
the perspective underlying social exchange theory, interdependence theory, and resource de-
pendence theories (Staudenmayer 1997). For now these simplifying assumptions can help
more than they hurt, much like anechoic chambers help speaker engineers, and frictionless
inclines helped cannoneers (Lewin and Gold 1999, pp. 37–66) and (Aronson et al. 1990, p.
76).
e dictator game is useful to approximate a situation where an individual (A) has a
dependent (B). In power terms (Section 3.3.7), A has relatively more power than B, because
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A determines B’s allocation of money. In interdependence theory terms (Section 3.3.6), B
is asymmetrically dependent on A for their rewards. e traditional dictator game can be
used to evaluate the extent to which A “helps” B, and does so with exceptional clarity and
precision (helping is quanti ed in exact dollar amounts), but only if we make a number of
assumptions about their situation. e assumptions include (but may not be limited to):
A does not know B; A will not interact with B again; and A will not reverse roles some
time in the future. ese assumptions are clearly unrealistic for most situations, especially
work situations where A and B are coworkers, know each other, may have relationships
with one another both in and outside of work, expect to work with each other again in
the future, have superordinate goals, have organizational cultural norms, and have various
task-related constraints either restraining them from, or encouraging them towards helping
behaviour. In other words, the dictator game ignores all social and technical factors of a work
relationship. Given these obvious de ciencies, what could the dictator game possibly teach
us about helping behaviour between coworkers?
e dictator game is useful precisely because it strips away all social factors. e be-
havioural economics research program was partly designed to systematically isolate social
factors, removing every plausible alternative explanation for prosocial behaviour. e de-
scription above reviews only a small number of the hundreds of studies that have manipu-
lated all possible social and experiment variables that could account for helping behaviour.
is methodical scienti c approach has isolated participants to an extent never before real-
ized, all in order to determine the baseline, the very foundation-level of helping behaviour. I
believe we have almost reached that bedrock in the Dana et al. (2006) study. e Hoffman
et al. (1994) study demonstrated that the social forces created by the experimenter could
account for some of the generous giving, but not all of it. It was concluded that the remain-
ing giving must be altruistic. But then the Dana et al. (2006) study isolated proposers from
their receivers, demonstrating that almost all the remaining generous giving was in response
to the social expectation exerted by the receiver. If the double-blind (Hoffman et al. 1994)
and isolated receiver studies (Dana et al. 2006) were combined, we should expect that there
would be zero generous giving by the proposer. What is left, in the dictator game, are two
individuals who have no reason to help one another. e strength of the behavioural eco-
nomics approach is that researchers can start with this bedrock level of social isolation, add
social forces piece by piece, and measure their effects in dollar values.
e previous sections have reviewed organizational studies that have tried to discover
the reasons for helping behaviour through surveys and experiments. Often researchers sift
through dozens of personal, task-related, and behavioural variables and try to nd correla-
tions to valued work outcomes (Section 3.2.1), performance (Section 3.2.2), and helping
(Section 3.2.3). e experimental studies by their nature provide stronger links between in-
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terdependence and helping behaviour, but there are relatively few to learn from and their
methods and ndings are often muddled and inconclusive (Sections 3.2.3 and 5.1.2). Or-
ganizational scholars can learn much from behavioural economics experiments, which are
systematic, clear, and methodologically sharp (see Gintis (2009, pp. 49–52) and Camerer
(2003a, pp. 34–42) for thorough explanations and arguments for experimental rigour).
e most important nding for explaining helping behaviour in work situations is the
effect of social expectations. Removing social expectations removed almost all generous giv-
ing (Dana et al. 2006). is indicates that behaviour which had previously been labeled (for
lack of a better explanation) altruistic, may have been the result of social expectations.
e extent that this nding is generalizable to other situations or other experiments is
not known. Also not understood well by behavioural economists is how “social expectation”
should be represented and analyzed. Expectation is a social psychological construct, and
as can be seen in the last section, the economist’s solution is to turn it into a variable in
an individual’s preference function, or call it a norm. I contend that the correct way to
deal with the force created by a social expectation is through social psychological theory (see
Section 4.2) which is decidedly not a methodological individualistic explanation. In fact,
I would argue that behavioural economists have been treating a lot of social behaviour as
the result of an individual’s choice over a preference function. at is, they have assigned a
cognitive explanation for something that is social—the interaction between two individuals.
3.4 Predictions based on previous theories
is section will collect and summarize the empirical, theoretical, and logical arguments
reviewed in Section 3.3. Recall that we are interested in answering the following question:
why and under what conditions will an individual help their dependent? In Section 3.1.5
I distinguished between level and mutuality of dependence, each of which I argued will
independently affect the amount of helping behaviour. is means that the following set of
questions need to be answered.
3.4.1 What are the effects of interdependence on helping behaviours?
As the level of dependence increases from low to high, what is the effect on helping behaviour?
In an asymmetric situation this would mean, holding all else equal, if the extent to which B
depends on A increases, would A change their helping behaviour towards B? is can be
illustrated as a transition from cell (A) to cell (C) in Table 3.3. In a symmetric situation this
would mean, holding all else equal, if the extent to which B depends on A and A depends
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on B increases, would A and B change their helping behaviour towards each other? is
is illustrated as a transition between cell (B) and cell (D). What predictions would previous
theories make for these changes in level of dependence?4
As the dependence changes from asymmetric to symmetric, what is the effect on helping
behaviour? In both the low and high levels of dependence this would mean, holding all else
equal, if at rst A does not depend on B, would A change their level of helping behaviour
if the situation changed so that A likewise depended on B? is is illustrated as a transition
from cell (A) to (B), and from cell (C) to (D).
Mutuality of dependence
Asymmetric Symmetric
Level of Low (A) (B)
Dependence High (C) (D)
Table 3.3: e possible effects of level and mutuality of dependence on helping behaviours
3.4.2 General empirical ndings
With two exceptions, those empirical studies dealing with helping behaviour have investi-
gated symmetrically dependent situations. While some have reported nonsigni cant nd-
ings, all signi cant ndings have indicated that as level of dependence increases from low to
high, that is, as we move from cell (B) to (D), helpful behaviour increases. ese generally
accepted ndings are illustrated in Table 3.4. e transitions between cells (A) and (C) are
less well understood; the predictions based on theory are con icting, and empirical ndings
have been nonsigni cant (Bowler and Brass 2006; de Jong et al. 2007). e empirical effects
of a change in mutuality of dependence is currently unknown (Table 3.5).
Mutuality of dependence
Asymmetric Symmetric
Level Low (A) ? (B) lower helping beh.
of ↕ ↓
Dependence High (C) ? (D) higher helping beh.
Table 3.4: e effects of a change in level of dependence: ndings from past empirical research
4It will be assumed throughout the following discussion that predicting a change in one direction implies
that moving in the other direction would bring about the opposite change. For example, if a theory predicts
an increase in helpful behaviours when moving from cells (B) to (D), that theory would predict a reduction in




Level of Low (A) ?→ (B) ?
Dependence High (C) ?→ (D) ?
Table 3.5: e effects of a change in mutuality of dependence: ndings from past empirical research
3.4.3 Felt responsibility
Felt responsibility argues that as level of dependence increases, contact and understanding
between coworkers would increase, allowing A to realize the impact they have on B, and
vise versa (see Section 3.3.1 for details). is perceived impact increases their motivation
to help. But, crucially, the argument rests on A liking B, because the outcome valence of
“helping my coworker” needs to be positive for motivation to increase. Other researchers add
to the argument, stating that the motivation is also created by a felt need to adhere to a social
norm of responsibility. Felt responsibility supports the following hypothesis: when moving
from cell (B) to (D), helping behaviour will increase due to an increase in felt responsibility.
Felt responsibility also supports: moving from cell (A) to (C), helping behaviour will increase
due to an increase in Person A’s felt responsibility. No empirical study has tested this second
hypothesis. Moving from cell (A) to (B) or (C) to (D) would presumably increase the amount
of contact between A and B, and would probably increase A’s perception of the impact they
have on B. e following hypothesis would then be reasonable: moving from (A) to (B) and
from (C) to (D) would increase helping behaviour due to an increase in A’s felt responsibility.
No empirical study has tested this third hypothesis. See Tables 3.6 and 3.7 for an illustration
of the hypotheses derived from the felt responsibility arguments.
3.4.4 Norms
Often researchers who primarily use other explanations (such as perspective taking, felt re-
sponsibility, help seeking, social exchange theory, interdependence theory, or power and
in uence) appeal to empathy, or various norms of altruism, reciprocity, equity, or benevo-
lence to support their argument (see Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4). As dependence increases, A
realizes that B depends on them in order to complete their task, and feels a force to obey
social norms and help B. In general, if level of dependence increases, or if mutuality changes
from asymmetric to symmetric, it could be argued that A will somehow feel a greater need
to obey social norms and help an ever more dependent B.
e following hypotheses would be expected to hold: moving from cells (A) to (B), and
(C) to (D) (see Table 3.6), or from (A) to (C), and (B) to (D) (see Table 3.7) would lead
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to a relative increase in helping behaviour, due to an increased pressure to conform to social
norms, or to avoid the appearance of violating social norms. Since the norm explanation is
implicit or explicit in so many studies of helping behaviour it is unclear how much support
each norm has and for which cell transitions. It would be safe to say that since most empirical
evidence supports an increase in helping behaviour when moving from cell (B) to (D), this
would suggest that norms may have had a place to play in those results.
Mutuality of dependence
Asymmetric Symmetric
Level of Low (A) lower helping beh.→ (B) higher helping beh.
Dependence High (C) lower helping beh.→ (D) higher helping beh.
Table 3.6: Effect of a change in mutuality of dependence, according to theories of felt responsibility, social
norms, social exchange, and behavioural economics
Mutuality of dependence
Asymmetric Symmetric
Level Low (A) lower helping beh. (B) lower helping beh.
of ↓ ↓
Dependence High (C) higher helping beh. (D) higher helping beh.
Table 3.7: Effect of a change in level of dependence, according to theories of felt responsibility, social norms,
and behavioural economics
3.4.5 Social exchange theory
Predictions based on social exchange theory are mixed (see Section 3.3.5). Classic studies
on helping behaviour in organizations used social exchange theory to predict that as inter-
dependence increased, so should helping behaviour. But their ndings were inconclusive.
Current studies maintain that in symmetric “equivalent” relationships, social exchange the-
ory predicts an increase in helping behaviour due to the norms of reciprocity, responsibility,
altruism, and even group cohesion. e following hypothesis would be expected to hold:
moving from cells (A) to (B) and (C) to (D) would increase helping behaviour between A
and B due to a strengthened social exchange relationship (see Table 3.6).
Current theorists have argued that social exchange relationships are based on equivalence
between exchange partners. If B is dependent upon A, A would have little to gain from help-
ing B. Ultimately, the decision to give help is made in terms of what the help giver needs, or
what the help giver has to gain from giving help. erefore, if giving help has no future value,
or is not in repayment for a prior exchange, there would be no reason for the individual to
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give help. e following hypotheses were therefore proposed (Bowler and Brass 2006, p. 72):
as asymmetric dependence increases, moving from cell (A) to (C), helping behaviour from
A will decrease due to a weakened social exchange relationship; as symmetric dependence
increases, moving from cell (B) to (D), helping behaviour from A will increase. Or, follow-
ing the nomenclature of the previous hypotheses and tables: moving from cell (C) to (A)
would increase helping behaviour from A, and moving from cell (B) to (D) would increase




Level Low (A) higher helping beh. (B) lower helping beh.
of ↑ ↓
Dependence High (C) lower helping beh. (D) higher helping beh.
Table 3.8: Effect of change in level of dependence, according to theories of social exchange, power and in uence,
and interdependence theory
3.4.6 Interdependence theory, power and in uence
For symmetric relationships, interdependence theory and theories of power and in uence
would hypothesize the same relationship as social exchange theory; social exchange theory
is often used to explain symmetric relationships within these theoretical frameworks (see
Sections 3.3.6 and 3.3.7). us, the predictions for movement from cell (A) to (B) and (C)
to (D) would be illustrated by Table 3.6, and for the same reasons as social exchange theory.
With regard to asymmetric dependence (cells A and C), Interdependence eory and
theories of power and in uence argue that power holders are in uenced by two compet-
ing forces: social norms, and self-interest. As noted above, social norms would in uence a
power holder to help their dependent, or risk violating the norms. Self-interest, on the other
hand, in uences a power holder to pursue their own agenda, sometimes at the expense of
their dependent. Using similar logic as the social exchange theorists, and using arguments
from impression formation and social judgment literature, the power-dependence literature
indicates that as a power holder increases their power, they do not need to pay attention to
their dependent’s behaviour, invest in their relationship with their dependent, require help
from, or feel the need to spend effort giving help to their dependent. e following hypothe-
ses would be proposed (de Jong et al. 2007, p. 1627): as asymmetric dependence increases,
moving from cell (A) to (C), A will perform fewer helping behaviours; in symmetric relation-
ships, as level of dependence increases, moving from cell (B) to (D), A and B will perform
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more helping behaviours. e predictions of power and in uence literature correspond to
the predictions of the social exchange theory (see Table 3.8).
3.4.7 Behavioural economics
e axiom of sel shness would clearly produce the same hypotheses as social exchange the-
ory, interdependence theory, and power and in uence (Tables 3.6 and 3.8; see Section 3.3.8).
However, behavioural economists have found that individuals do not behave according to
the axiom of sel shness. In order to account for this, researchers have added other-regarding
preferences into their decision-making model, rational choice theory. Other-regarding pref-
erences are argued to be an economist’s operationalization of social norms which have proven
to be t through through evolution (Gintis 2003). Other researchers have demonstrated that
those social norms argued to be responsible for apparent other-regarding behaviour, such as
altruism, are actually responses to social expectations. Removing the social expectations from
the experimental situation has been shown to reduce helping behaviour to almost nothing.
e relative contribution of other-regarding preferences and/or forces felt from social
expectations is still a matter to be decided through further study. What is clear, and widely
agreed to, is that humans do not behave purely sel shly. As such, the empirical results from
behavioural economics would probably support the following hypotheses: moving from cells
(A) to (B), and (C) to (D), or from (A) to (C), and (B) to (D) would lead to a relative
increase in helping behaviour (illustrated in Tables 3.6 and 3.7, respectively). Although past
behavioural economic experiments indicate that this is the pattern organizational researchers





Section 3.4 summarized how the literature has explained and predicted the effect of interde-
pendence on helping behaviour. Previous work has not considered that level and mutuality
of dependence are independent factors affecting helping behaviour. Or, having considered
it, previous work has offered con icting explanations and predictions for their effects. A new
theory is needed to clarify the effect of level and mutuality of dependence on behaviour. e
hypotheses will be tested in the experiment in Chapter 5.
Interdependence is hypothesized to affect helping behaviour in a two-step process. First,
task-dependence affords the ability and opportunity for help. Second, situations of task-
dependence create social expectations. Unmet social expectations create an unbalanced state
lled with tension which gives rise to forces towards helping behaviour. As an analogy, higher
levels and mutuality of dependence opens a door for helping behaviours, and the social ex-
pectations created by the situation motivates the helper to walk through.
4.1 Interdependent situations afford helping behaviours
e review in Section 3.4 and its tables raises two questions: why would an increase in the
level of dependence, ceteris paribus, lead to an increase in helping behaviours? And: why
would a change from asymmetric to symmetric, ceteris paribus, lead to an increase in helping
behaviours?
It was noted in Section 3.1.1 that what we refer to as interdependence is a result of a
division of labour which creates a task relationship. Person B is dependent upon A only
to the extent that their ability to complete their task is affected by A’s actions (or lack of
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actions).1 When minimally dependent on A, B is affected by a small set of A’s actions.2
e extent to which A can affect B’s ability to complete their task is relatively limited. Even
given A’s most unhelpful behaviour, B will be able to compensate and complete their task.
Likewise, when maximally dependent on A, B is affected by a large set of A’s actions. A
can affect B’s ability to complete their task to a great extent. Given A’s most unhelpful
behaviours, B is unable to compensate in order to complete their task. But, given A’s helpful
behaviours, B is able to complete their task much quicker.
Interdependence is task-related, which is key to understanding how a situation constrains
and allows helping behaviours. If B has a high level of dependence on A, A is able to per-
form task-related behaviours that help and do not help B. But if B has a low level of de-
pendence on A, A will nd it more difficult to to perform task-related helpful and unhelpful
behaviours, simply because B is not as dependent upon A as before. In situations with low
levels of dependence, the set of A’s helpful and unhelpful task-related behaviours is smaller
than it would be in situations with high levels of dependence. To be clear, in low depen-
dence situations, A would still be able to go “above and beyond” their job description and
help B, but doing so is less convenient, less appropriate, or less tting. e same would hold
true for unhelpful behaviours; in situations of low dependence, A would be able to go out of
their way to be unhelpful to B, but doing so is less convenient. A low dependence situation
constrains A’s ability and opportunity to help and not help. Conversely, dependence affords
A the ability and opportunity to help B, in the same way that objects afford some actions
and not others (Gibson 1977; Norman 1988).
Gibson (1977) argues that an object in its environment exists independent of those per-
ceiving it. Its form is re ected by light and perceived by a human or animal. Depending on
the human’s life space they will perceive the object as having particular subjective uses and
properties. For example, a pen on a table affords a student the ability to write; if the student
is having trouble opening their desk the pen now affords a levering or crowbar action; if the
student is trying to open a stubborn backpack zipper the pen affords a prying action; or if
the student is trying to make a mask out of paper the pen affords a poking action. Norman
(1988) uses Gibson’s theory of affordances to explain how people learn to cope with the
tens of thousands of distinct objects in everyday life. We cope by intuitively understanding
how things work, by observing their affordances, constraints and mappings (Norman 1988,
p. 12).
Like objects which afford and disafford uses, high dependence situations afford A the
1As de ned by ompson (1967) and most others, interdependence involves work products, resources,
information, or anything that the dependent would nd useful to complete their task. I am using the term
“actions” because, presumably, an individual would need to take an action (or not take an action) in order to
send (or fail to send) whatever it is that the other is dependent upon.
2See also the discussion on the difference between level and mutuality of dependence in Section 3.1.5.
86
ability to help and not help B more than do situations of low dependence. Without the
affordances that high dependence situations provide, high levels of helpful and and unhelpful
behaviours are at best more difficult to perform, and at worst are simply not possible.
Viewing situations as providing affordances for behaviour is supported by previous orga-
nizational research. Interdependence theory views situations as “social affordances” that pro-
vide “opportunities for acting, interacting, and being acted upon” (Reis 2008, p. 316). High
interdependence affords communication between team members (Gladstein 1984, p. 501).
Situational affordances were implicitly used by OCB researchers to explain why OCBs do
not positively affect group performance in all situations. ey argued that OCBs improve
performance only in interdependent situations, because only interdependent situations need
helping behaviours (Podsakoff et al. 1997, p. 268) and (Organ 1988, p. 109). Further, when
nding a strong correlation between high levels of symmetric dependence and helping be-
haviours, Bachrach et al. (2006b) noted: “the condition effect is not too surprising because
the task structure in the high task interdependence condition afforded group members more
opportunity to help than in the low task interdependence condition” (p. 1401).
In symmetric situations where A and B depend upon each other, and where there are
high levels of dependence, there is more interdependence and more interaction (Brass and
Burkhardt 1993, pp. 445–446) and (Settoon and Mossholder 2002, p. 258). More inter-
action leads to more chances to offer help (Anderson and Williams 1996; Podsakoff et al.
1997; Bachrach et al. 2006b; Organ 1988, p. 109). As Weick (1979) remarked, “When two
people encounter one another, there is some possibility that each can bene t the other. For
each, the contact with another person affords the possibility of increased need satisfaction
and self-expression” (p. 90).
On the other hand, low levels and non-mutuality of dependence have been argued to
constrain (or not require) interaction (Stewart and Barrick 2000, p. 137). In groups that lack
interdependence (members are relatively independent), helping behaviour and coordination
between teammates is simply not needed so it is not performed (Wageman and Baker 1997,
p. 154), and when performed wastes time and effort (Liden et al. 1997, p. 176).
In summary, previous research has indicated that symmetric situations and a high levels of
dependence require more interaction and afford the ability and opportunity for more helping
behaviour. It is expected that moving from cell (A) to (B) will lead to a higher probability
of helpful and unhelpful behaviours, as will a move from cell (C) to (D), from (A) to (C),
and from (B) to (D) (see Table 4.1). Hypotheses derived from this argument are presented
in combination with those derived from balance theory in Sections 4.2.4 and 4.2.3.
Symmetric and high dependence situations afford A the ability to help. However, open-




Level of Low (A) (B)
Dependence High (C) (D)
Table 4.1: e possible effects of level and mutuality of dependence on helping behaviours
behaviours. Even though the situation affords an increased probability of helpful and un-
helpful behaviour, why would A help B? Why not more unhelpful behaviour? A must feel
forces towards helping B. e forces are a result of the situation creating social expectations
for helping behaviour.
4.2 Interdependent situations create social expectations and
cognitive tension
Above and beyond the ability and opportunity to help given to A, highly dependent situa-
tions also result in B needing more actions from A (Podsakoff et al. 1997, p. 268) and (Organ
1988, p. 109). If in a situation of low dependence, A can act as they wish and B’s ability to
complete their task is only minimally affected. But as dependence increase, so too does B’s
need for A to act in a way that allows B to complete their task. e need from B is a social
expectation on A to act in a way that allows B to complete their task, and an expectation
to not act in a way that prevents B from completing their task. Social expectations create a
force on A towards action by creating a situation of cognitive inconsistency—acting in an
unhelpful way will disappoint B, violate B’s expectations, and will create cognitive tension
in A. Naturally, expectations only create forces towards action under some conditions. e
conditions are understood by examining the cognitive unit triad that is formed by A, B, and
B’s expectations, the cognitive inconsistency created by the unit, and the manner in which
that inconsistency is resolved. Heider’s balance theory explains this process.
4.2.1 Balance theory
eories of cognitive consistency are based on the Gestalt laws which describe how people
prefer good perceptual forms and balanced states that minimize stress (Wertheimer 1938).
Consistency theories are in uential in social psychology, and include psychological balance
(Abelson and Rosenberg 1958), system strain or symmetry theory (Newcomb 1953), cogni-
tive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957), among others (Eagly and Chaiken 1998, pp. 282–284).
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While not as in uential as Festinger’s version, Heider’s balance theory (Heider 1946, 1958)
was the rst and simplest (Fillenbaum 1968, p. 177). Recent research has used balance the-
ory to understand problems such as consumer psychology and marketing (Woodside and
Chebat 2001) and the process of group problem solving (Adejumo et al. 2008). A more
general concept of tension has been used to help explain altruistic behaviour: an individ-
ual experiences tension when they see somebody in need, and altruistic behaviour reduces
that tension (Batson 1998, p. 287). Balance theory has not been used to explain helping
behaviour in organizations.
Heider’s theory involves structure and dynamics. Heider proposed that a person’s atti-
tudes towards people and things can be represented as a cognitive structure, viewed as a triad,
composed of three elements, and relations between those elements (Heider 1946, 1958). A
structure of elements and relations can be balanced or unbalanced. When balanced, the
structure is stable. When unbalanced, the structure produces forces which encourage change
towards a more balanced state.
First, the elements include the reference or focal person (p), the other person in the situa-
tion (o), and an impersonal entity (x) (Figure 4.1). e entity x could be an idea, an attitude,
an event, a situation, a thing, etc. Relations include: sentiments, such as liking, valuing, es-
teeming (L), or their opposites (∼L); and unit relationships, which means belonging to,
possession, similarity, proximity, causality, or membership (U ), or their opposites (∼U ). A
structure is always considered with respect to the reference person, p. When p has an attitude
towards o, or belongs in a unit with o, it can be represented as a positive relation (L or U ) or
a negative relation (∼L or ∼U ). For example, p liking their friend o is represented as pLo; p
disliking a rival is represented as p∼Lo. Likewise, when p has an attitude towards the thing
x, it can be represented with a positive L or negative ∼L relation. Or, when p has a unit
relationship with x (they own it, or they made it), it can be represented with a positive U or
negative ∼U . For example, p likes the ice cream (x) is represented as pLx, or p made the ice
cream is represented as pUx. Similarly, o also has a positive or negative relationship with x.
e relation between o and x is perceived rather than actual, because the relation exists from
p’s point of view.
Second, Heider proposed that a dynamic structure exists between the p–o cognitive dyad
and between the p–o–x cognitive triad. I will only discuss the triad condition here. e
basic premise of Heider’s theory is that cognitive structures tend towards balance. e per-
son perceiving an unbalanced state will experience forces towards change. If change is not
possible, the person will experience tension and stress (Heider 1958, p. 201). In the case of
three elements, “a balanced state exists if all three relations are positive in all respects, or if
two are negative and one positive” (Heider 1946, p. 110). Mathematically, balance exists if










Figure 4.1: e basic cognitive unit-sentiment triad, p-o-x, with possible positive (+) and negative (-) relations
(Adejumo et al. 2008, p. 85). An unbalanced state can be made harmonious, “either by
a change in the sentiment relations or in the unit relations” (Heider 1958, p. 207), which
means a change in one of the relation signs so that the product is positive.
Consider a situation in which a person (p) believes that the current health care system (x)
is morally unjust and should be changed, and p’s good friend (o) believes the system works
well. e situation, pLo, oLx, p∼Lx, is in an unbalanced state (Figure 4.2a). Changing the
sentiment relations would bring balance in the following ways. One, p can start to feel that
perhaps the health care system isn’t as broken as they thought: p∼Lx → pLx (Figure 4.2b).
Two, p can attempt to change o’s mind: oLx → o∼Lx (Figure 4.2c). ree, p can start
to feel that o is unreasonable, won’t take the time to understand the issue, and begins to
dislike o: pLo → p∼Lo (Figure 4.2d). Any one of these changes would bring the situation
back into balance.3 e situation would be likewise unbalanced if p was in a unit relation
with o, which could occur if p believed they were similar to or responsible for o. Instead
of pLo, the relationship would be represented as pUo. For example, p could be o’s parent,
supervisor, or teacher. Unit relationships do not require that p like o, but the relationship
would be strengthened if there were also a positive sentiment relationship (Heider 1958,
pp. 183–184).
Without a change, p will feel stress and tension with respect to this situation. Although
not formalized in his notation, Heider (1958) implied that the cognitive tension resulting
from an imbalanced triad is in proportion to the importance (strength) of p’s sentiment and
unit relations (pp. 174–217). For example, the amount of tension in the situation would
be great if o was p’s best friend, or if p believes strongly about x because they grew up in
poverty, or if p believes o is absolutely committed to their like of x. In comparison, the
tension would be lower if o were only a passing acquaintance, if p only disliked x because of
what they once read in a magazine, or if p knew that o only liked x for super cial reasons.
3e third option may seem drastic, but Heider’s theory is situational and social psychological; the unbal-
anced state relates only to x, and only to o as they relate to x. Only with particularly strong sentiments, and in
situations where there are no other x’s with which p is in relation to o, will p∼Lo colour the entire relationship





















































































Figure 4.2: Ways in which to balance an imbalanced cognitive triad.
e correspondence between relation strength and the level of cognitive tension is key to the
application of balance theory to social expectations.
4.2.2 Application of balance theory to social expectations
Work relationships are unit relationships. At its most basic level, “separate entities com-
prise a unit when they are perceived as belonging together” (Heider 1958, p. 176). When a
coworker, B, is dependent upon A’s work, A is in some sense responsible for, committed to,
in proximity of, or similar to B. A and B would comprise a unit: pUo. If there is any de-
pendence at all between A and B, there is at least one social-psychological situation in which
their sentiment and unit relations form a balanced or unbalanced triad: it is with respect to
that task interdependency. e dependent, B, needs and therefore expects action from A in
order to complete their task.
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Let A and B be referred to as p and o, and B’s social expectation as x. e dependent
task-relationship creates a unit relation between A and B: pUo. If we assume that B wishes A
to act in away that enables them to complete their task, B will desire their expectation: oLx.
If A intends to conform or abide by B’s expectation: pLx. e cognitive triad that results,
pUo, oLx, pLx, would be balanced (Figure 4.3a). If, on the other hand, A intends to not
meet B’s expectation: p∼Lx. e situation that results, pUo, oLx, p∼Lx, is unbalanced
(Figure 4.3b). A will feel tension, stress, and discomfort, from the imbalance. ere will























































































Figure 4.3: Social expectations as a balanced and unbalanced cognitive triad
e imbalance can be resolved in three ways. One, A could start to help B and follow
their expectations: p∼Lx → pLx (Figure 4.2b). Two, A could convince B that they do
not need help from A, or use any other argument to convince B that their expectation is
incorrect: oLx → o∼Lx (Figure 4.2c). ree, A could arrange to break B’s dependence on
A’s actions, or convince themselves that there is no dependence, or that B’s expectation is
unreasonable, or that they have met their obligation: pUo → p∼Uo (Figure 4.2d). In this
third case, B’s expectation, oLx, may still exist, but A would experience no tension, stress, or
forces towards action; A needs to be in a unit or sentiment relationship with B in order for
there to be a balanced or unbalanced cognitive triad. Breaking the unit relation may resolve
A’s cognitive tension, but it may result in con ict between A and B; B may still believe
that their expectation is reasonable and applicable to this situation, but A does not. In this
case A’s cognitive triad does not exist and experiences no tension and thus no forces towards
action. B, on the other hand, still perceives an unbalanced triad, with its resulting cognitive
tension. e result may be a perceived amount of “unhelpful behaviours from A” from B’s
point of view, and a “reasonable lack of action from A” from A’s point of view. B would
perceive con ict in the situ tion. A may also perceive con ict, but will not perceive that they
were obligated to help in the rst place.
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e characteristics of the situation will determine the probabilities of each action (Fig-
ure 4.2b, c, or d). However, if there is at the least a positive probability of A choosing option
b, we should expect that as the level of cognitive tension increases, over a large number of
individuals, there will be an overall increase in helpful behaviour from A.
Balance theory explains how dependence or interdependence encourages A towards help-
ing behaviour through the forces produced by B’s social expectations. e question now
remains, how do changes in the level of dependence or the mutuality of dependence affect
those forces? I will rst address the effect of low vs. high levels of dependence. e section
after will deal with the effects of asymmetric vs. symmetric situations.
4.2.3 Level of dependence: Moving from cell (A) to (C) and from (B) to
(D)
e strength of the forces acting on A can change for two reasons: the unit relation between
A and B (pUo) can increase in strength; or B’s social expectation of A (oLx) can increase
in strength.
e unit relation pUo refers to the extent to which A feels responsible for, causes the
actions of, belongs to, is in possession of, similar to, or in proximity of, B (Heider 1946).
First, increased initiated interdependence has been found to increase the initiator’s feeling of
responsibility for the dependent’s work (omas 1957; Horsfall and Arensberg 1966; Kig-
gundu 1981, 1983). Further, power holders in asymmetric relationships have been found
to experience feelings of guilt, irritation and unwanted responsibility for their dependent’s
well being (Drigotas et al. 1999; Kelley et al. 2003, p. 257). Second, level of dependence,
interaction, and contact has been argued and shown to increase the perception of impact on
those who are affected by the work (Grant 2007; Grant et al. 2007; Grant and Parker 2009).
Perception of impact is the understanding that one causes the actions of, or is causally re-
lated to another person. Felt responsibility and perception of impact are two ways in which
A perceives a unit relationship with B Heider (1958). As such, it is expected that as level of
dependence changes from low to high, whether in asymmetric or symmetric situations, the
strength of the unit relation between A and B, pUo, will increase.
e sentiment relation oLx refers to the extent to which B likes, values, desires, or feels
strongly about their expectation that A should help. While B could expect help from A
“out of the blue,” with no real reason, such expectations would carry little weight and would
correspond to a low level of tension and few forces towards action on A. In contrast, task-
dependent work situations provide a warrant and support for B’s expectation. First, the
warrant for the expectation is that A affects B’s ability to complete their task. e warrant is
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B’s legitimate, task-related need for help. High levels of dependence create a higher need for
help (Rusbult and Van Lange 2003, p. 363), and strengthen the warrant for B’s expectation.
Second, the warrant needs to be supported in order to carry weight. Support for B’s
expectation is provided by social norms. It has been argued that as level of dependence
increases, the chance of activating a social norm of reciprocity (Gouldner 1960) and a norm
of equity increases (Adams 1965; Smith et al. 1983, p. 655), as do norms of benevolence
(Brown and Levinson 1987; Goffman 1971; Gouldner 1960; Flynn and Lake 2008, p. 128),
and norms of altruism (Krebs 1970), which lead to helping behaviours (e.g., Bachrach et
al. 2006a, p. 194; Bachrach et al. 2006b, p. 1397; de Jong et al. 2007, p. 1627). Empathetic
concern has been shown to correlate strongly with helping behaviours (Eisenberg and Miller
1987; McNeely and Meglino 1994) arguably due to norms of responsibility (Berkowitz 1972;
Settoon and Mossholder 2002, p. 259).
However, it is not the social norm itself that increases the forces on A to help B. For
how can a social norm by itself have any power? A social norm needs to be in relation to
another person and in the context of a particular situation. B needs to believe that the social
norm is activated in that situation. More accurately, A needs to believe that B believes that
the norm is activated, since A’s cognitive triad imbalance is from A’s point of view. e
activated norms support B’s expectation of A’s behaviour, oLx. If A does not follow B’s
expectation, p∼Lx, A will experience tension. As the strength of the norms increase, so
too does the tension acting on A to resolve the imbalance. is tension gives rise to forces
towards change, that is, from p∼Lx → pLx. Refusing to help B would “be violating an
implicit norm of benevolence (Brown and Levinson 1987; Goffman 1971; Gouldner 1960)”
(Flynn and Lake 2008, p. 128), or any of the norms that are active in that situation, and
would increase the chances for social censure (Burke et al. 1976; Settoon and Mossholder
2002, p.259). To violate the norm would create awkwardness, embarrassment, and other
discomfort (tension) for A.
To summarize, high dependence situations create in B the need for help from A. In-
deed, without the high level of dependence there would be less warrant for B’s expectation.
Support for B’s warrant is provided by social norms. As level of dependence increases, social
norms are activated and strengthen B’s expectation of help. us, a high level of dependence
strengthens the unit relationship pUo and the sentiment relationship oLx which increases
the strength of A’s cognitive triad imbalance. A stronger imbalance increases the forces acting
on the helper to restore balance. e three methods of restoring the balance were described
in Section 4.2.2. One method would be to meet the expectation. Finally, without the af-
fordances provided by a high level of dependence, A will simply not have the ability or
opportunity to help B (Section 4.1).
94
Hypothesis 1a: Situations of high dependence afford and motivate helpful be-
haviours, such that there is a higher probability for helpful behaviours in high
dependence situations than in low dependence situations.
ere are two arguments that suggest that con ict between A and B will increase as level
of dependence increases. e rst argument draws upon the power and in uence literature.
In addition to helpful behaviours, a high level of dependence affords A the ability and op-
portunity to affect B’s task in general. is introduces the issue of power; as A’s ability to
affect B’s task increases, so too does A’s power over B’s task. As (Emerson 1962) noted,
power is inextricably related to dependence: “Pab = Dba; the power of A over B is equal
to, and based upon, the dependence of B upon A” (p. 32). Unbalanced relations, that is,
relations of asymmetric dependence, are particularly prone to the effects of power (Emerson
1962, p. 34). Some of A’s increased power would be expressed as help towards B (level of
dependence affords helpful behaviours), but some of A’s power would be expressed as un-
helpful behaviour towards B (level of dependence affords more task-related behaviours in
general). As a result, heavily dependent individuals often perceive the power imbalance neg-
atively; the dependent feels that the power holder is intrusive, has control over their work,
and experiences a mix of “anxiety, insecurity, and mistrust” (Drigotas et al. 1999; Rusbult
and Van Lange 2003; Kelley et al. 2003, p. 257). us, as level of dependence increases,
we should expect the level of con ict within the group to increase as well, particularly in
asymmetric task-relationships.
e second argument is based upon the affordance and balance theory approach. As de-
pendence increases both helpful and unhelpful behaviours are afforded. And, as dependence
increases, the level of tension produced by A’s imbalanced cognitive triad increases. One of
the options to reduce that tension is as hypothesized above, A increases helpful behaviours:
p∼Lx → pLx. A second option is that A cognitively justi es a lack of responsibility for B’s
welfare, or that B’s expectation is unreasonable or inapplicable to A: pUo → p∼Uo. e
lack of unit relation between A and B is temporary and only with respect to that particular
expectation and social-psychological situation. But the result is an increase in con ict per-
ceived by both B and A. B, for the unhelpful behaviour or lack of helpful behaviour which
affects their ability to complete their task. A, for the perception of an increased expectation
from B, which is an attempt to affect A’s ability to complete their task.
Hypothesis 1b: ere is a greater tendency for intragroup con ict in situations
of high dependence than in situations of low dependence.
We should also expect that in situations of high dependence, along with an increased af-
fordance and motivation for helpful behaviours, there should also be an increased affordance
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and motivation for communication. is is expected because the help seeker would want to
communicate their increased urgency, need, and reasoning for their request for help.
Hypothesis 1c: Situations of high dependence would require, afford, and mo-
tivate communication, such that there is a higher probability for task-related
communication in high dependence situations than in low dependence situa-
tions.
Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c are illustrated in Table 4.2.
Mutuality of dependence
Asymmetric Symmetric
Level Low (A) lower helping beh. (B) lower helping beh.
of lower communication lower communication
Dependence lower intragroup con ict lower intragroup con ict
↓ ↓
High (C) higher helping beh. (D) higher helping beh.
higher communication higher communication
higher intragroup con ict higher intragroup con ict
Table 4.2: Effects of a change in level of dependence according to Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c
4.2.4 Mutuality of dependence: Moving from cell (A) to (B) and from (C)
to (D)
e unit relation pUo refers to the extent to which A feels responsible for, causes the actions
of, belongs to, is in possession of, similar to, or in proximity of, B (Heider 1946). Sym-
metric dependence has been argued to foster a sense of social responsibility (Krebs 1970)
and, ceteris paribus, lead to “higher levels of group cohesion than other task environments”
(Seashore 1954; Smith et al. 1983, p. 655), an argument reiterated by later organizational
scholars (Lawler and Yoon 1998; Stewart and Barrick 2000). Increased initiated interdepen-
dence has been found to increase the initiator’s feeling of responsibility for the dependent’s
work (Kiggundu 1983), but the effect is not only con ned to those who initiate the interde-
pendence; required interaction has increased felt responsibility (Turner and Lawrence 1965),
as has symmetric dependence (Pearce and Gregersen 1991; Anderson and Williams 1996;
Bachrach et al. 2006b; de Jong et al. 2007). Group cohesion, and felt responsibility increase
the extent to which A perceives a unit relationship with B. As such, it is expected that as the
situation changes from asymmetric to symmetric, the strength of the unit relation between
A and B, pUo, will increase.
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e sentiment relation oLx refers to the extent to which B likes, values, desires, or feels
strongly about their expectation that A should help, or perform actions that allow B to
complete their task. ere are two arguments that suggest that mutuality should increase the
strength of B’s expectations on A. e rst argument relies on the fact that social norms
increase the strength of oLx. Social norms are present in asymmetric situations and are
increasingly applicable when moving from low to high dependence (see last section). Sym-
metric dependence simply increases the effect of these norms. Since the power of norms
rests in the shared understanding between A and B as to which social norm is applicable in
the current situation, and what the consequences of violating those norms should be, it is
expected that in symmetric situations this shared understanding should increase. As shared
understanding of norms increases, so too does the tension produced when the norm is vio-
lated (Flynn and Lake 2008, p. 129). A similar argument has been made that reciprocality
intensi es expectations of social exchange and reciprocity (Anderson and Williams 1996;
Settoon and Mossholder 2002, p. 259). In summary, it is expected that as the situation
changes from asymmetric to symmetric, A and B will better understand each other’s expec-
tations, and better understand the consequences of violating the shared norms underlying
those expectations, both of which serve to increase the strength of oLx.
e second argument is derived from the affordances and balance theory approach. Mu-
tuality of dependence means that in the past, and again in the future, A will also be depend-
ing on B for help. A better understands B’s expectation because A also expects helping
behaviour from B. e probability that A will reduce their cognitive tension by breaking
the unit relation with B will decrease because they realize that they will be in a similar situ-
ation in the future. erefore, reducing tension through helpful behaviour becomes a more
probable action in situations of mutual dependence.
Hypothesis 2a : Situations of mutual dependence afford and increase the moti-
vation for helpful behaviours, such that there is a higher probability of helpful
behaviours in symmetric situations than in asymmetric situations.
ere are two arguments that suggest that con ict between A and B will decrease in
symmetric situations. e rst argument draws upon the power and in uence literature. As
discussed in the previous section, a high level of dependence affords task-related behaviour in
general. As the extent to which B depends on A increases, A’s power over B’s task increases,
particularly in asymmetric situations (Emerson 1962). However, Emerson also notes that
symmetry alters the power relationship. Keeping B’s dependence on A stable, and increasing
A’s dependence on B to an equivalent level creates a symmetrically powerful relationship.
While symmetry does not neutralize either one’s ability to control the other’s task, it does
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eliminate the power imbalance. Removing the power imbalance reduces the negative effects
of asymmetric dependence, yielding “the sorts of bene ts that accrue from balance of power,
including more placid and positive emotional experience (less guilt, anxiety), reduced use
of threat or coercion, less reliance on norms or contractual agreements, and greater stability
and congeniality (Baumeister et al. 1993; Fiske 1993; Drigotas et al. 1999)” (Rusbult and
Van Lange 2003, p. 355). As a result, as mutuality increases we should expect the level of
con ict within the group to decrease.
e second argument is based upon the affordance and balance theory approach. It was
argued that in symmetric situations, A will be depending on B for help. As a result, A and
B’s expectations for help will be more equivalent than in asymmetric situations. is would
lower the extent to which A feels that B is attempting to exert control with their expectation,
because the reverse situation also occurs. Further, because A has a lower probability of break-
ing the unit relation as a method of relieving the tension of B’s expectation (see Hypothesis
2a), there is a lower probability that B will be disappointed by having their expectations not
met (and vise versa when A is expecting help from B). As a result of both arguments, the
following hypothesis should be expected:
Hypothesis 2b: ere is less tendency for intragroup con ict in symmetric situ-
ations than in asymmetric situations.
We should also expect that in situations of mutuality there is less need for communica-
tion. Reciprocality and role switching should increase expectations and lower the need for
verbal communications, such as asking for help, convincing the help-giver that help should
be given, or arguing over help not given.
Hypothesis 2c: ere is a lower probability of task-related communication in
symmetric situations than in asymmetric situations.
Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c are illustrated in Table 4.3.
4.2.5 e combination of level and mutuality
Hypotheses 1a states that in general, high levels of dependence lead to an increase in the
probability for helpful behaviours. Hypothesis 2a argues that in the symmetric situation, A
and B will better understand each other’s expectations and the consequences of violating the
shared norms underlying those expectations, which serves to further increase the strength of




Level Low (A) lower helping beh. → (B) higher helping beh.
of higher communication lower communication
Dependence higher intragroup con ict lower intragroup con ict
High (C) lower helping beh. → (D) higher helping beh.
higher communication lower communication
higher intragroup con ict lower intragroup con ict
Table 4.3: Effects of a change in mutuality of dependence according to Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c.
B at some point in the future, which reduces the probability that they will choose to solve
their imbalanced cognitive triad by breaking their unit relation with B and refusing to help.
It is proposed that these two effects will compound, such that alone, level of dependence and
mutuality of dependence will increase the probability of helpful behaviours, but together
they will make an even higher probability of helpful behaviours.
Hypothesis 3a: A high level of dependence will combine with symmetric mutu-
ality of dependence, such that together they will result in a higher probability of
helping behaviour than either situations of asymmetry with high dependence,
or symmetry with low dependence.
Hypotheses 1b and 1c argue that a high level of dependence will tend to increase in-
tragroup con ict and task-related communication, but Hypotheses 2b and 2c argue that
symmetric situations will tend to decrease intragroup con ict and task-related communica-
tion. It is difficult to deduce which effect will be more powerful. As a result, no hypothesis
is made as to the interaction’s effect on intragroup con ict.
Hypotheses 3a is illustrated in Table 4.4.
Mutuality of dependence
Asymmetric Symmetric
Level Low (A) lower helping beh. → (B) higher helping beh.
of ↓ ↓
Dependence High (C) higher helping beh. → (D) much higher helping beh.
Table 4.4: Effect of the combination of level of dependence with mutuality of dependence, according to Hy-
pothesis 3a.
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4.3 Group rewards create cooperative structures
Of particular interest to this thesis are asymmetric situations. If more helping behaviours are
needed, the theory argues that one should make the task-dependence more mutual. But this
may be a difficult change in real work situations. Instead, would it be possible to increase the
helping behaviour in asymmetric situations through an increase in reward interdependence?
Adjusting performance rewards is typically the easiest way to change work groups, but rst
we need to understand the effect the change will have (Wageman and Baker 1997, p. 142).
Studies of the effects of interdependence on group performance have found that high in-
terdependence (typically meaning a combination of high level and symmetric dependence)
correlates well with performance, as long as it is paired with group rewards (Wageman 1995).
In an extensive meta-study, a similar (but weak) t between reward interdependence and task-
interdependence was found by researchers in the Deutsch “social interdependence” tradition
(Johnson and Johnson 1989; Stanne et al. 1999). Later experiments con rmed the trend,
but contradicted social interdependence theory by nding that it is interdependence that
drives helping behaviour; rewards had no independent effect (Wageman and Baker 1997).
A replication study con rmed the basic ndings, but contradicted the effect of reward inter-
dependence; in this case individual reward interdependence coupled with high task interde-
pendence led to the highest levels of helping behaviour (Allen et al. 2003). As a result, there
is currently some confusion as to what role reward interdependence plays in encouraging
helping behaviour:
If it is impossible to decrease the asymmetry in task dependence, one could
try to motivate the powerful to pay attention to the powerless by increasing
the amount of outcome interdependence [reward interdependence]. is could
also reduce the potential attraction of abusing power advantages within a team.
Although such an intervention might seem logical and is in line with ndings
from earlier research into interdependence (e.g., Johnson and Johnson 1989;
Van der Vegt et al. 2005; Wageman 1995), future research is needed to establish
whether such an intervention would actually have the desired effects (de Jong
et al. 2007, p. 1326).
A line of research begun by Deutsch (1949) argues that situations in uence how people
believe their goals are related and in uence how they interact, which in turn affects their
performance and group cohesiveness. From the discussion in Section 4.2 we know that as
interaction and work group cohesiveness increases, so too will A’s perception of a unit rela-
tion with B, pUo. How then might situations in uence work group cohesiveness and pUo?
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Situations can be structured cooperatively or competitively. When structured cooperatively
there are positive correlations among member’s rewards, and when structured competitively
there are negative correlations among member’s rewards (Beersma et al. 2003, p. 574). Co-
operative situations promote supportive behaviour where group members perceive a shared
fate, look out for the interests of the others, and share information. Participants in cooper-
ative situations perceive that they can reach their goals only if the others in their group also
reach their goals. On the other hand, competitive situations motivate group members to
withhold information and impair the progress of others in order to gain an advantage. Par-
ticipants in competitive situations believe that, if they are competitively linked with others
in their group, when others attain their goals it reduces their own ability to reach their goal
(Stanne et al. 1999, p. 134).
From social interdependence theory, we should expect that increasing reward interde-
pendence (from individual to group) should increase A’s perception of unit relation with
B, pUo. It should alert A and B that they are in a cooperatively structured situation, and
thereby increase A’s understanding of B’s social expectation, oLx, and A’s understanding of
the social norms supporting B’s expectation. As a result, the tension and the forces acting
on A towards helping behaviour and communication should increase. With the increase
in helping behaviour and intragroup cooperation, group rewards should reduce the overall
intragroup con ict.
It is expected that this effect is simple and will not interact with either level or mutuality of
dependence. In all conditions it is expected that the addition of group rewards should increase
helping and communication, and reduce con ict. erefore the following hypotheses are
presented straightforward without reference to the previous 2x2 matrix organization that
hypotheses 1 and 2 used.
Hypothesis 4a: Group rewards signal cooperative situations, such that there is a
higher probability of helpful behaviours in situations with group rewards than
individual rewards.
Hypothesis 4b: Group rewards signal cooperative situations and lead to less in-
tragroup con ict than individual rewards.
Hypothesis 4c: Group rewards signal cooperative situations and lead to more




is study is concerned with three aspects of task structure: mutuality of task dependence,
level of dependence, and reward interdependence. e hypotheses discussed in Section 4.2
predict how different task structures would affect helpful behaviours, intragroup con ict,
and task-related communication between interdependent dyads. e general theoretical ar-
gument is that the manipulations of task structure would create stronger expectations from
the helpee, which would produce tension in the helper, which would motivate the helper
towards performing helpful behaviours. is chapter will describe the experimental task,
how the independent and dependent variables were operationalized, the procedure, and the
results.
5.1 Previous experimental tasks
An experiment was needed that operationalized mutuality of dependence, level of depen-
dence, and reward interdependence such that each could be manipulated while keeping the
fundamental task the same and while not affecting the other manipulations. During the
development of this task I examined the literature for studies that have used experimental
tasks to investigate interdependency. In the next section I will review these past studies with
an eye to how well the experimental tasks were able to manipulate these different aspect of
interdependence.
5.1.1 Problems manipulating level and mutuality of dependence
Previous experimental studies in the organizational behaviour eld have used variations on
group decision-making tasks, such as: copy-editing manuscripts and catching errors in APA-
style references (Wageman and Baker 1997; Allen et al. 2003); a performance-appraisal task
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recommending merit bonuses based on written descriptions of employees (Saavedra et al.
1993); or a card sorting task requiring three person teams to arrange stacks of shuffled cards
into predetermined sequences (Bachrach et al. 2006b).
ese experimental tasks have the bene t of face validity; readers can readily visualize how
a pair working together on a copy-editing task is similar to many of the task relationships
found at work. Unfortunately sometimes what is gained in face validity is lost in ne con-
trol over the manipulations. For example, consider level and mutuality of interdependence
(Section 3.1.5).
Bachrach et al. (2006b) use a card sorting task and create two level of dependence condi-
tions, low and high. Participants were divided into groups of three and given three stacks of
cards. In the low task interdependence condition team member A sorted one stack of cards
individually, after which team member B sorted the second stack, and then member C sorted
the third stack. “ese individuals were not allowed to physically aid in the processing of an-
other member’s cards” (p. 1398). Unfortunately it is unclear how the high interdependence
condition worked, due to ambiguity between the description (p. 1398) and the graphical rep-
resentation of the interdependency manipulations (p. 1405). Most likely the authors allowed
all three team members to work together to sort the rst stack into its required sequences,
after which the team moved to stack two, then nally to stack three. In this condition the
three team members were allowed to physically help one another. e authors summarize
their manipulation:
ese constraints required that members in the low task interdependence con-
dition work on their own stack of cards in relative isolation, whereas group
members in the high task interdependence condition were required to work
on a communal stack of cards in conjunction with one another (Bachrach et al.
2006b, p. 1398).
e authors had confounded level and mutuality of dependence: the “low task interde-
pendence” condition is a low level of symmetric dependence, while the the “high task interde-
pendence” condition is a high level of symmetric dependence. e authors have argued that
organizational citizenship behaviour (in this case task-related helping behaviour) can vary
from low to high over the low to high levels of interdependence. e authors predicted that
in task situations with low interdependence, moving from low levels of OCBs to high levels
of OCBs would decrease the groups performance, as opposed to the high interdependency
condition, where moving from low to high levels of OCBs would increase performance. In
short, interpersonal task-related help was predicted to do more harm than good in a task sit-
uation with low interdependence. However from the quote above, and the manner in which
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the authors have constrained the behaviour of their participants, it would not appear to be
possible to have any helping behaviour in the low interdependence condition.
Helpful behaviours in this experiment were observed and rated by graduate student ob-
servers using a standard seven item helping scale (Podsakoff et al. 1997) . Curiously the
authors do report a mean of 4.05 out of 7 (SD = 0.87) helping in the low interdependence
condition, as compared to a 4.81 (SD = 0.95) in the high interdependence condition. Why
is there helpful behaviour when it would appear to be constrained out of the situation? e
answer lies in how the participants in the experiment are interdependent, and this affects the
ability of the experiment to manipulate level of dependence without affecting the task.
e two levels of interdependence do not involve the same task or the same type of
interdependence. According to the description of the experiment, there is no physical in-
terdependence between team members in the low interdependence condition. ere is no
resource or work output sent, nor is there any needed by any of the members in order to
complete their task. What must have been sent and received is information about how to
best complete the task—although it is impossible to be certain of this, because the authors
did not provide an example or what was or was not considered a helpful behaviour. Assum-
ing this, the low condition is interdependent with respect to information, while the high
condition is interdependent with respect to information as well as physical behaviours. In
the rst condition it is an individual task with informational help from teammates. In the
second condition it is a group task, with all that group-work entails when sharing physical
space and resources to complete a task—who holds the cards, who moves the cards, and the
numerous other roles that appear in teams.
Manipulating informational interdependency becomes more complicated when we con-
sider that the interdependence varies as a function of the complexity of the predetermined
card sequence task-goals, the source card stacks, and the intelligence of the participant. To
summarize the card sorting task, the teams were judged on accuracy (completing the se-
quences correctly and in the proper order) and time, while they competed for a share of a
$1500 prize. e teams were given three shuffled stacks of cards, each of which was made
from three different decks, coloured black, green, or red. e team needed to create a num-
ber of sequences of ascending cards (ace through king) with speci c alternating patterns of
suits and deck colours. An example sequence was Ace of Spades in black, 2 of Clubs in green,
3 of Diamonds in red, and so on. e sequences and possible combinations of cards were
deliberately complex so that some of the participants would be confused about what to do
and how to do it in the least amount of time.
Even within the low condition, the amount of informational interdependence in the card
sorting task varied on the extent to which a participant was confused about what to do, could
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General Errors Errors of the type
trained on
Errors of the type
not trained on
Low task interdependence 33% 67% 0%
Medium task interdependence 33% 33% 33%
High task interdependence 33% 17% 50%
Table 5.1: Task interdependence manipulations from (Wageman and Baker 1997, p. 152)
not understand the best process to go through in order to complete the task, or forgot a con-
dition of the experiment (the violation of any condition nulli ed the team’s eligibility to win
the prize). For a suitably complex task there would be informational interdependence—a
participant would need help (communication) from their teammates to gure out what to
do and how to do it quicker. But this also depended on the cognitive ability of the partici-
pant—if they understood the task and how to complete it best, there would be little if any
informational interdependence. In short, this particular form of informational interdepen-
dence is difficult to manipulate, because it depends on cognitive ability, motivation to focus
on the task, and other mercurial individual differences. It would be possible, for example,
for team A to have no informational interdependence because the individuals each under-
stood the problem, and for team B to have a very large amount of interdependence because
they didn’t pay attention to the task instructions. But both of these teams would officially
have been in the low interdependence condition. e authors themselves admit that this was
a problem: “although there were signi cant differences in task interdependence across the
two experimental conditions, activities in the low interdependence condition were not com-
pletely independent (e.g., task interdependence in the low condition was rated as 4.15 on a
7-point scale)” (Bachrach et al. 2006b, p. 1401), as compared to a 5.94 in the high condi-
tion (p. 1399). As a result of the difficulty isolating and manipulating their interdependence
condition, the authors did not nd their hypothesized negative relationship between helping
behaviour and task performance (pp. 1400-1401).
e experimental task used by Wageman and Baker (1997) and Allen et al. (2003) al-
lows more careful control over interdependence, and although the manipulations may not
be precise enough to vary the actual levels of interdependence, it could be easily adapted to
manipulate mutuality of dependence. ese studies formed teams of two participants who
worked together to correct mistakes in a six-page article describing a psychology experiment.
Errors were of three types: general grammatical and spelling errors; errors in citation format;
and errors in tables, headers, and equations. Team member A was taught how to correct
citations according to APA style, and member B was taught how to correct tables, headers,
and equations in APA style. e conditions of low, medium, and high interdependence were
created by giving the team members a different percentage of each of the three error types.
Table 5.1 presents the distribution of errors for each of the interdependency conditions.
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As interdependence increased, a participant was given more errors for which their team-
mate was trained. is required the participant to consult their teammate in order to correct
the error. e authors observed that the error was solved through different communica-
tions and behaviours, such as “sharing each others’ tip sheets; teaching each other what they
learned during the training session; trading articles; and discussing how to approach the task”
(Wageman and Baker 1997, p. 154).
e authors note that because “General Errors” involve grammar and spelling mistakes,
there was always an element of interdependence between the two team members. is is to
be expected, considering that it is labeled “low task interdependence” condition and not “no
task interdependence.”
In order to judge the suitability of an experimental task the question becomes, how pre-
cise is the level of dependence manipulation? Are groups in the Low condition at a similar
level of dependence? Are groups in different conditions experiencing a different amount of
dependence? It is possible that due to similar problems found in the Bachrach et al. (2006b)
experiment, the interdependence manipulation may not have produced the desired actual
level of dependence, which may help explain the weak correlation between interdependence
and helping behaviour (Wageman and Baker 1997, p. 154).
However, a strength of the copy editing task is its ability to be adapted to manipulate
mutuality of dependence. In the original experimental task the two teammates had a perfect
symmetry of dependence. One team member was trained to x citation errors, and the other
was trained to x errors in tables, headers, and equations. Team member A was faced with
a situation where they needed B’s knowledge to x a certain percentage of errors, and B
needed A’s knowledge for the same percentage of errors. e task could be changed to vary
the percentage of errors, such that A did not require B’s knowledge (0% of errors of the type
not trained in) but B required A’s knowledge (perhaps 50% of errors of the type not trained
in). In this manner it would be convenient to create asymmetric dependence.
e experimental task used by Saavedra et al. (1993) was designed to manipulate mutu-
ality of dependence. Participants were divided into groups of three to evaluate the perfor-
mance of hypothetical workers, based on reading a summary of their behaviour. e teams
were asked rate the set of workers on a number of scales, then use the result and a lookup
table to determine what the worker’s merit increase would be. e team’s output was a merit
evaluation sheet. e authors note that there was a unique and correct evaluation for each
worker’s summary, based on the words used to describe the worker. Each team’s performance
would be evaluated based on the number of workers they could evaluate and the correctness
of each evaluation.
e teams were randomly assigned to four sequence conditions: pooled, sequential, re-
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ciprocal, and team. e pooled condition was essentially an independent condition: a stack
of worker summaries was placed in the centre of the table and each team member would
select a summary, rate the worker, look up the worker’s appropriate merit increase, ll out
their merit evaluation form, and select a new summary. Each team member did this sequence
independently. e teams in the pooled condition were considered a team because they were
measured as a group and given a group-level reward.
In the sequential condition the task for evaluating each worker’s summary was split into
three parts. Each part was one third of the total amount of work. Each team member was
randomly assigned to be the A, B, or C role. e A role took the worker’s summary from
the stack, completed the rst part of the work and handed the summary and merit evaluation
sheet to B, then took the next worker’s summary from the stack. B completed their task and
sent the materials to C, who completed their task and placed the nished merit evaluation
sheet on the nished pile. e group received a group-level performance measurement and
reward.
e reciprocal and team conditions used the same distribution of work: role A was the
support who would take the worker’s summary and ll out the preliminary information of
the merit evaluation form. Role B and C would work together to rate the worker, while A
would assist B and C by looking up the appropriate merit bonuses in the lookup table. e
difference between the reciprocal and team condition was that the groups in the team con-
dition were allowed to decide on how they would organize themselves, while the reciprocal
condition was prescribed these roles in the experiment task instructions. e authors note
that 79% of the groups in the team condition arrived at this division of labour on their own
(Saavedra et al. 1993, p. 65).
ere are three points to note about the Saavedra et al. (1993) experimental task. First,
the authors stressed to the participants that there were correct evaluations of the worker’s
summary paragraph, based on the words used in the description, and that these words and
their values were invariant across all summaries. But the participants only realized the cor-
rectness of their merit evaluations after the experimenter took the merit evaluations, marked
them, and returned the feedback. Feedback was given after a 10 minute practice trial, and
the 10 minute experiment trial. us, the participants were unsure of the correctness of their
evaluations during the task itself. Second, because of the lag-time in correctness feedback,
the members in the sequential and reciprocal/team conditions were interdependent not in
the correctness of their work, but in the timing of their work. In the sequential condition,
for example, it did not matter to B how well A did their job, it only mattered how quickly
A could nish their section of work and hand off the merit sheet to B. To be clear, timing
is certainly a component of interdependence, but it is different from correctness. ird, the
task was designed in a way that would make it difficult to introduce level of dependence as
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a manipulation. For example in the sequential condition, it is difficult to imagine how to
make B more dependent on A. If A were given more work, or if A were given more impor-
tant work, it could certainly delay B’s work. But B’s work wouldn’t become more or less
difficult based on A’s ability to complete their task. B would still be able to complete their
portion of the task regardless of how A performed, and regardless of the amount of work
or the importance of A’s portion of work. is is a consequence of the second point above:
without an experimental operationalization of correctness (See Section 3.1.5), it would be
difficult to change the extent to which B depends on A, or C depends on B. For these reasons
I felt the Saavedra et al. (1993) experimental task was unsuitable for this study.
5.1.2 Problems measuring helpful behaviours
Past experimental studies which have used helpful behaviours as a dependent variable have
been unable to measure it objectively. It is unclear whether or not this is because the “helpful
behaviour” concept has its roots in observational and survey-based methods, many of which
are from the OCB literature (Podsakoff et al. 2000). But the result is that past experimental
studies have relied on third party observer ratings and group self-assessments of helpfulness.
Bachrach et al. (2006b) used graduate students working in pairs to observe and rank the
amount of OCBs between team members. After the teams completed their tasks, the grad-
uate students used a standard seven item helping scale from the OCB literature (Podsakoff
et al. 1997). e average interrater reliability of the graduate student’s judgements was .69
(p. 1399). e problems of subjectivity in observer ratings cannot be avoided, but Bachrach
et al. (2006b) compound the problem by not providing an example of what is considered a
helpful behaviour and what isn’t. is is a particularly harmful omission because the study’s
form of informational interdependence (Section 5.1.1) is difficult for readers to visualize.
For example, how were different behaviours weighted? How important was it to give a small
practical instruction such as, “Move this card there,” versus an instruction that triggered a
greater conceptual understanding of the task as a whole? Suppose a member misunderstood
the instructions, and a teammate said, “No, you’re supposed to build a sequence of cards
using the pattern on the sheet, it doesn’t matter how you get there, just speed matters.” Un-
fortunately there are no examples of what constituted a helpful behaviour, how it was coded,
and how that translated to the observer’s rankings.
ere are similar problems with the Wageman and Baker (1997) and Allen et al. (2003)
task. Helpful behaviours were measured in two ways. First, one of the experimenters ob-
served the copy-editing teams through a one-way mirror. At the end of the task the ex-
perimenter rated the team on a scale from 0 (did not cooperate at all) to 4 (cooperated a
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great deal). Second, the team members were given a post-session questionnaire. Four ques-
tions measured how much the subjects believed they had cooperated with their teammates
(p. 150). As in the Bachrach et al. (2006b) study, it is difficult to compare different helpful
acts when they are informational. Suppose a teammate had the question, “Should the con-
ference name or the paper’s title be in italics when citing a conference presentation?” Would
this be considered more or less helpful than simply passing the cheat sheet which had all the
APA rules for formatting citations? Although, to be fair, this is an unavoidable problem with
any observational-based measure.
5.1.3 Requirements for an experimental task
A new experimental task needed to satisfy the following seven conditions.
1. e task needed to be executed at low and high levels of dependence and still remain
the same.
2. e task needed to remain the same given an individual and group reward structure.
3. e task needed to remain the same whether the participants were in an asymmetric or
symmetric dependence. is is a particularly difficult condition to meet, as can be seen
in the discussion of the Saavedra et al. (1993) merit evaluation task. Most complex
tasks are changed when a participant works on them in isolation or with other people;
they are simply no longer the same task.
ese rst three conditions should hold, otherwise it would be difficult to separate the
effect of the manipulation from the effect of the different task.
4. e task’s level of dependence needed to depend not only on time, as in the Saavedra
et al. (1993) task, but also to whether or not the task was completed correctly. e
task needed to model the situation described in Section 3.1.5, common in software
engineering and other industries, where a task can be completed to varying levels of
quality. e participants needed to be able to complete the task to speci cation, and
then have the opportunity to put in more effort to do a better job. Participants needed
to be able to perform helpful behaviours, at a well understood cost to themselves.
ese clearly de ned, optional, helpful behaviours would model the effort, time, and
resources it takes an employee to go above and beyond the call of duty (see pp. 77–78).
5. e experiment needed to have an objective, quantitative, behavioural measure of help-
ing behaviour.
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6. e participants needed to be well aware of the precise cost of each of their actions,
and the effect this cost would have on their ability to reach their goal and receive their
reward. No information about the experiment was hidden from the participants. In
addition, participants needed to be tested on their understanding of the rules and the
costs and effects of their actions. is was accomplished through the use of control
questions, which participants were required to answer correctly before participating.
is and the previous two items are informed by recent methodological advances in be-
havioural economics (Herrmann et al. 2008a,b; Hertwig and Ortmann 2001, 2008a,b;
Ariely and Norton 2007).
7. e task had to be simple enough that little to no training was required. is was in-
tended to remove training effects, physical aptitude, and cognitive ability as confound-
ing variables, which have been noted to obscure the results of group task experiments
(Allen et al. 2003, p. 732).
5.2 e card game task
A new card game task was developed in order to satisfy the conditions above. e card
game was designed to simulate a work situation in which a worker could complete their
task to varying degrees of correctness. At the beginning of the experiment participants were
arranged in dyads and randomly assigned the title of “Player A” and “Player B.” e game
consisted of 20 rounds. Depending on the condition, in each round one participant was the
sender of cards and their partner was the receiver of cards. Each player had a hand that could
hold two cards. e sender (e.g., A) was given a goal number, such as 8, and drew playing
cards until the sum total their hand met or exceeded their goal (e.g., 4 & 4, 3 & 5, or 4 &
5). Upon reaching their goal, A sent their hand to their partner, B. Player B’s task was to
take the cards sent by A and add their own hand in order to reach their goal, such as 22.
If B was able to reach their goal, their team would have successfully completed one round.
If B failed to meet their goal, the team would receive a “failed round,” the consequences of
which depended on the condition (Section 5.2.3, p. 116). Drawing a card had a cost of $1,
and the players needed to meet or exceed their goal while staying under their budget. For
example, a budget of $24 meant the player could draw 24 cards maximum.
e deck from which the players drew cards changed based on the number of cards that
player had already drawn that round. At the beginning of a round players would draw aces,
2’s and 3’s, and as they drew more cards they were more likely to get higher numbered cards.
e card distribution is given in Table 5.2. e card distribution was designed to simulate
effort and a dynamic where “more effort leads to better quality work,” where higher valued
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hand signi es more effort or better quality work. If the player decided to do only the bare
minimum of work required to meet their goal, they could stop drawing cards when they
reached their target. is would be considered a minimally “correct” hand for the sender, as
they had reached their goal. ere was an element of randomness, but it was constrained,
such that if a player wanted to send a higher hand to their partner, they would need to draw
more cards at a higher cost.
Percent chance of getting this card during Draw # X
Draw # 60% 25% 15% Draw # 60% 25% 15%
1 to 5 Ace 2 3 21 to 25 5 6 7
6 to 10 2 3 4 26 to 30 6 7 8
11 to 15 3 4 5 31 to 35 7 8 9
16 to 20 4 5 6 36 to 40 8 9 10
Table 5.2: Card distributions
Players were encouraged to focus their attention on their cost for two reasons. One,
their budget modeled their total amount of time and effort they could spend on the task,
and served to make helpful behaviours personally costly (Bergeron 2007). Two, they were
competing against other participants in the same condition and same role (A’s vs. A’s, and
B’s vs. B’s) for $20 prizes—since there were 8 conditions, and two roles per condition, there
were 16 prizes in total. e participant with the lowest total cost would win the prize.
It was made clear in the instructions that the receiver was using the sent hand and adding
to it in order to complete the group’s task. For example, if A sent their hand worth 8, and
B’s goal was 22, B would need to get a hand worth 14 (B’s goal, minus the sent hand) in
order to complete their task. us, the receiver’s level of dependence was contingent on the
task goal (e.g., a goal of 24 vs. a goal of 22), their task budget (e.g., a budget of 30 vs. a
budget of 20), and the behaviour of the sender. For example, if A instead had instead sent a
hand worth 12, and B’s goal was 22, B would have only needed to get a hand of 10 in order
to reach their goal. Depending on B’s budget, the difference between A sending 12 vs. 10
could have been the difference between B succeeding or failing at their task.
5.2.1 Design, research participants and procedure
e experiment took place in a 40-seat computer lab. e computer lab was designed like
most student computer labs: to put the most number of computers in the least amount of
space. Following established behavioural economics procedure, in order to minimize the
interpersonal social factors that might in uence behaviour, care was taken to keep partners
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as anonymous as possible (Herrmann et al. 2008b; Camerer 2003a). Styrofoam dividers
separated the computers, such that a participant would have to lean far back and look around
in order to see their neighbour’s screen. e styrofoam dividers had the side bene t of creating
a “serious” situation for the students when they were allowed into the room. As is standard
in behavioural economics experiments, participants were randomly assigned a role, and the
roles were distributed such that partners would not be seated near to each other in the lab.
However it is impossible to completely remove all social in uence in such an experiment: the
participants were drawn from the same research pool and the participants knew that someone
in the room was their partner.
A total of 182 participants were recruited from a research pool of second year business
undergraduate students (42.8% female, average age = 20.2 years, average number of years in
undergrad = 2.2, average number of years of full-time work experience = 1.0). Participants
received course credit for participation, and 16 individuals received performance-based prizes
of $20. Upon entering the lab, students sat at their computer and were instructed not to speak
with the other participants. ey were randomly assigned to one of 8 conditions described
below, and shown a 9-minute training video (an in-browser “screencast”) speci c for their
condition. After nishing the training video they answered a set of six control questions
designed to test their understanding of the task and the costs and effects of helping behaviour
(Herrmann et al. 2008b). e script for the screencast with screen captures of the video are
presented in Appendix B. e control questions are presented in Appendix Appendix C.
e control questions were designed to ensure that participants understood that drawing
extra cards was optional, and that helping their partner by drawing extra cards was costly and
would prevent them from winning the prize. All participants were required to answer the
control questions correctly before entering the game.
e computer program was designed to be as simple as possible while still giving the
feedback required to keep track of costs and the number of successful rounds. Figure 5.1
presents a screenshot of the computer program written to run the experiment. e players
are given buttons to draw a card, discard the card they’ve drawn, move the card to their hand,
discard a card they have in their hand, or give up the round. e players are given feedback
on their cost so far this round, their budget for this round, their total and average cost for
the game as a whole, and the number of successful rounds out of the total rounds they’ve
played. When they’ve met their rounds goal the “Send Cards” button is activated. e right
side of the computer program acted as an instant messaging system which was activated after
10 rounds of play (see the discussion of the communication manipulation, p. 117).
In order to test the hypotheses in Section 4.2, 91 dyads were randomly assigned to eight
conditions in a 2 (low vs. high level of dependence) × 2 (asymmetric vs. symmetric de-
pendence) × 2 (individual vs. group reward) completely crossed factorial design. A 2 (no
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Figure 5.1: Screen capture of experiment program.
communication vs. communication) within-subjects condition was used to create a 2 × 2
× 2 (× 2) mixed factorial design.
5.2.2 Dependent Variables
Helpful Behaviours
e behavioural measure of helpfulness was the number of cards that a player drew in excess
of their goal. e participants knew, through the training videos and the control questions,
that drawing more cards would be helpful by making it easier for their dependent to reach
their goal. For example, if A’s (the sender’s) goal was 8, and had drawn a 3 and a 5 in 12
draws, their cost for that round would have been 12. If they then decided to send a higher
hand to their partner B (the receiver), A would draw more cards, perhaps drawing two cards
and getting a 5. eir hand would then be worth 10, their cost would have been 14, and
they would have performed two helpful behaviours.
Helpful behaviours could only be performed by one member of the group per round:
the sender. In that round the receiver could not perform helpful behaviours for their partner
because the receiver’s hand was not sent to their partner (see Section 5.2). erefore the unit
of analysis was the group, which decreases the degrees of freedom but is the only meaningful
way to compare number of helpful behaviours between conditions. Additionally, it would
be difficult to use an individual level of analysis because Player A and B’s behaviours are not
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independent (Kashy and Kenny 2000).
Communication
Communication was measured as the number of task-related communications between part-
ners. Because communication was free-form through an instant messenger style interface, the
messages were unstructured and not always task-related. e communications needed to be
analyzed and placed in one of two categories: task-related and non-task-related. Task-related
communications included any of the following: related to understanding partner’s situation;
a request for certain behaviour; agreeing to a request; related to understanding the game;
related to understanding the individual vs group reward conditions; or related to under-
standing the competition and/or how to win it. Non-task-related communications included
everything else, which was usually such messages as: introductions; talking about courses;
complaining about the experiment; talking about plans for the weekend; and so forth.
e metric used to measured communications was the number of words sent. is was
chosen over the number of messages. e number of words was chosen because counting only
the number of messages sent could misrepresent the importance of each message—it was ob-
served that many messages were one or two word responses (e.g., “ok” or “sure thing”), while
a few others were 20–30 word sentences, and that these messages should not be weighted
equally. is introduces the problem of weighting a 10 word message as twice as meaningful
as a ve word message. e alternative would have been to individually code each message
and rate it in terms of importance on a scale, but that would have introduced a level of bias
and subjectivity that I wanted to avoid. Neither option was perfect, but this solution was
chosen because it adds some weight for meaning while keeping the measure as objective as
possible.
Intragroup con ict
Hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 4b predict that the level of con ict in a relationship will depend upon
the level of dependence, mutuality of dependence, and reward interdependence. Intragroup
con ict was assessed using questionnaire items rated on 5-point Likert scales in which 1 =
strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree. Con ict was assessed using seven items adapted from
Lee et al. (1991) and Saavedra et al. (1993) to measure intragroup con ict: (a) “ere was
a lot of tension among my partner and I”; (b) “My partner and I never interfered with each
other’s work [reverse scored]”; (c) “My partner and I got along with one another [reverse
scored]”; (d) “Given the way my partner performed their role I often felt frustrated”; (e) “I
found myself unhappy and in con ict with my partner”; (f ) “My partner, who I depended on
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to get my job done, often let me down”; and (g) “I found myself in con ict with my partner
because of their actions (or lack of actions).”
I factor analyzed this set of items using a principle component analysis, and the results
showed (unexpectedly) two factors accounting for 58.7 % and 14.6 % of the variance. e
second factor was question (b): “My partner and I never interfered with each other’s work.”
Question (b) correlated poorly with all other questions, with correlations ranging from .037
to .21. Upon further inspection, it would appear that this question did not make sense to the
players in this experiment; there is no way for a player to “interfere” with their partner’s work
because the player’s task-related behaviours are constrained to drawing cards, not drawing
cards, and passing their hand. With such low correlations, this question was dropped from
further analysis.
e revised set of 6 questions resulted in one factor accounting for 68% of the variance.
e KMO test for sampling accuracy was .82, which is considered great (Kaiser 1974), indi-
cating that the sample size is adequate for factor analysis. Similarly, Bartlett’s test of sphericity
is signi cant (χ2(15) = 402.45, p< .001) indicating that factor analysis is appropriate (Field
2009, p. 660). e reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) for the con ict scale was .90 and the item
loadings ranged from .60 to .91. e group-level measure of con ict was the average of A
and B’s con ict measure.
5.2.3 Independent Variables (Experimental Manipulations)
Level of Dependence
Two level of dependence conditions (low, high) could be created in a number of ways, such
as: increasing the goal of the receiver, reducing the goal of the sender, decreasing the budget
of the receiver, changing the card distribution for the receiver or the sender, or increasing the
cost of cards for the receiver or dependent. I chose to decrease the budget of the receiver, as it
was the most direct and easiest to understand method of increasing the receiver’s dependence
on the sender. As the receiver’s budget decreases there is a greater chance that they will not
be able to reach their goal before they run out of budget.
Table 5.3 shows the goals and budgets for the sender and receiver in each of the 8 con-
ditions. Note that the sender and receiver’s goal and budget only changed between the low
and high dependence conditions. In the low dependence condition the sender’s goal was 8,
their budget was 40; the receiver’s goal was 24, their budget was 37. In the high dependence
condition the sender’s goal was 8 with a budget of 40 (no change), but the receiver’s goal
was 24 with a budget of 22 (budget was reduced by 15). erefore, the task itself does not
change between conditions, only the receiver’s budget changes. Given the card distribution
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(Table 5.2), it is difficult for the receiver in the high interdependence condition to complete
their task if the sender sends only the bare minimum hand of 8—the sender will run out of
budget before they can reach their total goal of 24. us, in order for the receiver to complete
their task they are dependent on the sender for help.
Crucially, the sender’s budget does not change—it is 40 in both low and high dependence
conditions. is means that there is no experimental constraint on the sender’s ability to help
the receiver in either condition.
Goal, Budget Pairs:
(sender goal, sender budget); (receiver goal, receiver budget)
Individual Reward Group Reward
Asymmetric Symmetric Asymmetric Symmetric
Low Dependence (8, 40); (24, 37) (8, 40); (24, 37) (8, 40); (24, 37) (8, 40); (24, 37)
High Dependence (8, 40); (24, 22) (8, 40); (24, 22) (8, 40); (24, 37) (8, 40); (24, 22)
Table 5.3: Goals and budgets for each experimental manipulation
Mutuality of dependence
Two mutuality conditions (asymmetric, symmetric) were created by varying who depended
on whom. Recall that at the start of the experiment one participant in the dyad was given
the name Player A, the other Player B. e asymmetric condition was created by making A
the sender and B the receiver for every round. For all 20 rounds B depended on A, and A
did not depend on B at all. Player A would send their cards to B, and B would try to reach
their goal.
e symmetric situation was created by alternating between the two: In round 1, A was
sender and B was receiver; in round 2, B was sender and A was receiver; in round 3 A was
sender and B was receiver; and so forth. In this way A and B relied on each other an equal
amount, affording them the opportunity to help or not help in kind.
Reward interdependence
Two reward conditions (individual, group) were created by changing how a “failed round”
affected the player’s costs. Recall that the participants were competing for $20 prizes that
would go to the participant with the lowest overall cost at the end of 20 rounds. Participants
in the individual reward condition were instructed that only their personal cost mattered.
eir partner could fail to reach their goal, and their team could fail to complete every round,
but only their own cost would be counted. For example, in this condition a Player A could
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draw the minimum number of cards possible to reach their goal, send those cards to their
partner, and they would have a good chance or winning their prize. Player A’s cost would
not be affected if their partner could not reach their goal and their group received a “failed
round.”
Participants in the group reward condition were instructed that both their individual cost
and their group success mattered, in the following way: their personal cost would increase
by $15 for every round their group failed. For example, in this condition if a Player A drew
the minimum cards possible to reach their goal, but in doing so their partner could not reach
their goal, both Player A and Player B’s cost would increase by $15. In this way the sender’s
performance (cost) and their reward was affected by their partner’s ability to complete their
task.
Communication
Two communication conditions (no communication, communication) were created by al-
lowing communication through an instant messenger style window in the computer card
game. e instant messenger window was greyed-out (not working) during the rst 10
rounds of the experiment. At the beginning of the 11th round the instant messenger became
active and the players were shown a dialog window alerting them of the change. e partici-
pants were noti ed during the training screencast that they would be allowed to communicate
after the 10th round, and one of the control questions quizzed them on this condition.
Although direct typed communication was restricted for the rst 10 rounds, partners
likely communicated through two forms of behavioural communication. One, the game
software noti es both partners of a failed round if the receiver is unable to reach their goal.
Recall that this would result in a cost of $15 for both players in the group reward condition,
and even though there is no additional penalty in the individual performance measurement
condition, the players are still noti ed that they failed a round. Two, those players in the
reciprocal measurement condition could communicate behaviourally through the cards that
they sent to each other in alternating rounds. Recall that the sender and receiver roles alter-
nate between Player A and Player B in the reciprocal sequence condition, and if one of the
players was unhappy with the cards their partner sent the last round, they could send a lower
hand this round in retaliation.
5.3 Results
e analysis consists of two parts: one, a test of the within subjects effect of the communi-
cation manipulation; and two, tests of hypotheses 1a–4c. In all cases results are presented at
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the group level of analysis.
e means and standard deviations for the dependent variables helpful behaviours, task-
related communication, and intragroup con ict across levels of dependence, mutuality, and
reward are presented in Table 5.4. e Pearson correlations among these variables appear in
Table 5.5. A more thorough understanding of the results may be gained by seeing how many
dyads performed a certain number of helpful behaviours per condition, which is presented
in Figure 5.2. Before testing the hypotheses, a mixed ANOVA with the within-subject ma-
nipulation of communication (no communication vs. communication) was run. e only
dependent variable for which communication would have a before/after affect on would be
the number of helping behaviours, as task-related communications were only allowed in sec-
ond communication condition (obviously), and intragroup con ict was assessed only once
at the end of the experiment. e results of the mixed ANOVA are presented in Table 5.6.
ere was a signi cant main effect of the communication manipulation on the amount of
helpful behaviours, F (1, 83) = 71.69, p < .001, η2 = .46. Speci cally, the overall average
number of helpful behaviour before communication was allowed was M = 25.93, SD =
29.66, and after was M = 66.67, SD = 58.69. ere was a signi cant interaction effect
between the communication and level of dependency manipulations, F (1, 83) = 12.83, p <
.001, η2 = .134, illustrated in Figure 5.3. Allowing communication increased the number
helpful behaviours in both the low and high levels of dependence conditions, but the effect of
communication was larger in the high dependence condition (no comm: M = 37.53, SD =
34.80, allowing comm: M = 95.93, SD = 53.52) than in the low level of dependence
condition (no comm: M = 14.59, SD = 17.46, allowing comm: M = 38.04, SD =
48.85).
e communication by level interaction was signi cant, but in the same direction, which
makes reading the effects of the level of dependence simple—communication did not change
the direction of the level of dependence effect. is is the difference between the top row of
moderating effects vs. the middle or bottom row in Figure 2 in Podsakoff et al. (1995, p. 432).
e interaction of communication with all other variables was non-signi cant, which means
that the nature of the other manipulation effects was not changed by allowing communica-
tion. For the simplicity of the following analysis I chose to group the two communication
conditions into one, eliminating the between-subjects component of the factorial design.
For the rest of the analysis the helping behaviours dependent variable is the sum of helping
behaviours over all 20 rounds of the experiment. e resulting design is a 2 (low vs. high
dependence) × 2 (asymmetric vs. symmetric) × 2 (individual vs. group rewards) completely
crossed factorial.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.2: Distributions of helpful behaviours (all rounds), by condition
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1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Helpful Behaviors —
2. Intragroup con ict -0.247* —
3. Task-related Communication 0.222* -0.119 —
4. Level of Dependency 0.515** 0.204 0.155 —
5. Mutuality 0.178 -0.260* -0.048 0.011 —
6. Reward 0.297** -0.172 0.126 -0.011 -0.033 —
Note. N=91 groups. Level of dependence was coded as 0 = low level, 1 = high level. Mutuality
was coded as 0 = asymmetric, 1 = symmetric. Reward was coded as 0 = individual, 1 = group.
Tests of signi cance are two-tailed.
* p < .05. ** p < .01
Table 5.5: Correlations among independent and dependent variables.
Source of variation df MS F η2
Comm 1 75341.08 71.69*** 0.46
Comm×Dependency 1 13486.92 12.83*** 0.13
Comm×Mutuality 1 898.57 0.86 0.01
Comm×Reward 1 849.52 0.81 0.01
Comm×Dependency×Mutuality 1 3954.12 3.76 0.04
Comm×Dependency×Reward 1 34.85 0.03 0.00
Comm×Mutuality×Reward 1 829.55 0.79 0.01
Comm×Dependency×Mutuality×Reward 1 1221.80 1.16 0.01
Note. N = 91 groups. *** p < .001
Table 5.6: Four-way mixed ANOVA for helpful behaviours. Within-subject manipulation of Communication
and between-subjects manipulation of level of Dependency, Reward, and Mutuality.
MANOVA answers the question of whether or not a combination of the three dependent
variables varies as a function of the manipulations (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007b, p. 243).
Huberty and Morris (1989) explain the distinction between univariate and multivariate ques-
tions: for univariate questions: “there would be no interest in seeking any linear composite
of the outcome variables; an underlying construct is of no concern” (p. 303). is study
presents no argument that helpful behaviours, con ict, and communications represent a sin-
gle underlying conceptual variable. When testing multiple ANOVAs in ated Type I error
becomes a concern. But Type I error is problematic only “if the set of conclusions must be
evaluated as a whole” (Shaffer 1995, p. 562). Because the dependent variables are not mea-
suring a single underlying conceptual variable, and because there are no hypotheses regarding
the joint effects of the dependent variables, in ated Type I error between the three ANOVAs
is not a concern and experiment-wise alpha adjustments will not be needed.
e results of three three-way analysis of variances (ANOVA) for helpful behaviours,
intragroup con ict, task-related communication by level of dependence, mutuality of de-




























Figure 5.3: Interaction of communication by level of dependence on helpful behaviours.
Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a dealt with the effects of dependency, mutuality, and their
interaction effect on helpful behaviours. Hypotheses 1a and 2a predict main effects for level of
dependency and mutuality, but as there was an interaction effect between level of dependence
and mutuality, caution should be used in interpreting their main effects until the interaction
effect is understood.
Hypothesis 3a predicted mutuality of dependence would strengthen the effect of level
of dependence. ere was a signi cant interaction effect between level dependence and
the mutuality manipulations, F (1, 83) = 5.05, p < .05, η2 = .057, illustrated in Fig-
ure 5.4. e effect of level of dependence was stronger in symmetric situations than in
asymmetric situations. Speci cally, in the low level of dependence condition, there is no
signi cant difference (F (1, 83) = .01, p > .05) between the number of helpful behaviours
in the asymmetric condition (M = 53.52, SD = 66.49) and the symmetric condition
(M = 51.74, SD = 53.42). e number of helpful behaviours was signi cantly higher
(F (1, 83) = 10.31, p < .025) in the symmetric condition (M = 161.13, SD = 73.17)
than in the asymmetric condition (M = 104.55, SD = 67.93).1 erefore, Hypothesis 3a
was supported; the effect of level of dependence was stronger in symmetric than in asymmet-
ric task-relationships.
Hypothesis 1a predicted that a high level of dependence would afford and create forces
towards more helpful behaviours than a low level of dependence. e main effect of level of
dependence on helpful behaviours was signi cant (F (1, 83) = 39.54, p < .001, η2 = .323).
1To control for the Type I family-wise error rate, the Bonferroni correction was used for the simple effects
analysis of interactions. Two post-hoc tests were performed with an adjusted α = .05/2 = .025 (Tabachnick
and Fidell 2007a, p. 130).
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Source of variation df MS F η2
Helpful Behaviours
Dependency 1 147074.38 39.54*** 0.32
Mutuality 1 18472.91 4.97* 0.06
Reward 1 53372.96 14.35*** 0.15
Dependency×Mutuality 1 18788.28 5.05* 0.06
Dependency×Reward 1 3870.43 1.04 0.01
Mutuality×Reward 1 3725.82 1.00 0.01
Dependency×Mutuality×Reward 1 6232.49 1.68 0.02
Intragroup Con ict
Dependency 1 1.39 4.25* 0.05
Mutuality 1 2.37 7.27** 0.08
Reward 1 1.01 3.10 0.04
Dependency×Mutuality 1 0.56 1.73 0.02
Dependency×Reward 1 0.2 0.61 0.01
Mutuality×Reward 1 0.12 0.37 0.00
Dependency×Mutuality×Reward 1 0.03 0.10 0.00
Task-related Communication
Dependency 1 22169.36 2.10 0.02
Mutuality 1 1852.67 0.18 0.00
Reward 1 14804.28 1.40 0.02
Dependency×Mutuality 1 30965.54 2.93 0.03
Dependency×Reward 1 4726.19 0.45 0.01
Mutuality×Reward 1 426.06 0.04 0.00
Dependency×Mutuality×Reward 1 4876.28 0.46 0.01
Note. N = 91groups. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
Table 5.7: ree-way Analysis of Variance for Helpful Behaviours, Intragroup Con ict, and Task-related Com-
munication.
e effect was in the same direction when for both asymmetric and symmetric conditions,
which makes interpretation simple. e average number of helping behaviours is lower in the
low level of dependence condition (M = 52.63, SD = 59.64) and higher in the high level
of dependence condition (M = 133.47, SD = 75.48). us, Hypothesis 1a was supported.
Hypothesis 2a predicted the same relationship between mutuality and helpful behaviours.
But the effect of mutuality was trickier. Although there is a signi cant main effect for mutu-
ality on helpful behaviour (F (1, 83) = 4.97, p < .05, η2 = .056), and the average number
of helpful behaviours increases from asymmetric (M = 78.47, SD = 71.26) to symmetric
dependence (M = 106.43, SD = 84.09), mutuality does not appear to independently affect
helpful behaviours. When in a low level of dependence the number of helpful behaviours are
essentially the same in the asymmetric and symmetric conditions. e results indicate that
symmetry of dependence can only be said to increase helpful behaviours when it is coupled
with a high level of dependence. us, Hypothesis 2a was not supported. e consequences




























Figure 5.4: Interaction of level of dependence by mutuality on helpful behaviours.
Hypothesis 4a predicted that group rewards would lead to more helping behaviours than
individual rewards. ere was a signi cant main effect of the reward manipulation on the
amount of helpful behaviours, F (1, 83) = 14.35, p < .001, η2 = .147. Overall, the average
number of helpful behaviours in the individual reward condition was M = 69.61, SD =
72.34, and in the group reward condition was M = 116.11, SD = 79.02. ere were no
signi cant interactions between reward and level of dependency (F (1, 83) = 1.04, p > .05)
or mutuality (F (1, 83) = 1.00, p > .05), indicating that group rewards increase the amount
of helping behaviours to the same degree in both low and high levels of dependence (Fig-
ure 5.5) and to the same degree in both asymmetric and symmetric dependence (Figure 5.6).























Figure 5.5: Interaction of level of dependence by reward interdependence on helpful behaviours.
Hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 4b dealt with the effects of the manipulations on the level of



























Figure 5.6: Interaction of mutuality by reward interdependence on helpful behaviours.
more intragroup con ict than a low level of dependence. ere was a signi cant main effect
of level of dependence on con ict, F (1, 83) = 4.25, p < .05, η2 = .049, and the effect was
in the direction predicted. Overall, the average con ict in the low level of dependence (M =
1.86, SD = .59) was lower than in the high level of dependence (M = 2.10, SD = .59).
us, Hypothesis 1b was supported.
Hypothesis 2b predicted that symmetric situations would lead to less intragroup con ict
than asymmetric situations. ere was a signi cant main effect of mutuality on intragroup
con ict, F (1, 83) = 7.27, p < .01, η2 = .08. Overall, the average con ict in the asym-
metric condition (M = 2.14, SD = .64) was higher than in the symmetric condition
(M = 1.83, SD = .53). us, Hypothesis 2b was supported.
Hypothesis 4b predicted that group rewards would lead to less con ict than individual
rewards. e effect for the reward manipulation was not signi cant at the α = .05 level,
but was marginally signi cant at the α = .10 level (F (1, 83) = 3.1, p < .10, η2 = .036).
Con ict in the individual reward condition (M = 2.08, SD = .58) was slightly higher
than in the group reward condition (M = 1.88, SD = .61). us, Hypothesis 4b received
partial support.
Hypotheses 1c, 2c, and 4c concerned the effects of the manipulations on the number
of task-related messages sent between the partners. It was hypothesized that a high level of
dependence and group rewards would increase the amount of task-related communication
between partners, and that symmetric situations would result in a lower number of task-
related communications. None of the manipulations had signi cant effects on the number of




e results of the experiment support some aspects of the theory. is chapter will help
explain which parts were supported, which weren’t, and possible reasons why. e experiment
ndings also support and deepen the ndings from the case study. Possible ways to improve
the experiment and theory are considered.
6.1 Experiment discussion
e ndings for the experiment are summarized in the familiar 2x2 presented in Table 6.1.
To simplify the discussion I will discuss each dependent variable in turn.
Mutuality of dependence
Asymmetric Symmetric
Level Low (A) low helping beh. → (B) low helping beh.
of high intragroup con ict lower intragroup con ict
Dependence ↓ ↓
High (C) higher helping beh. → (D) much higher helping beh.
higher intragroup con ict higher intragroup con ict
Table 6.1: Results: e effects of a change in level of dependence and mutuality of dependence
6.1.1 Task-related communication
e most straightforward ndings are those dealing with the number of task-related words
communicated between members of the dyads. Hypotheses 1c and 4c were not supported;
the number of task-related words does not systematically vary due to any of the experimen-
tal manipulations. Re-running the analysis using task-related messages (instead of words)
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did not change the result. is was somewhat surprising because it was assumed that if the
helpee’s expectations increased in strength there would be an corresponding increase in the
need to understand what the helpee wanted, and this would lead to more communications.
Conversely, if the helpee’s expectations were relatively weak, there would be less need to
understand the helpee’s situation, and less communication. Hypothesis 2c argued that sym-
metric situations would tend to reduce the need for communication, but this result also was
not found.
A possible explanation is that the task situation was relatively simple and an increased
need to understand the other’s situation did not require any extra task-related communica-
tion. A secondary explanation is that the communications were different, but not in number
of words or number of messages. Perhaps the communication was different in the content
of the messages. Perhaps situations of high dependence encouraged messages that were more
urgent or intense than did situations of low dependence, or symmetric situations encouraged
less urgent or intense messages than did asymmetric situations. A qualitative data analysis
would be needed to test these revised explanations, or perhaps a mechanism could be added
to the experiment program with which a participant could register intensity of their message.
6.1.2 Intragroup con ict
Intragroup con ict was found to be affected by level of dependence and mutuality of depen-
dence. Signi cantly less con ict was found in the low level of dependence condition, and
more con ict was found in the high level of dependence condition. is nding con rms
Hypothesis 1b. Signi cantly more con ict was found in the asymmetric condition, and less
con ict was found in the symmetric condition. is con rms Hypothesis 2b. ese ndings
support the general theoretical argument proposed in the affordances and balance theory ap-
proach. However the cognitive mechanisms proposed to be operating were not measured,
and thus the speci cs of the theory cannot be supported with the current data. Simply, the
reason for the intragroup con ict was not measured. However, as intragroup con ict was sig-
ni cantly affected by both level and mutuality of dependence, a possible causal mechanism
can be proposed.
It is likely that the argument for situational affordances explains the difference in intra-
group con ict: higher levels of dependence afford not only more helping behaviours between
the help-giver and the help-receiver, but also all type of behaviours. In high levels of depen-
dence the help-giver is afforded more opportunity to affect the help-receiver in general. Some
of the effect is in the form of helpful behaviours, when A hypothetically reduces their cogni-
tive tension by helping B. But some of the effect is less than helpful, when A hypothetically
reduces their cognitive tension by breaking their unit relation with B, and is not helpful.
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is results in B not having their expectations met, causing negative affect towards A which
is captured by the intragroup con ict measure.
In situations of asymmetric dependence, B may perceive A’s ability to affect their task
as an intrusion and hypothetically experiences a mix of “anxiety, insecurity, and mistrust”
(Drigotas et al. 1999; Kelley et al. 2003, p. 257). Asymmetric situations by de nition lead
to a greater power imbalance (Emerson 1962). Mutuality, on the other hand, evens out the
power and control, thereby reducing the negative effects of asymmetric imbalance, resulting
in a “more placid and positive emotional experience (less guilt, anxiety). . . and greater stability
and congeniality” (Rusbult and Van Lange 2003, p. 355). A is hypothetically less inclined to
reduce their cognitive tension by breaking the unit relation, and has a better understanding
of B’s expectation (and vise versa). is results in less negative affect from A to B and B to
A, which is captured by the intragroup con ict measure.
6.1.3 Helpful behaviours
e theory proposed that task interdependence affects helpful behaviours in a two step pro-
cess. First, both level of dependence and mutuality of dependence afford helpful behaviours.
Second, once afforded, both level and mutuality of dependence motivate the helper to per-
form helpful behaviours. But the ndings indicate that this is not entirely accurate.
Level of dependence was found to independently affect helpful behaviours; the low de-
pendence situation decreased the probability of helpful behaviours and the high dependence
situation increased the probability of helpful behaviours. e results con rm Hypothesis 1a.
e effect of mutuality was more complicated. Instead of independently affecting helpful
behaviours, mutuality appears to only affect helpful behaviours in conjunction with a high
level of dependence. In situations of low dependence, there is no difference in the number
of helpful behaviours between asymmetric and symmetric conditions. On the other hand, in
situations of high dependence, the asymmetric structure decreased the probability of helpful
behaviours and the symmetric structure increased the probability of helpful behaviours. is
con rms Hypothesis 3a, but fails to con rm Hypothesis 2a.
is nding clari es our understanding of the role of level and mutuality of dependence.
Level of dependence appears to both afford and motivate helpful behaviours, while mutuality
appears to only motivate helpful behaviours. e explanation of why this is so is speculative,
as the strength of the unit and sentiment relations in A’s cognitive balance structure were not
measured. Nevertheless, the outcome of the theory is supported by the experimental data. In
terms of the theory (see Sections 4.1 and 4.2), symmetric situations hypothetically strengthen
the unit relation between helper and helpee, pUo, and strengthen the mutual understanding
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of the expectations and the social norms supporting that expectation, oLx. But mutuality
does not afford helping behaviour by itself. Only in the presence of the affordances provided
by a high level of dependence does the increased strength of the pUo and oLx relations pro-
vided by symmetric situations translate into an increased probability for helping behaviours.
As mentioned, the preceding explanation is speculative and leaves room for future research
to more carefully measure the underlying constructs.
6.2 Understanding the case study
e Application and Platform groups occupy cell (C) in Table 6.1—Application is asymmet-
rically dependent on Platform, and the level of dependence is quite high. It would appear
at rst that the ndings from the experiment both support and contradict the case study’s
ndings; the case study reports a high amount of intragroup con ict, but does not report a
high number of helping behaviours.
e low number of helpful behaviours observed in the case study can be explained in
four ways. One, the hypothesis that there would be more helpful behaviours is based on
a change from low to high levels of dependence. e case study indicated that the level of
dependence between Application and Platform had almost certainly increased over time. But,
because the case study was conducted at one point in time, we do not know how the amount
of helpfulness had changed. It could be that there actually were more helpful behaviours
between Application and Platform as the level of dependence increased. We cannot know for
sure due to time constraints and without a longitudinal methodology (see Section 2.4.1). A
second explanation could be that there are more of both helpful and unhelpful behaviours in
this high dependence situation, as hypothesized in Section 4.1. A third explanation could be
that unhelpful behaviours had outweighed helpful behaviours due to bias from the interview
questions, or unhelpful behaviours may have been easier to recall and may have made more of
an impact on the interviewee (see Section 2.6.1). e interview methodology was designed to
control bias and recall effects, but they are difficult to eliminate completely (see Section 2.4).
A forth explanation, and perhaps most plausible, is that the situational forces surround-
ing Platform encouraged them to resolve the tension they felt from Application’s expectations
by breaking the unit relation. Due to the way in which the groups were managed at the time
of the study, Platform’s immediate and long-term rewards were not based on how well they
handled Application’s requests. e Company’s institutionalized practices, and software en-
gineering practices in general, encouraged the Platform group to prioritize their own work
and group goals far ahead of those of the groups that depended on them. Together, the sit-
uational forces may have resulted in a higher probability of non-helpful behaviours towards
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Application, which were then cognitively justi ed by Platform. Some justi cations were ob-
served in the interview data: Platform stated that the relationship with Application was just
ne, that there were no serious problems, that Platform was simply too busy and overloaded
to do everything that Application wanted, that there were other groups that Platform needed
to interact with, and that contentious features should just be handed over to the Applica-
tion group. Platform’s perception of their relationship with Application (Section 2.6.1), and
particularly the behaviours that they expected from the Application group (Section 2.6.3),
indicate that Platform didn’t view the relationship to be as crucial as Application did, and
that Application’s expectations were either unreasonable or that Platform had met their obli-
gation already. According to Heider (1958), these justi cations are ways in which a unit
relationship can be turned negative in order to balance the Platform’s unit-sentiment triad
and relieve cognitive tension.
Overall, the case study ndings are strengthened by the experiment ndings. From the
case study ndings alone, it was unclear whether the behaviours between Application and
Platform were idiosyncratic to that particular relationship or those particular people and
their personalities. e case study generated the hypothesis that perhaps some of the dys-
functional interactions could be explained by the way in which the teams were designed to
interact. According to generally accepted software design principles, it would be ideal if Ap-
plication depended entirely on Platform and Platform did not have any task-level dependency
on Application. Asymmetric task-relationships limit circular dependencies and simplify the
development of large-scale software systems (see Section 2.1). e case study could only
suggest the hypothesis that the structure of the task-relationship in uenced the behaviour
observed.
e theory and experiment attempted to answer the questions raised by the case study.
e experiment demonstrated that the way in which the groups were designed to interact
may have itself in uenced how the two teams behaved towards one another. e high level
of asymmetric dependence may have contributed to greater intragroup con ict. And while
greater level of dependence may have encouraged stronger expectations and forces towards
helping, the lack of symmetry in their relationship may have limited the extent to which
those expectations were translated into helpful behaviours.
6.3 Contributions to the literature
I believe that the theory and experiment make a number of contributions to the literature, pri-
marily in clarifying the explanation for a help giver’s prosocial behaviour to their dependents,
and introducing an endogenous explanation for unhelpful behaviour. First, with regards to
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prosocial motivation, the balance theory approach helps explain how the forces arise in the
help giver as a result of their felt responsibility for their dependent (Kiggundu 1981, 1983;
Pearce and Gregersen 1991). is removes the need for power to explain the forces towards
action (Kahn et al. 1964), and the need for the help giver to like their dependent (Grant
2007). Balance theory also helps integrate the social norm explanation for behaviour. Previ-
ously, social norms were used as secondary supporting evidence for why prosocial behaviours
would occur in organizations (e.g., Smith et al. 1983; McNeely and Meglino 1994; Settoon
and Mossholder 2002; Bachrach et al. 2006a). In the balance theory approach taken here,
norms are integral and support the dependent’s expectations, which increase the forces acting
on the helper—not towards helping behaviour directly, but away from the tension and dis-
comfort that arises from breaking the norm (Flynn and Lake 2008). Norms are activated in
the context of the relationship and contribute to the balance (or imbalance) of the situation.
Second, this approach helps explain why helpful behaviours are performed, but also why
unhelpful behaviours are performed. e literature on prosocial organizational behaviours
is, understandably, concerned with the antecedents and consequences of helpful behaviours.
Unhelpful behaviours are rarely if ever explained using the same model. e balance theory
approach views helpful behaviours as one of the possible actions available to a help-giver in
order to relieve the cognitive tension produced by the social expectations of their coworker.
Unhelpful behaviours are another action that would relieve cognitive tension. While this
may seem counterintuitive, from this theoretical view unhelpful behaviours are the result of
the help-giver breaking the unit-relation with their coworker, which balances the help-giver’s
cognitive triad. Unhelpful behaviours are then viewed as a rational response to a situation
where the help-giver is expected to help.
An affordances and balance theory approach also helps to answer a question that is at the
heart of much research into human behaviour. Under completely asymmetric dependence,
where B depends on A, and A does not depend on B at all, why would A help B? Even
further, why would increasing B’s dependence on A cause A to help B more? Social ex-
change explanations of behaviour state that since A has nothing to gain from B, increasing
the dependence would lead to a reduction in helping behaviour (Bowler and Brass 2006). In-
terdependence theory and power and dependence theory would argue the same: the powerful
A, with nothing to gain, would have no reason to help the powerless B (de Jong et al. 2007).
Underlying these organizational theories of human behaviour is the behavioural economics
rational actor model (Gintis 2009), and the assumption that humans act in their own self
interest (Henrich et al. 2005). But behavioural economics experiments, teasing apart every
possible social in uence acting on the participants of their experiments, have demonstrated
that humans do act prosocially (Camerer 2003a; Colman 2003). Others have argued that it
is not prosociality, but instead the in uence of the other’s expectations (Dana et al. 2006).
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Behaviour that appears to be prosocial, and can only be explained using the word prosocial
or other labels like altruism, are instead acts of rational humans. ey are rational humans
trying to satisfy their own needs, with one more condition: that their needs also include the
expectations of others. But the question remains, why and how are expectations transformed
into forces acting on the helper?
An affordance and balance theory approach does not solve this thorny issue conclusively,
but it does offer a little more explanation as to what is happening. Why would A help B?
And when B’s dependence is increased, why would A help B even more? It is possibly
because a situation of higher dependence is a situation that affords more helping behaviour,
and it is a situation that causes B to increase their expectations for help. ose expectations
create a force acting on A to increase their help to B. at force, and the conditions under
which it acts to produce helping behaviour, is explained by balance theory. I believe this
helps sort out the contradictory hypotheses and the inconclusive ndings about the effect of
asymmetric dependence on helping behaviour (Bowler and Brass 2006; de Jong et al. 2007).
6.4 Limitations of the experiment and boundary conditions
e card game experiment attempted to mix the social psychological and behavioural eco-
nomics styles of experimentation. e game was designed to create a task-relationship and
an amount of “groupness,” while satisfying the constraints listed in Section 5.1.3. It was also
designed to have some of the methodological rigour of behavioural economics experiments:
participants were not deceived, were told explicitly all reward conditions, were given the costs
and bene ts of theirs and their partner’s actions, and control questions attempted to ensure
that participants understood the rules and conditions before they were allowed to participate
(see Gintis 2009, pp. 49–52, and Camerer 2003a, pp. 34–42 for a review).
But maybe the experiment did not work as well as possible. e experiment was proba-
bly not “groupy” enough to qualify as a face-valid simulation of what real groups do in real
work situations (e.g., Saavedra et al. 1993; Wageman and Baker 1997; Allen et al. 2003;
Bachrach et al. 2006b). Participants were not face-to-face, their partner was never identi ed,
and they were not completing a work-like task. Yet, it was also too complicated to qualify
as a behavioural economics experiment. In experimental economics terms, the experiment
was testing many “joint hypotheses” at once. Economics experiments are designed to reduce
the number of competing explanations for ndings, yet even very simple experiments can
have joint hypothesis. For example, prisoner dilemma games are testing the joint hypothe-
ses: 1) that players are self-interested (or that they have x amount of social preferences), and
2) that they are playing game-theoretically (Camerer 2003a, p. 48). is means if a player
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does choose to play cooperatively with their partner, the experimenter can not de nitively
claim that this behaviour was a result of a social preference for cooperative behaviour, or
if that person was playing a strategy and purely self-interestedly (that cooperating will earn
them more money in the long run). e ultimatum game had the similar problem, as dis-
cussed in Section 3.3.8. e dictator game removed the element of strategy so that only
the social preference hypothesis was tested.1 Even in the simplest of economic experiments
a researcher can be testing joint hypotheses, and as a result it is often impossible to make
de nitive conclusions from the results.
e card game experiment could be improved in a number of ways to reduce alternative
explanations for the participant behaviour. First, the reward was probably quite weak. e
reward was $20, and was awarded if the participant could get the lowest cost as compared
to 11 or 12 other participants (a “tournament structure”). A participant could not tell how
competitive they were based on their own costs, and a proportion of their costs were random
based on the card distributions. In contrast, the behavioural economics studies are careful to
tie rewards directly to a choice (e.g., Dana et al. 2006), or on a random subset of all choices
made (e.g., Bottom et al. 2006), and the rewards are money which is easy to understand and
always wanted. Camerer (2003a) put it this way:
By inducing value using money payments, the experimenter need rely only on
the assumptions that everybody likes having more money and nobody gets tired
of having more of it. ese are safe assumptions, and substantially safer than
guring out whether somebody is motivated by having their name posted if they
did best (some people might be embarrassed by it), is likely to give up if they
are far behind when payoffs have a tournament structure, and so forth. (If you
know anybody who is tired of getting more money let me know; I’ll take their
leftovers!) (p. 39)
In this way the forces acting on the participants are more carefully controlled and are
acting as intended. In the card game experiment it is difficult to tell how powerful the re-
ward’s force was (due to the reward’s tournament structure). Drawing a card needed to be
personally costly so that helpful behaviours were costly. e lack of powerful force could
have effected the help-giver by making helping behaviours less costly, but it could have also
affected the help-seeker by reducing the strength of their expectations. As a result, the ex-
periment may have been biased towards producing helpful behaviours. In order to improve
1Although we now know that there was an even deeper joint hypothesis: that 1) the player was displaying
a social preference for altruism, or 2) the player was avoiding the discomfort of appearing to violate the other
player’s social expectations.
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this, the experiment would need to tie behaviour directly to monetary reward. Perhaps the
reward payment could be based directly on their total hand cost. Or the experimenter could
give the participants an endowment and observe how helpful they are if it means physically
giving away money they already have, which would invoke loss aversion. It would be useful
to see if strengthening these forces would eliminate the helping behaviour observed in the
results.2
Second, the game lasted 20 rounds, which in retrospect may have been tiring for the
participants. A small fraction of participants sent messages to their partners complaining
they were tired of clicking, or messaged that they were getting bored. On the one hand,
20 rounds reduces the variance in the helpful behaviours dependent variable. Further, more
rounds allowed the help-giver to experience the force of the help-seeker’s expectations and
adjust their behaviour to reduce their tension. On the other hand, and more importantly,
exhaustion or boredom effects could have threatened internal validity. Perhaps the number
of rounds could have been reduced, and coupled with the direct reward proposed above the
situation would have more experimental realism (Aronson et al. 1990, p. 70).
In defence of the experiment, the situation appeared to have enough experimental realism
and the manipulations had enough power to result in signi cant differences in the number
of helpful behaviours and in intragroup con ict. But I believe the experiment could be
improved greatly by strengthening the forces acting on the help-giver and help-receiver.
e limitations of the card game also have to do with properties of the theory which
was tested. In the affordances and balance theory approach being proposed, a number of
steps connect the situation to helping behaviour. One, A perceives themselves and B as
a unit, pUo, which is perhaps increased by a sense of responsibility for their dependent’s
work, group cohesion, or a perceived impact on their dependent’s work. Two, B’s social
expectations, oLx, increase as a result of increased reciprocal interaction, perspective taking,
emphatic concern, and a number of social norms which may be activated in their relationship.
ree, A perceives B’s social expectation to have warrant and support. Four, A perceives
tension in their relationship with B. is tension results from an imbalance in their unit-
sentiment triad: their unit relation with B, pUo, B’s social expectations, oLx, and A’s level
of helping behaviour, pLx. Five, A moves to resolve that tension in one of the ways speci ed
in Section 4.2.2, some of which will be ful lling B’s expectations to behave helpfully. Step
ve is the theoretical consequences of the preceding steps, and we can test it with A’s helpful
2I don’t believe it would eliminate helping completely, but it would certainly reduce the absolute number
helpful behaviours. e question then is whether or not the experimental manipulations would still show an
effect on helping behaviour—which is what we are most interested in, not the absolute number of helpful
behaviours. at is, would the probability of helping behaviours still increase when moving from a low level
of dependence to a high level of dependence? e theory would hypothesize that it would, but this should be
tested experimentally.
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behaviours. Steps one, two, three, and four, on the other hand, are the joint hypotheses being
tested in the card game experiment. Perhaps even other hypotheses are being tested, as in
the case of the ultimatum game above; A could be acting strategically in helping B, instead
of reducing tension felt by an imbalance of their unit-sentiment triad. Future work could
carefully pick apart each of the steps in this process to test how each step responds (if at all) to
task-structure manipulations, norm manipulations, social manipulations such as knowledge
of and repeated games with the help-receiver, and so forth.
6.5 Practical implications
I am hesitant to make any recommendations based on the current work (and who would lis-
ten?). But the case study does highlight one important issue: Application, in its completely
asymmetric relationship with Platform, felt that Platform didn’t understand their point of
view, and didn’t realize the amount of impact they had. Symmetric dependence would al-
most certainly improve that, by making Platform equivalently dependent on Application’s
behaviour, and would presumably encourage perspective taking (Parker and Axtell 2001) and
felt responsibility (Kiggundu 1981). is is obviously a very difficult structural change to
make, and it is unclear whether or not it would be a net bene t; perhaps in software engineer-
ing the unintended consequences of an asymmetric relationship are acceptable, compared to
the technical nightmare of having two teams symmetrically task related on a daily basis. Per-
haps a more realistic intervention would be to encourage perspective taking or other methods
to help Platform understand the effect they have on Application. e extent to which these
are substitutable for true task-related mutuality is a question for further research.
Wageman and Baker (1997) and de Jong et al. (2007) made arguments that reward in-
terdependence might be able to soften the negative impact of task dependence; if two teams
are not structurally encouraged to be helpful towards one another, perhaps increasing the
amount of group rewards for both teams is an easy way of inducing cooperation. e nd-
ings in this study clari ed the contradictions between those studies and the ndings of Allen
et al. (2003). It appears that group rewards do have a positive effect on helpful behaviours.
e boundary conditions on this effect are essentially unknown, though. Will this effect
persist if the experiment were modi ed as suggested above? Although group rewards may
encourage helpful behaviours in the laboratory, real work situations are different; if asym-
metry presents signi cant task-related constraints and incentives to behave self-interestedly
and in con ict, are group rewards a strong enough force to encourage helpful behaviours?
Further, how fair or realistic would it be to Platform to have their rewards based on Appli-
cation’s performance, even if Application is heavily dependent on Application’s work? Such
135
a solution could encounter organizational or even labour relations and legal issues.
6.6 Conclusion
Work teams are often a complicated mess of interconnected, uncertain, shifting dependen-
cies that are only understood in a haphazard and socially constructed way after the fact (Stau-
denmayer 1997). But some interdependencies are relatively stable patterns of dependence,
designed into the system by task requirements. Such is the case for software teams that are
deliberately designed to be asymmetrically dependent in order to minimize code-level depen-
dency loops. For those teams that are shifting and changing and only understood after the
fact, it may be difficult for an observer to causally attribute behaviour to the task-dependence
itself. But for those situations where patterns of interdependence are stable and clear, it is
possible that the task-dependence may itself be a cause of con ict and unhelpful behaviours.
It may also be a cause for cooperation and helpful behaviours. It is important to under-
stand then, in those situations where interdependencies are clear and powerful, how the
task-dependence is in uencing individual behaviour.
e theory and experiment described in this dissertation attempted to explain and demon-
strate how task-dependence caused a change in behaviour. Previous theory had trouble ex-
plaining why, ceteris paribus, a high level of dependence between A and B would lead to
more helpful behaviours from A, when compared to a low level of dependence, especially
in situations where A does not likewise depend on B. e affordance and balance theory
approach explained that in a high level of dependence, and in a symmetrically dependent
situation, B will have high expectations for help, and this causes a set of forces to act on
A motivating them towards helpful behaviours. e experiment demonstrated that a high
level of dependence is necessary for helpful behaviours to increase—without the ability and
opportunity afforded by task-dependence, a high social expectation will have little effect on



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Script and screen captures of the training
video
Every condition:
ank you for participating in this experiment.
I will brie y describe the task you will be given, how your performance will be measured,
and how you can compete to win $20 (Figure B.1).
Figure B.1
You will be paired with another person in this room, but you will not know who it is.
One of you will be “A,” and the other will be “B.” You and your partner will be playing this
card game as a team. In this card game you have a “hand” which can hold two cards. e
two cards in your hand sum up to the total value of your hand (Figure B.2).
You will draw new cards from a deck and choose which cards to keep in your hand. e
deck is lled with Aces through to 10’s, no face cards. Aces are worth 1, 2’s are worth 2, and




For each round, A and B have a goal. e goal for each round is to hit (or go over) the
target number with the two cards in your hand, in the least number of draws. A goes rst.
Once A hits (or goes over) their target, A can send those cards to B. B will use those cards to
reach their own target (Figure B.4).
Figure B.4
B will take the cards sent by A, and then add their own cards in order to hit their target.
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In this case, B takes the 8 sent by A, and now needs 10 more to reach their target. We can call
this ”dependence” – B depends on A in order to reach their goal. Once B reaches their goal,
they can send their cards. If B reaches their goal and sends their cards, the team completes a
successful round (Figure B.5).
Figure B.5
However, cards have a cost, and you have a budget. Every card that A draws costs 1, and
brings A closer to the budget limit. Here, A has reached the goal of 8 using 6 cards, which is
well below their budget of 25. If a player cannot reach their goal within their budget, they
will need to give up the round, and both team members will fail that round (Figure B.6).
Figure B.6
You may be wondering, What cards are in the deck? e cards that you draw will change,
based on how many cards you have already drawn that round. e rst ve cards that you
draw will be Ace’s, 2’s, or 3’s. at is the deck for the rst ve draws. e probability of
getting each card is different. You have a 60% chance of getting an A, a 25% chance of
getting a 2, and a 15% chance of getting a 3. It is harder to get higher cards.
e next ve cards that you draw will be 2’s, 3’s, or 4’s. is is the deck for your 6th to
10th cards. Just like before, it is easier to get lower cards, and harder to get higher cards.
For draw numbers 11 to 15, that is, for the 11th through 15th card that you draw, the
cards will be 3s, 4s, and 5s. Draw numbers 16 to 20, 21 to 25, and 26 to 30 will give you
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higher numbered cards. For example, if you draw your 26th card, you are guaranteed to get
a 6, a 7, or an 8. Your handout sheet has a summary of the card distributions which you can
reference during the game (Figure B.7).
Figure B.7
Asymmetric Condition:
What happens after round 1?
In round 1, when A reaches their goal they send their cards to B. B uses those cards to
try to reach their goal. B depends on A. B sends their cards, and the team has a success.
In round 2, the sequence simply repeats. A sends their cards to B, which means B depends
on A. B sends their cards for a team success.
Round 3 is the same, and so on. For every round in the game, A sends their cards to B,
and B uses those cards to try to reach their goal.
Symmetric Condition:
What happens after round 1?
In round 1, when A reaches their goal they send their cards to B. B uses those cards to
try to reach their goal. B depends on A. B sends their cards, and the team has a success.
In round 2, the sequence is reversed. is time B starts rst. B reaches their goal and
sends their cards to A. A uses those cards to try to reach their goal. In other words, this time
A depends on B. A sends their cards, and the team has a success.
In round 3, the sequence is reversed. A starts rst, and sends their cards to B. B sends
their cards for a team success.
In round 4, the sequence is reversed again. is time B starts, and A depends on B. In
round 5, it is revered. e sequence alternates for every round - rst B depends on A, then




at concludes the summary of your task. Now we will go through how your performance
will be measured, and how you can win $20 (Figure B.9).
Figure B.9
Individual Reward Condition:
You will be measured by how many cards you draw. Cards are not free; each card you draw
will cost 1. is is your only performance measure.
For example, even if your partner fails a round, and your team is unable to complete a
successful round, will be measured only by the cost of the cards you drew. In other words,
there is no punishment for your team failing a round.
For example, suppose it costs A 12 to get 2 cards, and A sends their cards to B. However,
using those cards, B is unable to reach their goal. B’s cost for that round will be their full
budget for that round.
Suppose A gave up their round. eir cost is the budget for that round. B did not draw
any cards that round, therefore their cost is 0, and their average cost will be unchanged. In
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summary, it is only the number of cards you draw that will affect your average cost, and that
will affect your ability to win the competition.
Group Reward Condition:
You will be measured by a combination of how many cards you draw and how many successful
rounds your team can complete. Cards are not free; each card you draw will cost 1. Also,
your team’s success will affect your performance, because a failed round will cost 15. Both
team mates are affected by the team’s performance.
For example, suppose it costs A 12 to get two cards, and A sends their cards to B. However,
using those cards, B is unable to reach their goal. B’s cost for that round will be their full
budget for that round. And because the team failed, both team members are charged an
additional 15 (Figure B.10).
Figure B.10
Suppose A gave up their round. eir cost is their budget for that round. B did not
draw any cards that round, therefore their cost is 0. And because the team failed, both team
members are charged an additional 15. In this way, failing a round will affect your average




After 10 rounds you will be able to communicate with your partner using an instant mes-
senger system built into the experiment program.
Who am I in competition with?
Since A’s and B’s are in different situations, you won’t be competing with your team mate.
Instead, you will be competing with the other participants in the same situation as you. So
all A’s will compete, and all B’s will compete.
For example, after the game ends we will rank all the A’s. We will rank everyone based
on their average cost for all rounds. e person in the number 1 spot will be the one with
the lowest average cost. e person who drew the fewest cards will win the $20 prize (Fig-
ure B.12).
Figure B.12
We’ve now seen What the task is, and How your performance will be measured. Let’s
now look at:
How to use the Program
Let’s start with A. e program is very simple, with most of the space taken up with
information that you can use to judge how well you’re doing in the game. To the right we
have the instant message communication that you’ll be able to use after the 10th round. On
the bottom there is a status bar for messages from the server. e top right shows your current
card, and the top centre shows your hand. A can Draw a new card, and then has the option
of moving that card to their hand, discarding the current card, and giving up the round (we
won’t do that unless we can’t reach the goal and we’ve run out of budget). I will move this
card to the hand to show how it’s done. en we’ll draw some more cards, and move them
into the hand. You can see that the program gives us the total of the Hand, and whether or
not we’ve reached the goal. Obviously we haven’t reached our goal yet, so we’ll draw some
more cards. As we’re drawing cards we can see ”this round’s cost” is increasing. If we hit our
budget, and we haven’t reached our goal, then we’ll have to give up. Once we have a card
that we’d like to swap, we can discard one of the cards in our hand, that frees up a space, and
we can move the current card into our hand. We can draw some more cards until we have
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another card we want to keep. Now we’ve reached our target and the ”send cards” button is
now active, showing that we can send our cards to our partner.
Here is an important aspect of the game. A is not forced to send the cards, even though
they have reached their target. If they wish, they may continue to draw cards. A may wish
to do this in order to get a higher hand total, which I’ll try to do now. Notice that while I’m
doing this, the cost for this round is increasing. So getting a higher hand total to send to B
is costing A. Now that A has a higher total, as you can see we’ve exceeded the goal, we can
send the cards to B (Figure B.13).
Figure B.13
Let’s move to B now. B will receive the following message: you have been sent these
cards. Your goal is <> so your target is now <> (Figure B.14).
Figure B.14
B pressed OK, and we can see that they now have the same task. B must now try to reach
their goal with the least number of cards, and within their budget. We’ve done this now with
<> cost, the hand total meets our target, and we can send these cards. We have a successful
round, and the next round can begin. at is how this game is played (Figure B.15).
After the fth round of play you will be able to communicate with your partner. You
can communicate anything you wish, as many times as you wish. We only ask that you not
reveal your name or your identity to your partner.
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Figure B.15
Summary - Individual Reward:
In summary, please remember the following points.
• ere are 20 rounds in the game, total.
• You will be able to communicate with your partner after 10 rounds.
• You are not in competition with your partner. is means that you both could win
the $20 prize, if you both do well enough.
• For performance measurement, only your cost matters. Your average cost will not be
affected if your team fails a round.
• And nally, the lowest average cost will win the $20 prize.
Good luck.
Summary - Group Reward:
In summary, please remember the following points (Figure B.16).
• ere are 20 rounds in the game, total.
• You will be able to communicate with your partner after 10 rounds.
• You are not in competition with your partner. is means that you both could win
the $20 prize, if you both do well enough.
• For performance measurement, teamwork matters. A penalty of 15 will be added to
your cost for every failed round for your team.






Screen capture of control questions
Figure C.1: Screen capture of control questions.
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